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INTRODUCTION
WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AS INTEGRAL 
TO UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Wollstonecraft and Mill: Two Watersheds 
for the Idea of Women’s Human Rights
The idea of women’s human rights is the view that women are 
entitled to equal rights with men because of the sexes’ shared sta-
tus as human beings. Mary Wollstonecraft fi rst and John Stuart Mill 
after her were the primary philosophical architects of this view. 
Wollstonecraft developed a rational theological justifi cation for the 
idea that women held equal rights alongside men, while Mill built a 
secular liberal utilitarian foundation for the same argument. Each 
of these watershed contributions to theories of women’s human 
rights—the fi rst religious, the second secular—is best understood 
as emerging from a sequential (if often implicit) dialogue. Looking 
backward, this dialogue moved signifi cantly beyond past traditions 
of thought concerning the rights of persons, which had been biased 
toward, and even exclusively focused upon, men. Going forward, 
their international reception by both Western and non-Western in-
tellectuals  ensured that Wollstonecraft and Mill have shaped debates 
about women’s human rights on a global scale. There have been 
many dozens of thinkers and activists from around the world who 
helped to form this powerful political concept, in part through a 
dialogue with these two innovative schools of thought.
In order to argue for the human rights of women, Wollstonecraft, 
Mill, and their international interlocutors were forced to reconceive 
the notion of human rights itself. They realized that the idea of hu-
man rights could not be universal—that is, apply equally to each 
and every human being—without the explicit inclusion of women, 
or “half the human race.” Without such universal coverage for men 
and women alike, the idea of human rights would not be coherent, 
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let alone just. Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s joint reconceptualization 
of human rights undermined the idea of the patriarchal family and 
its traditional rationalizations: for until the family underwent an 
egalitarian transformation, human rights would not be available to 
women. Their shared understanding of universal human rights also 
threatened to destabilize a range of patriarchal institutions and prac-
tices related to marriage, education, law, government, and political 
economy. Given its global reach—actual and potential—the idea of 
women’s human rights should be understood as a central concept for 
modern political philosophy. Yet its intellectual history has largely 
been untold until now.1
Defi ning Women’s Human Rights
Before we can understand or even trace the intellectual history of 
the idea of women’s human rights as rooted in Wollstonecraft, Mill, 
and their global readership, we need to have a grasp of the concept’s 
more recent defi nition in world politics and international law. The 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized “the equal 
rights of men and women” in its preamble. Yet the declaration’s only 
other specifi c mention of women, in article 16, strongly associated 
them with their traditional reproductive roles within marriage and 
the family: “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due 
to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found 
a family.” Second-wave feminists underscored the moral problems 
with the marginalized and domesticated status of women within ap-
peals to universal human rights after World War II. Women’s rights 
were not typically seen as integral to a general set of human rights to 
which women were entitled on the basis of their humanity but rather 
were seen as rights that they possessed on the basis of their gender 
roles and sexual functions. In her 1966 Statement of Purpose for the 
National Organization for Women, Betty Friedan called for a re-
newed attention “to the proposition that women, fi rst and foremost, 
are human beings, who, like all other people in our society, must 
have the chance to develop their fullest human potential.”2
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After the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1979, the idea of women’s hu-
man rights became a cornerstone of United Nations development 
programs, state constitutions, and democratic social movements 
around the globe. Charlotte Bunch contributed to making the idea 
into a feminist idiom, through her advisory roles in the United Na-
tions and her founding of a research institute on women and global 
leadership at Rutgers University in 1989. The same year, feminist 
activists from the Philippines-based GABRIELA women’s coalition 
had inspired her with the slogan “women’s rights are human rights.” 
In a 1990 article, Bunch proposed that theorists and policy mak-
ers take a more “creative” approach to human rights. The ongoing 
“feminist transformation of human rights,” if more broadly adopted, 
could challenge the “narrow” legal defi nition of human rights so that 
“women’s lives” would be recognized as an integral part of the hu-
man experience that international law sought to protect.3
Held in June 1993, the United Nations’ World Conference on Hu-
man Rights built on the rising international view that women’s rights 
are a kind of human rights. Participants in the conference produced 
the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights. The Vienna Declaration 
represented a milestone for human rights and for feminism because 
of its defi nition of the term “human rights of women” for interna-
tional law. The document used the term “human rights of women” 
in two interrelated ways. First, it meant women’s shared rights with 
men, such as nourishment, safety, and education. As a corollary, it 
entailed women’s equal access to these human rights, without gender 
discrimination. Second, it meant women’s rights as human beings to 
be free from “gender-specifi c abuses” such as “murder, systematic 
rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy,” as was tragically preva-
lent in “situations of armed confl ict.”4
The fi rst branch of the Vienna Declaration’s defi nition of women’s 
human rights presented those rights as equally shared with men, on 
the basis of their shared and equal status as human beings. As stated 
in article 1, “The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an 
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inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human rights.” 
This conception of women’s human rights was identical to the con-
ception of universal human rights promulgated by the Universal 
Declaration in 1948. Its rhetorical formulation, however, aimed to 
remind people that women are human like men and therefore are 
entitled to share the same basic human rights as men.5
An offshoot of this fi rst defi nition of women’s human rights 
specifi ed a fundamental right to nondiscrimination. Reinforcing 
 CEDAW, the Vienna Declaration called for the “elimination of gen-
der bias in the administration of justice” as one of the human rights 
to which both women and men were entitled. This universalistic le-
gal principle of nondiscrimination, if implemented, would allow for 
the practical possibility of equal access to the human rights shared 
between the sexes. This principle had to be implemented in a way 
that respected the equality of men and women in order to realize 
its objective of ensuring their equal access to human rights such as 
nourishment and education.6
The second branch of the Vienna Declaration’s defi nition of 
 women’s human rights did not dwell on abstract issues of justice, such 
as defi ning equality of rights and access to them, but concentrated 
rather on concrete issues of injustice. In particular, it focused on rem-
edying the gender-specifi c injustices women had faced because they 
had historically been denied both entitlement and access to universal 
human rights. To address these gender-specifi c injustices, the univer-
salistic concept of women’s human rights had to be applied in a way 
that recognized the fact that women on the whole had typically faced 
particular kinds of human rights violations. The Vienna Declaration 
specifi ed sexual violence as the main and most troubling example of 
a human rights violation that affected women more than men. Inde-
pendent of which sex was the victim, such violations of human rights 
were wrong. Yet the differences in how sexual violence affected men 
and women were real and thus relevant for future lawmaking. Be-
cause they had been disproportionately subjected to sexual violence, 
women around the globe had an urgent need for new laws and poli-
cies that explicitly protected their gender against further violations 
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of their human rights to bodily integrity, sexual choice and expres-
sion, personal security, and, most important, life itself.7
Taken together, the two branches of the Vienna Declaration’s def-
inition of women’s human rights raise a paradox. How can women’s 
human rights, such as the right not to be raped, be both universal in 
scope and particular to women? Put another way, how can human 
rights function as absolute moral standards at the same time as they 
are tailored to address contingencies of gender, culture, time, and 
place?
A resolution to this paradox is implicit in the Vienna Declaration’s 
two-branch approach to defi ning women’s human rights. Imagine the 
two branches of the defi nition of women’s human rights as springing 
from their roots in the Universal Declaration, especially its pream-
ble’s statement of “the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family.” With this image in mind, the right not to be raped 
may be categorized under the branch of shared and equal human rights 
for men and women as well as under the branch of gender-specifi c hu-
man rights for women. Because both kinds of women’s human rights 
are derivative from universal human rights, the right not to be raped is 
ultimately a universal human right even if particular laws and policies 
at any given time or place focus on women’s special and urgent need 
for its assurance. The two-part structure of the legal defi nition of 
women’s human rights suits its application to the concrete complexi-
ties of politics and law, including the global problem of discrimina-
tion against women and how it intersects with other dangerous preju-
dices. The internal complexity of the idea also suggests its interest for 
abstract debates in moral, political, and feminist philosophy, such as 
the relationship between the universal and the particular, the absolute 
and the relative, as well as conceptions of equality and difference.8
Tracing a Genealogy of Women’s Human Rights: 
Wollstonecraft, Mill, and Beyond
The philosophical roots of this international legal defi nition of 
women’s human rights can indeed be traced long before the United 
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Nations’ human rights declarations of 1993 and 1948. Through this 
fi rst book-length comparative study of the political theories of Woll-
stonecraft (1759–97) and Mill (1806–73), I argue that they repre-
sent two watershed moments—the former religious and the latter 
secular—in the development of this infl uential modern political 
concept. The concept of women’s human rights grew not from the 
heavily invoked, revolutionary-era idea of the “rights of man” but 
rather from the more radical idea of the “rights of woman.” The 
introduction of the concept of the rights of woman amid the late 
eighteenth-century European and American discourses on “natural 
rights” and the “rights of man” made the emergent idea of “human 
rights” universal in scope, applying to each and every human. As 
Wollstonecraft argued in 1792, it was necessary to revise the con-
stitution of the French republic to include “the rights of woman” in 
order to realize “justice for one half of the human race.” Without 
the rights of woman, the rights of man demanded by the French 
revolutionaries could merely be understood as rights for the male 
half of the human species.9
Her studied and sympathetic attention to the particular, gender-
based injustices that faced women of her time led Wollstonecraft to 
theorize the necessity of including women in any universalistic and 
egalitarian defi nition of what she called “the rights of humanity.” 
Her friend Thomas Paine had once used the term “human rights” 
in his 1792 treatise The Rights of Man, Part the Second, but he did not 
dwell on the issue of the rights of woman. Wollstonecraft’s signal 
contribution to political theory was to systematically explain why 
any such concept of the “rights of humanity” or “human rights” 
must refer equally and explicitly to both women and men, girls and 
boys in order to be universalistic in both its conceptual scope and 
its potential applications. Other prominent women’s rights advo-
cates from the late eighteenth century—such as French revolution-
aries Nicolas de Condorcet and Olympe de Gouges as well as the 
pseudonymous “Sophia” before them in England—had also argued 
for the equal rights of men and women. Unlike these shorter es-
says, Wollstonecraft’s 1792 book A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
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comprehensively treated the questions of why and how the sexes 
should have equal rights in all domains of human life. Translated into 
French, Spanish, German, Dutch, Danish, and Czech, and published 
in multiple English editions, Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman also 
decisively impacted the terms of the international philosophical and 
political debates on women’s rights for roughly the fi rst century after 
its debut in London.10
Despite Wollstonecraft’s signifi cance as a systematic theorist of 
why women’s rights are integral to universal human rights, philo-
sophical genealogies of the concept of women’s human rights have 
typically reached only as far back as Mill’s 1869 book The Subjec-
tion of Women. As the fi rst major secular philosopher of women’s 
human rights, Mill exerted an expansive infl uence in the twentieth 
century—especially on liberal political theorists such as John Rawls, 
Susan Okin, and Martha Nussbaum—but his infl uence meant that 
the history of the idea was often cut short. I begin with Wollstone-
craft, because her Rights of Woman was the fi rst internationally re-
nowned philosophical treatise to analytically address women’s rights 
among the radical political questions raised by the French Revolu-
tion. Prior to Mill, Wollstonecraft was the most signifi cant feminist 
political philosopher and icon in the Atlantic world and its colonies, 
as much for as despite her scandalous reputation as a sexual radical. 
Mill’s Subjection of Women was published in twenty-six non-English 
editions, seventeen countries, twelve European languages, and three 
non-European languages between 1869 and 1928. The global popu-
larity of The Subjection of Women gave it even greater power than the 
Rights of Woman to inform both Western and non-Western thinkers’ 
approaches to defending the human rights of women.11
By approaching the question of the evolution of women’s hu-
man rights through the genre of philosophical genealogy, I follow 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (1887) in method 
and intent. Nietzsche sketched the development of the modern West-
ern ideas of good and evil through their transformations in ancient 
Greek, Christian, and modern European culture. He did not aim to 
provide a comprehensive, uncritical, or dispassionate  narrative of the 
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evolution of Western morality. Rather, he sought to tell a conceptual 
story of how these ideas arose and were transformed by larger cul-
tural and political trends such as religion and democracy. Moreover, 
he sketched the development of these values into order to spur the 
questioning of them. Similarly, my objective is to reveal the major 
contours of the philosophical development and reception of women’s 
human rights. By connecting the intellectual history of the past with 
the politics of the present, such a genealogy instigates moral debate 
on the idea in question.
In any philosophical genealogy written in the spirit of Nietzsche, 
the author ought to acknowledge her own normative philosophical 
commitments. This honesty of perspective allows for the story (in 
this case, the origins and development of women’s human rights) to 
unfold in a way that more fully engages the issues it raises, including 
those raised by such normative commitments. Some of my commit-
ments lie with the feminist liberal tradition. Feminist liberalism is a 
family of philosophical approaches to the problem of women’s sub-
jection that prioritize women’s and gender issues (including women’s 
rights to equal educational, employment, and political opportunities 
alongside men) among its other liberal democratic political com-
mitments (such as legitimate representative government and social 
justice for the poor and marginalized). Feminist liberalism has been 
critical of liberalism, because the latter alone does not always fulfi ll 
its own egalitarian principles of justice with respect to women, in 
theory or in practice.12
At the same time as Marxism, psychoanalysis, and existentialism 
inspired a variety of feminist philosophical alternatives to the school 
of Wollstonecraft and Mill, feminist liberalism came to be widely 
critiqued over the course of the twentieth century. Wollstonecraft 
and Mill became scapegoats for such criticism, functioning as one-
dimensional caricatures of feminist liberalism for feminists and non-
feminists alike. The stridency on the feminist side was especially 
strong. For both radical feminists such as Zillah Eisenstein and con-
servative feminists such as Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, “liberal femi-
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nism” was a negative yet apt epithet for the tradition, as exemplifi ed 
by Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman. From both the right and the 
left, the pejorative use of the term “liberal feminist” neatly captured 
the despised individualistic, rationalistic, and bourgeois aspects of 
Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s political thought.13
Such critiques have assumed, however, that Wollstonecraft, Mill, 
and their followers are primarily liberals and secondarily femi-
nists. Paying attention to their defi ning contributions to the idea of 
 women’s human rights allows us to develop a counterinterpretation of 
their legacies for feminism today. Wollstonecraft and Mill exercised 
a critical style of feminist inquiry into the value of liberal ideas for 
women, which ultimately put feminism fi rst and liberalism second. 
Liberalism had to meet certain feminist standards of justice—such 
as the actual guarantee of equal human rights for the sexes—in order 
to realize its own basic moral principles. In Nussbaum’s formulation, 
these liberal principles could be stated most generally as (1) recog-
nizing the “equal dignity of persons,” (2) respecting the power of 
“moral choice” within each person, and (3) ensuring the consequent 
right of each person to fair treatment by society at large. Nussbaum 
further argued that feminist criticism had the potential to transform 
liberalism in a way that made it “more deeply consistent with its own 
most foundational ideas.”14
Fundamentally, I also share Okin’s feminist liberal conception of 
the integral place of women’s rights within a universal and egalitar-
ian conception of human rights. As Okin wrote in 1998, fi ve years 
after the Vienna Declaration, “The male bias of human rights think-
ing and its priorities had to change in order for women’s rights to 
be fully recognized as human rights.” By male bias, she meant the 
historic tendency for male-dominated societies to perpetuate legal 
and cultural norms that discriminate in favor of men against women. 
Similarly to Mill in chapter 1 of his Subjection of Women, she acknowl-
edged the practical necessity of confronting the fact of male bias in 
public opinion about women’s rights. As Mill conceded in the open-
ing pages of his argument, “I am willing to accept the unfavorable 
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conditions which the prejudice assigns to me.” He consequently ad-
mitted that the “burthen of proof” was upon him to demonstrate 
women’s desert of equal rights with men, and that society would be 
better off for granting them. More than a century later, Okin fol-
lowed a similar strategy in her women’s human rights advocacy. The 
male-biased presumption against women’s rights had to be exposed, 
analyzed, and proven to be logically inconsistent with any concept of 
universal human rights, before public opinion could change.15
Although male bias posed a serious obstacle to the recognition 
of women’s rights as human rights, it was hardly the only prejudice 
to which human rights discourse was prone. Cultural biases, rooted 
in racism, nationalism, and classism, often intersected with sexism. 
Together, such prejudices produced even more complex, and of-
ten seemingly insurmountable, barriers to broad understanding of 
women’s rights as a kind of human rights. For example, Wollstone-
craft and Mill regularly appealed to a Western European standard 
of women’s progress that presumed the comparatively lesser status 
of women in non–Western European cultures, particularly among 
Muslim and Hindu peoples. Although Wollstonecraft and Mill ar-
gued for the human rights of women and men in a universal sense, 
their Eurocentric prejudices compromised the global scope of their 
abstract defi nitions of women’s human rights when applied in rhe-
torical practice.
Looking back at the problem of cultural bias in Wollstonecraft and 
Mill, I share the contemporary postcolonial feminist theorist Inder-
pal Grewal’s ethical concerns with such Western-biased uses of the 
idea of women’s human rights. In 1999, Grewal set forth a post-
colonial model for assessing the moral ambiguities of the concept 
of women’s human rights, particularly as it applies to non-Western 
cultures. Grewal contended that the Vienna Declaration masked the 
imperial dimension of the idea of women’s human rights with its ap-
pealing language of universal human values. Although she supported 
the idea that feminism ought to be international in its scope and 
goals, she was skeptical of the view that the United Nations’ “hu-
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man rights regime” was actually representative of the interests and 
needs of women in the developing world. Rather, the United Na-
tions’ human rights declarations were a product of complex geopo-
litical systems that reifi ed inequalities of power across national, class, 
ethnic, religious, and gender lines. The result was an approach to 
women’s human rights that privileged the perspectives and interests 
of the West against those of the rest of the world, most especially the 
postcolonial and developing world. Focusing on India, Grewal as-
sessed how universalistic human rights discourse did not address the 
particular—culturally rooted, religiously based, nationally driven, 
and economically sustained—problems that faced women of her an-
cestral nation. Instead, universalistic human rights discourse had the 
tendency to treat women’s problems homogenously, and to use an 
implicitly or explicitly Western liberal standard of justice in attempts 
to address abuses of them.16
This book brings together Okin’s concern with confronting male 
bias and Grewal’s concern with tackling cultural bias in the defi ni-
tion of women’s human rights. My primary aim is to explain how 
a revised and internationalized theory of women’s human rights, 
grown out of Wollstonecraft and Mill but stripped of their Eurocen-
tric biases, is a valuable contribution to thinking about universal hu-
man rights today. I understand this theory of women’s human rights 
to be a foundational plank of feminist liberalism.
Indeed, contemporary feminist liberals have connected their egal-
itarian theories of justice to the tradition rooted in Wollstonecraft 
and Mill. More important, they have seen the enduring relevance 
of this school of thought for addressing grave problems of global 
justice today. I follow Amartya Sen, Nussbaum, and their philo-
sophical mentor Rawls in understanding global justice as the quest 
for social justice— or the realization of human rights, as well as fair 
and nondiscriminatory access to other public goods—at the interna-
tional or transnational level. Sen, for example, has recently treated 
the Rights of Woman as a philosophical antecedent for his social jus-
tice theory, especially the idea that women across the world would be 
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 empowered by their societies to be “active agents of change” if they 
were granted the basic freedom and rights necessary for their own 
self-development.17
I have written this genealogy in the spirit of Sen’s recovery of 
Wollstonecraft as a foundation for theorizing global justice in a cos-
mopolitan way. By cosmopolitan, I mean attempts to think globally 
that are respectful to both a core set of universal human values and 
relational differences within and across cultures. The Wollstonecraft-
ian strand of cosmopolitanism prioritizes universal human rights, 
 especially the basic right to agency itself, yet subsequently examines 
how gender and other cultural differences affect the differential and 
unjust treatment of women within and across societies. The inter-
rogation of such injustices paves the way for further allegations, or 
aspirational claims, of women’s need for human rights in law, policy, 
and culture. According to Sen, such allegations derive their creative 
force from their imaginative character. By alleging a human right 
for women that does not yet exist in practice, an advocate may open 
up new vistas of thought on what human rights could and should be 
in the future. For Sen as for Bunch before him, such creative, femi-
nist transformations of human rights depend upon far-seeing and 
often courageous political demands on behalf of women’s “agency 
and well-being.”18
Feminist theory has become known for its diversity of approaches 
to conceptualizing and understanding the thorny problems of so-
cial justice that face women. Even with the plentiful divisions within 
contemporary feminist theory, the widely accepted twentieth-
 century social scientifi c distinction between gender and sex has pro-
duced an important conceptual overlap across many of its schools of 
thought. This gender-sex distinction draws a line between socially 
constructed gender roles and the biologically based sexual differ-
ences that manifest across individuals in the human species. Gender 
roles are assigned, performed, and sometimes subverted within so-
cial contexts, and are often culturally specifi c. Sexual differences are 
understood as rooted in the physiology of the body and its genetics. 
In the words of the physical anthropologist Agustín Fuentes, “Sex 
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is a biological state that is measured via chromosomal content and a 
variety of physiological and developmental measures. Gender is the 
roles, expectations and perceptions that a given society has for the 
sexes.” The upshot of this distinction is that gender roles are under-
stood as products of human society, its cultures, and its economic 
and political systems, and as such, may be distinguished from sex 
understood in biological or genetic terms.19
Teasing out the ways that gender roles are symbolically and in-
stitutionally associated with sex within human cultures, yet are not 
in fact dependent on sex, has become a core theoretical project of 
feminism. One of the most infl uential examples of this project was 
Wollstonecraft’s rejection of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s thesis that girls 
are by nature inclined to play with dolls and admire their looks in the 
mirror. For her, this was a classic case of a male theorist who mistook 
the effects of a male-dominated culture for its causes. Breaking a new 
path for male feminist philosophers, Mill made the related point that 
those who believe “the inequality of rights between men and women 
has no other source than the law of the strongest” conveniently 
ignored that the rule of law had institutionalized such relations of 
domination. He pointedly asked: “But was there ever any domina-
tion which did not appear natural to those who possessed it?”20
This genealogy of women’s human rights builds on the gender-sex 
distinction, conceptualizing gender alongside race, ethnicity, class, 
religion, and nationality as identity traits that are sculpted within 
human cultures. Although I interpret Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s 
feminist theories of human development as approaching remark-
ably close to the contemporary social scientifi c distinction between 
gender and sex, I also examine how Wollstonecraft and Mill were 
not entirely thorough in exposing the cultural contingencies that 
fashioned religion, class, and nationality. This tendency in their po-
litical theories informed their—sometimes unrefl ective, sometimes 
purposive, but always paradoxical and troubling—perpetuation of 
their British culture’s prevalent stereotypes of non-Western, non-
Christian peoples, especially Muslims and Hindus, in their argu-
ments for women’s human rights. Although Wollstonecraft and Mill 
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 technically  understood that male bias was a kind of artifi cial cultural 
bias that could be gradually transformed through public criticism, 
they did not subject their Eurocentric prejudices to the same rigor-
ous critique. For this reason, I draw a distinction between male bias 
and cultural bias in my analysis of their writings, while acknowledg-
ing that they, strictly speaking, categorized the former as a subset of 
the latter in their respective political theories.
By looking at an intellectually and culturally diverse array of re-
sponses to Wollstonecraft and Mill, we see how a range of politi-
cal thinkers have responded to their arguments for women’s human 
rights as well as their rhetorical reliance on negative cultural stereo-
types. Mill’s liberal utilitarianism made his arguments easy to adapt 
in other cultures and religions, as it did not make metaphysical de-
mands on his readers. On the other hand, it was the resonance of 
Wollstonecraft’s brand of rational (and radical) Christian dissent that 
made her arguments and rhetoric for women’s human rights imme-
diately infl uential in the early feminist abolitionist movement, espe-
cially among Unitarians in Britain and Quakers in the United States. 
Her metaphysical and religious orientation did not lend itself to po-
litical and cultural adaptation beyond the transatlantic popularity of 
rational dissenting Protestantism in the fi rst half of the nineteenth 
century, however.
Mill thus eclipsed Wollstonecraft as a philosophical source for 
women’s human rights arguments at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, as evidenced by his spirited global reception on the woman 
question from political magazines in Meiji Japan to parliaments from 
New Zealand to the Southern Cone. By the time an international 
group of political representatives collaborated to produce the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the language of human 
rights had been secularized. This genealogy outlines how the creative 
and critical adoption of Mill’s liberal utilitarianism by a variety of in-
tellectuals from around the globe aided the secularization of the idea 
of universal human rights. It also illustrates some of the enduring 
ethical problems with this secular trend in human rights discourse—
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including pervasive cultural insensitivity to non–Western European 
religious practices and prejudicial Western assumptions about the 
backwardness of such religions on gender issues.21
To better grapple with these ethical issues surrounding the cul-
tural biases of women’s human rights advocates, I attend to the social 
scientifi c distinction between “insider” and “outsider” perspectives 
on cultures. Following the work of Brooke Ackerly, I take the insider 
perspective to be a point of view held by a researcher who studies the 
community or culture to which she at least partly affi liates herself. 
The outsider perspective is the obverse: a point of view held by a 
researcher who studies a community or culture to which she does 
not affi liate herself. Affi liation may be internal (holding at least some 
beliefs of the group) and/or external (expressing outward signs of 
belonging at least to the margins of the group). Building on the femi-
nist standpoint theory of Patricia Hill Collins, Ackerly has advanced 
a third category, what she terms the “multi-sited critic,” a point of 
view that bridges these insider and outsider perspectives. The multi-
sited critic is a researcher who self-identifi es as bridging several cul-
tural sites and self-consciously uses a variety of insider and outsider 
perspectives in studying the value of the practices of these groups 
and their belief systems. The diffi culty of achieving this multisited 
or multisided perspective in practice does not compromise its value 
as a normative ideal to which people may aspire in both their private 
lives and their public work.22
Throughout, I often read Wollstonecraft as embodying the in-
sider perspective of a woman of faith who has faced patriarchal in-
justice partly due to her Christian culture, yet enacted an immanent 
and personally compelling critique of this oppression from within 
her community. I also tend to read Mill as a kind of outsider social 
scientist. As a man, he stood outside the direct experience of patriar-
chal oppression by virtue of his gender, but witnessed the suffering 
it caused the women in his life and felt the pain it indirectly brought 
upon him. Mill sought to comparatively study the global phenom-
enon of patriarchy in order to diagnose its pathologies and prescribe 
Y6872.indb   15 1/6/16   10:37:58 AM
I N T R O D U C T I O N
16
its social remedies, so as to remove it as an obstacle to happiness. On 
the other hand, both Wollstonecraft and Mill spoke to the ethical 
questions of why, when, and how people should strive to bridge these 
insider and outsider perspectives in human rights advocacy. They 
advanced reasons for achieving, partly or fully, a multisited point of 
view on how different cultures infl uence the moral formulation and 
political dissemination of women’s human rights.
One fi nal methodological caveat: this book provides an interna-
tional philosophical genealogy of the concept of women’s human 
rights, not a defi nitive causal story about how Wollstonecraft and 
Mill drove the development of this idea beyond philosophy and 
in its institutionalization in law and politics. The latter cannot be 
demonstrated with any certainty, but the former can be sketched— 
historically and philosophically—in a way that I hope will be pro-
ductive and informative for scholars in humanistic and social scien-
tifi c disciplines. This genealogy is comparative on two levels: fi rst, it 
identifi es and analyzes the important similarities and differences be-
tween Wollstonecraft’s theory of women’s human rights and Mill’s; 
second, it looks at a range of non–Western European responses to 
these watershed theories as a way of illustrating how a robust cross-
cultural and international dialogue has shaped the reception of the 
idea of women’s human rights since the nineteenth century.
Especially through its international reception, feminist liberal-
ism has been able to shed a crude Eurocentrism in favor of a cos-
mopolitan yet culturally sensitive ethic of humanistic regard for the 
welfare of women. Non–Western European feminist thinkers have 
revised and internationalized Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s theories of 
 women’s human rights, by critically engaging their books as well as 
their life stories from the nineteenth century forward. Such cross-
cultural dialogues on women’s human rights have contributed to the 
ongoing philosophical reconciliation of feminism with liberalism. As 
Nussbaum argued, in the conclusion of her Women and Human De-
velopment (2000), the goal of a globally oriented feminist liberalism 
is not to strip human communities of their cultural and religious 
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traditions but rather to fi nd ways of fairly balancing the demands of 
cultural affi liation, religion, and universal human rights.23
Overview and Chapter Summary
The fi rst chapter opens with a genealogy of the philosophical idea 
of rights and its limited applications to women from the late medi-
eval era through the early nineteenth century. Against this intellec-
tual background, we better understand why Wollstonecraft turned 
to a universalistic, rational Christian metaphysics and ethics, and 
why Mill turned to a liberal, rule utilitarianism, to justify the integral 
place of women in any coherent conception of the rights of humans. 
Chapter 2 proceeds to comparatively evaluate Wollstonecraft’s re-
ligious and Mill’s secular foundations for justifying women’s hu-
man rights, displaying each of their real limitations as much as their 
strengths. Although contemporary liberals have taken nonfounda-
tionalist, or purely political, approaches to justifying human rights 
in response to what Rawls called “the fact of pluralism,” I argue that 
the respective foundationalist approaches of Wollstonecraft and Mill 
remain politically salient in different ways for defending women’s 
human rights in conditions of cultural pluralism. Chapter 3 explains 
why their dramatically different theories of rights fi t into their strik-
ingly similar virtue theories of human development, and their resul-
tant backing for state-mandated universal primary education (UPE). 
I consider the moral problem that their consequentialist arguments 
for the societal benefi ts of female education may reinforce the gen-
der biases that they seek to undercut. Chapter 4 focuses on the re-
lated problem of cultural bias for women’s human rights arguments. 
Wollstonecraft and Mill established a contradictory rhetorical model 
for making women’s human rights claims in the sense that it reduced 
particular non-Western women to cultural stereotypes rather than 
respecting them as distinct individuals and peoples worthy of human 
rights in the fi rst place. However, rhetorical analysis of the arguments 
of three early non–Western European respondents to the Rights of 
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Woman and The Subjection of Women demonstrates how it is possible 
for feminist liberals to achieve a partial yet suffi ciently ethical tran-
scendence of such cultural biases. Chapter 5 concludes the book by 
resolving the paradox evoked by Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s uses of 
autobiography as a literary mode of women’s human rights advocacy. 
How can autobiography, as a genre predicated upon the subjective 
biases of the author, serve as a vehicle for making nondiscrimina-
tory claims for universal human rights? First, Wollstonecraft, Mill, 
and their international readership modeled how autobiography may 
provide a stirring emotional and intersubjective basis for women’s 
human rights advocacy, even inspiring cross-cultural solidarity for 
the cause. Second, they represented how writing, reading, and re-
sponding to autobiography may serve as forms of public resistance to 
reductive or merely instrumental treatments of the human subject, 
due to the genre’s basic assumption of the intrinsic value of indi-
vidual human lives.24
Chapter 1 outlines the place of women in the evolution of rights 
discourse in Western political thought prior to Wollstonecraft and 
Mill. I begin this brief history of Western ideas of rights with the 
late medieval philosophies of the Franciscan theologians John Duns 
Scotus and William of Ockham and the Renaissance-era work of the 
Spanish Jesuit and Scholastic theologian, Francisco Suárez. I exam-
ine the growth of interest in the moral and political status of women 
in early modern theories of rights, freedom, and power, especially in 
the social contract tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant, but also in the appropria-
tions of Stoicism by Hugo Grotius and Rousseau. After tracing the 
gendered development of political discourses on the “rights of man” 
and the “rights of woman” in the wake of the French Revolution, I 
explain how the defi ciencies of past theories of rights—above all, 
their male bias and sidelining of women—led Wollstonecraft and 
Mill to develop two alternative foundations for a truly inclusive con-
cept of human rights. While Wollstonecraft drew from her mentor 
Richard Price’s dissenting Christian theology to forge a new meta-
physical and deontological grounding for women’s human rights, 
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Mill revised classical utilitarianism into a liberal utilitarianism that 
placed women’s human rights on a wholly secular foundation.
Chapter 2 delves further into the question of the moral foundations 
for human rights, and the strengths and weaknesses of Wollstone-
craft’s and Mill’s respective answers to it. Although  Wollstonecraft’s 
capacious metaphysics built a big tent under which all humanity 
could fi nd coverage for their rights, its explicitly Christian frame-
work suited it more for persuading people who shared those same or 
similar theological beliefs. In short, Wollstonecraft’s theory of hu-
man rights fell short of realizing its universalistic ethics in practice. 
Mill faced the opposite problem: his liberal theory of human rights 
was wholly secular and utilitarian, requiring a comparatively minimal 
set of moral beliefs from its adherents. The resultant issue was the 
instrumental, and thus insecure, status of rights within his utilitarian 
ethics and political theory. Mill’s designation of utility as the sole 
grounding for morality made his conception of rights instrumental 
to its good consequences, especially the free and full development of 
individuals. His theory of rights fell short of securing human rights 
in any absolute or fi nal sense, because the value of rights was always 
determined in relation to the rule that the free and full development 
of individuals should be fostered to ensure the greatest happiness 
for all. Despite their different fl aws, these two accounts of human 
rights both fi t Charles Beitz’s defi nition of “naturalistic” founda-
tions for human rights: for Wollstonecraft and Mill, all human be-
ings held equal rights “by virtue of their humanity,” or what makes 
them human. Although Wollstonecraft’s theory is grounded on her 
rational theology, it is naturalistic in the sense that it depends upon 
her conception of the human being as made in God’s rational image. 
By contrast, Mill’s theory is secular (in that it contains no appeal to 
theology, religion, or the supernatural) and nonmetaphysical (in that 
it rejects the a priori approach of metaphysics in favor of an a poste-
riori, empirical approach to defi ning a conception of the human be-
ing in relation to a utilitarian conception of happiness). Mill’s theory 
nonetheless fi ts Beitz’s defi nition of a naturalistic account of human 
rights insofar as it relies upon a conception of the human being as 
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a “progressive being,” capable of free and full self-development to-
ward happiness.25
Partly because of their fl aws, such foundationalist approaches are 
not as prominent as nonfoundationalist approaches to justifying a 
universalistic conception of human rights in contemporary liberal 
political theory. Most famously represented by the later Rawls and 
his philosophical followers such as Beitz, nonfoundationalist liberal 
theories take a purely political approach to justifying human rights 
by way of a hypothetical or actual international political consensus 
or legal practice. Such a purely political approach does not appeal 
to comprehensive doctrines, such as metaphysical or religious ideas, 
or other robust and morally demanding conceptions of human de-
velopment, happiness, or the good life. In contrast, Wollstonecraft’s 
rational theology and Mill’s liberal utilitarianism justifi ed their re-
spectively metaphysical and nonmetaphysical theories of universal 
human rights by way of their robust normative conceptions of the 
human being.
Despite their joint reliance on “comprehensive” and thus con-
testable conceptions of humanity, the foundationalist approaches 
of Wollstonecraft and Mill nonetheless remain politically relevant. 
Their respectively religious and secular justifi cations of universal 
human rights have implications for the practical question of how 
to ethically advocate for women’s human rights in a way that is re-
spectful to cultural differences yet also enables genuine reform on 
behalf of the well-being of women. This is especially the case when 
women’s human rights are not yet recognized in culture or law but 
must be alleged and defended in order to be institutionalized in the 
future. The joint reliance by Wollstonecraft and Mill on thick moral 
conceptions of the human being endowed their political theories 
with strong yet inclusive normative standards by which they could 
judge the value of extant or proposed laws, policies, and cultural 
practices for women’s and human development, as individuals or 
in groups. This option of appealing to a strong normative standard 
of humanity itself is crucial for debates on women’s human rights 
that often hinge on supposedly intractable confl icts between state 
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sovereignty, individual freedom, and traditional cultural practices. A 
basic and broad “concept of a person” can serve as a principled yet 
practical point of moral orientation by which women’s human rights 
advocates may judge resolutions to these confl icts that are both ethi-
cal and persuasive. To test and compare the moral and practical value 
of Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s naturalistic accounts of human rights 
in matters of political reform, I examine how their theories apply to 
the question of reconciling women’s human rights with the practice 
of religious polygamy in nineteenth-century Mormon Utah and in 
contemporary Islam.26
Chapter 3 compares Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s theories of hu-
man development, particularly their views on the relevance of sex 
and gender to education. I situate Wollstonecraft and Mill within 
a modern liberal tradition of virtue ethics, which posits a virtuous 
yet varied range of development outcomes as best or most happy for 
human beings. Despite the differences in their philosophical founda-
tions for women’s human rights, Wollstonecraft and Mill agreed that 
girls have the same fundamental right as boys to receive an education 
that would nurture the development of their core human capabili-
ties. Both prescribed a state mandate for UPE as a necessary prac-
tical step toward transforming the pernicious, male-biased gender 
norms that had stunted women’s self-development as well as human 
development as a whole.
Given their concern for persuading governments to pay their ob-
ligation to provide girls and boys the same access to an education in 
the broadest and most virtuous sense, it is not politically surprising 
that Wollstonecraft and Mill dwelled on the extrinsic social benefi ts 
of such an education rather than solely on its intrinsic benefi ts for 
the children. Ethically, however, such consequentialist arguments 
for women’s right to education had the countervailing rhetorical ef-
fect of construing girls and their education as mere instruments to 
broader social and political ends. This rhetorical strategy obscured 
the principle of equal respect for human individuals that is the cor-
nerstone of both Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s abstract foundations for 
universal human rights. By emphasizing how the education of women 
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would make men and society happier, Wollstonecraft and Mill rein-
forced the prevalent gender stereotype of women as passive or self-
less servants of their fathers, husbands, and children. Ironically, their 
consequentialist arguments for the public benefi ts of UPE did not 
escape gender bias so much as perpetuate it, despite their philosophi-
cal intentions to the contrary. To avoid such a pernicious feedback 
loop, reformers ought to balance or even counteract appeals to the 
public utility of UPE with regular reminders of its intrinsic value for 
individual girls and women.
Chapter 4 confronts the place of Western prejudices within Woll-
stonecraft’s and Mill’s narratives of women’s progress. Despite their 
repeated defenses of a common human nature that united the sexes, 
Wollstonecraft and Mill in their adaptations of Enlightenment phi-
losophies of history made their theories of women’s human rights 
less universalistic because of their Eurocentric biases. Following 
philosophers such as Voltaire and Adam Smith, Wollstonecraft 
and Mill assumed a Western European model of human economic 
and cultural development. Like Lord Kames and Antoine-Leonard 
Thomas, they condemned the low status of women in non-Western, 
non-Christian cultures and argued for the advancement of women 
based on such prejudiced Eurocentric comparisons with supposedly 
backward Muslims and Hindus. Although Wollstonecraft and Mill 
put strong feminist twists on these Western Eurocentric theories of 
human progress, they did not escape their cultural biases.27
The critical examination of the place of cultural bias in their polit-
ical theories leads us to a more general ethical question: May one ad-
vocate a global standard of human rights without an imperial mind-
set that imposes one’s own cultural biases upon others? Through an 
international genealogy of the reception of Wollstonecraft and Mill 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I reveal that some 
of their earliest interlocutors also faced the problem of cultural bias. 
Some replicated an Orientalist idiom for feminism and liberalism, 
while others confronted, challenged, and ultimately subverted this 
trend. Three nineteenth-century non–Western European feminist 
liberals—Maria Tsebrikova of Russia, Martina Barros Borgoño of 
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Chile, and Elvira López of Argentina—emerge from this reception 
history as examples of the practical possibility of achieving a partial 
yet suffi ciently ethical transcendence of cultural bias in women’s hu-
man rights advocacy. Tsebrikova, Borgoño, and López overcame a 
tendency toward perpetuation of cultural bias within feminist liber-
alism through their self-refl ective adoption of “rooted,” or culturally 
attuned, cosmopolitan perspectives in crafting universalistic argu-
ments for women’s human rights. The comparative study of their re-
ception of Wollstonecraft and Mill suggests that feminist liberalism 
may be reformulated in light of their and other non–Western Euro-
pean intellectuals’ concern with making culturally sensitive claims 
for the rights of women worldwide.28
Chapter 5 returns to the fundamental commitment of Wollstone-
craft and Mill to the universal human right to education, by explor-
ing how it prompted them to affi rm the power of literacy and litera-
ture for women’s human rights advocacy. In their literary writings, 
Wollstonecraft and Mill incorporated the experiences of the women 
they loved (such as Mary’s friend Fanny Blood and John’s wife, Har-
riet Taylor) into their personal narratives, making them function 
as biographies as much as autobiographies. Such literary works as 
Wollstonecraft’s novel Mary, a Fiction (1788) and Mill’s Autobiogra-
phy (1873) are thus better understood as (auto)biographies. Woll-
stonecraft and Mill can be read as contributing to the development 
of a modern genre: the literature of human rights.
Building on testimony and witness of women’s struggles for rec-
ognition of their human status, their (auto)biographical writings de-
veloped two narrative frameworks for advocating the human rights 
of women: Wollstonecraft’s stories of heroic womanhood and Mill’s 
stories of spiritual marriage. These narratives proved to have an in-
ternational impact. Wollstonecraft’s fi rst-wave feminist, and often 
religious, readers from the United States and across Europe hailed 
her as a “voice in the wilderness”—a feminist political prophet who 
cleared the way for their formal organization of the women’s rights 
cause. Mill’s representation of his spiritual marriage with Harriet 
Taylor had an even more global reach, becoming an  emotional 
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touchstone for translators of The Subjection of Women from late 
 nineteenth-century Maharashtra and Prague to twentieth-century 
Japan and South Korea.29
Despite their success in inspiring men and women from different 
cultures to care about rectifying the social and political inequality 
of the sexes, Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s (auto)biographical writings 
pose a series of philosophical questions for women’s human rights 
advocates. May one use subjective human stories as evidence to le-
gitimate universal human rights claims? If so, then how can such sto-
ries avoid being exploitative of the individuals whose lives and deaths 
originally inspired them? By underscoring the necessary overlap be-
tween biography and autobiography, Wollstonecraft and Mill broke 
down the apparent divide between “self” and “other.” Not solely 
subjective, their (auto)biographies wove their personal experiences 
of love and friendship into larger intersubjective stories about the in-
trinsic value of human lives. Hence Wollstonecraft and Mill cleared 
the way for writers of the literature of human rights to use testimony 
and witness of the real joys and sorrows of human persons, without 
reducing their subjects to mere means to a broader political end.
By reading, writing, and speaking about self, other, and their re-
lationships to each other, one gains literacy in the skills necessary 
for a narrative practice of human rights advocacy. This narrative 
practice produces sensitive and compelling human stories, which 
have the emotional power to move people to act on their duty to 
respect, provide, or allege the rights of self and others. As suggested 
by Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s vibrant global reception, such a con-
crete, passionate, and literary approach to advocating for women’s 
human rights may productively work in tandem with different ab-
stract  rational justifi cations for universal human rights. This practi-
cal and narrative mode of human rights advocacy has been made into 
history by ordinary people, whose lives, work, and stories show the 
centrality of individuals and other nonstate actors to the sustenance 
of the human rights tradition, past and present.30
Contemporary feminist political theorists such as Ackerly have 
argued that Third World and non-Western feminisms are not only 
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compatible with but have provided a grounding for international 
women’s human rights activism. Building on the visionary ideas of 
postcolonial feminism, they have demonstrated that the study of 
women’s activism and work in the developing world was (and is) part 
of the process of forging a humane, solidaristic, yet culturally sensi-
tive account of feminist social justice for women in a globalized po-
litical economy. Wollstonecraft, Mill, and Women’s Human Rights is one 
further contribution to this tradition of feminist thinking in which 
liberalism’s Western biases are critically assessed, but with the aim of 
a cross-cultural dialogue that pushes forward a more rooted cosmo-
politan understanding of the human rights of women worldwide, and 
how they play out in particular cultures and religious traditions.31
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A PHILOSOPHICAL GENEALOGY 
OF WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
Entering the Labyrinth: The Debate on the Origin of Human Rights
The circuitous quality of intellectual histories of universal human 
rights seems to be unavoidable. Entering the debate on the origins 
of the modern idea of rights is much like stepping into the fantasti-
cal labyrinthine library imagined by Argentinian author Jorge Luis 
Borges: one is forced to retrace one’s steps, and the steps of scholars 
past, in a futile attempt to fi nd the elusive founding text to which the 
apparently infi nite collection of books on human rights refers back. 
I begin, like most historians of rights, in late Enlightenment-era 
 Europe, then turn back to the late medieval era and the Renaissance, 
traveling through neo-Stoic thought and the social contract tradi-
tion, only to arrive again at the American and French Revolutions 
and their legacies for the globalizing political thought of the nine-
teenth century. By focusing on the marginalized place of women in 
theories of rights before Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill, 
we can better perceive the pivotal philosophical role that the inclu-
sion of women plays in postrevolutionary theories of universal human 
rights. When studied against the background of previous theories of 
rights and their real defi ciencies in relation to women, the innova-
tiveness of Wollstonecraft’s religious and Mill’s secular approaches 
to justifying women’s human rights shines in high resolution.1
As Jack Donnelly has argued, the idea of human rights originates in 
the West. He begins his history of the idea of universal human rights 
amid “the rise of modern markets and modern states and the rise of 
political claims of equality and toleration” in Europe. Richard Tuck, 
Brian Tierney, and Annabel Brett have pushed further back into the 
Western tradition, to the Roman Catholic theologians of the late 
medieval era, to fi nd the earliest known theories of subjective rights. 
Subjective rights are those rights that belong to an individual human 
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subject or agent; for the medieval theologians, these primarily in-
cluded individual rights to property and the simple use of nature for 
survival. The Protestant and neo-Stoic school of Hugo Grotius has 
been identifi ed as another important strain in the development of the 
modern concept of the rights of individuals, especially in the inter-
national realm. The English and European social contract tradition, 
beginning with Thomas Hobbes and extending through Immanuel 
Kant, has also been commonly cited as a source for contemporary 
theories of human rights.2
Moral cognates of rights, such as dignity and respect, have been 
integral to non-Western cultures and religions, Confucianism, Hin-
duism, and Islam, from the earliest historical records. According to 
Micheline Ishay and Paul Gordon Lauren, this ancient overlap in 
moral norms across world religions and cultures provides a historical 
basis for the international community’s more recent institutionaliza-
tion of universal human rights laws. Political theorists as various as 
Mary Ann Glendon, George Kateb, Amartya Sen, and Martha Nuss-
baum have used this “overlapping consensus” of intercultural moral 
norms as a starting point for arguing that an idea of human dignity 
is the historic basis for contemporary theories and laws concerning 
universal human rights.3
These vexed philosophical questions of establishing the moral 
foundation for rights, and understanding the relationship of rights 
to other moral concepts, such as sentience, dignity, respect, or equal-
ity, are the topic of chapter 2. Here, I focus on the equally challeng-
ing question of the historical origins of the modern ethical-political 
idea of subjective rights, especially for women. Since the European 
Enlightenment, subjective rights have become a dominant politi-
cal concept. In the wake of the social contract tradition, they have 
been commonly construed as moral entitlements of human beings, 
like nourishment, freedom, education, and citizenship, which en-
able their survival and development. Subjective rights have been 
conceptualized as grounded in the will, or agency, of human beings, 
whether or not they have been theorized as derivative from an objec-
tive source of moral authority, such as natural law or positive law.4
Y6872.indb   27 1/6/16   10:37:58 AM
A  P H I L O S O P H I C A L  G E N E A L O G Y  O F  W O M E N ’ S  H U M A N  R I G H T S
28
In a complex adoption of social contract theory, the early 
 nineteenth-century German idealist philosopher G. W. F. Hegel 
built his relational idea of individual rights on a thin conception of 
the human subject. This human subject had a will, by which he could 
distinguish himself from both internal and external natural forces. 
Conscious of his own freedom of will, he could identify himself as 
separate from his bodily desires or the physical obstacles to the satis-
faction of his desires. His claims to rights, for Hegel as well as many 
rights theorists since, were an expression of his subjective will, the 
practical human need for recognition and respect of one’s individu-
ality in relation to others, and acknowledgment of his legal status.5
Driven by the desires and needs of individual human beings, sub-
jective rights are meant to be directed toward the legitimate use of 
nature, property, freedom, or other forms of personal or political 
power. Defi ning the moral bounds of the individual’s use of sub-
jective rights in relationship to others is the ethical-political prob-
lem that has preoccupied liberal and democratic political theories 
from their origins in Grotius (1625) and Hobbes (1642) to the pres-
ent. This idea of subjective rights has its roots in the West, after 
1200. Whether one begins with late medieval Catholic theology, 
Protestant variants of Stoicism, the social contract tradition, or the 
democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth century, subjective 
rights have their philosophical origins in the religious and political 
debates of the British Isles, the Continental European powers, and 
their Atlantic colonies.
That said, we should recall Amartya Sen’s important distinction 
between rights and the cognate moral concepts that support them. 
Pointing to the ancient tradition of “conscious theorizing of toler-
ance and freedom” in Asian cultures, Sen argued that the “basic ideas 
underlying freedom and rights” are not exclusively Western. Indeed, 
the cross-cultural prevalence of these “underlying” moral ideas con-
tributed to the widespread appropriation of the concept of subjective 
rights in non–Western European cultures after the French Revolu-
tion. William Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming have illustrated 
this phenomenon with examples of modern Chinese fusions of rights 
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with Confucianism, such as China’s input into the 1948 Universal 
Declaration. According to de Bary, such intercultural exchanges and 
revisions of ideas mean that “human rights [are] still in the process 
of formation.”6
Attention to the idea of women’s human rights allows us to see how 
human rights gradually became an international and intercultural, as 
well as a philosophically universalistic, political concept. As David 
Armitage and Jennifer Pitts have shown, with their historical stud-
ies of the rise of modern forms of imperialism and internationalism, 
there was a global turn—for better and for worse—in British and 
European political thought at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
Political thought became globalized in its perspectives, as well as in 
its reception and infl uence, as much through as despite the growth of 
Western imperialism. Feminist historians have long noted that this 
trend was especially salient for the global diffusion of women’s rights 
discourse. At the turn of the nineteenth century, consideration of the 
moral and political status of women and slaves compelled political 
theorists to expand their defi nitions of rights-bearing subjects. The 
resultant rise of abolitionist and women’s rights discourses paralleled, 
if not propelled, the global turn in political thought, as exemplifi ed 
in the work of Wollstonecraft and Mill.7
The Rise of the Rights of Woman in the Western Enlightenment
Before the essays of French revolutionaries Nicolas de Condorcet 
and Olympe de Gouges on women’s rights in 1790–91, philoso-
phers debated the superiority or inferiority of women to men in 
the European querelle des femmes, but they did not typically express 
their views in the language of rights. This querelle was the lively 
intellectual debate on the question of the equality of the sexes that 
animated aristocratic courts and salons as well as Roman Catholic 
convents in Europe and its Latin American colonies after Venetian-
born Christine de Pizan completed her landmark feminist treatise, 
The Book of the City of Ladies, in France in 1405. Most of this que-
relle, however, revolved around the concept of equality and did not 
Y6872.indb   29 1/6/16   10:37:58 AM
A  P H I L O S O P H I C A L  G E N E A L O G Y  O F  W O M E N ’ S  H U M A N  R I G H T S
30
 invoke the  related idea of rights until the mid-eighteenth century. 
In 1739 London, “Sophia, a Person of Quality” published a long es-
say entitled “Woman Not Inferior to Man.” Its provocative subtitle 
invoked the concept of the “natural right of the fair sex to a perfect 
equality of power, dignity, and esteem, with the men.” Sophia used 
the Enlightenment-era discourse of “natural rights,” arising from 
seventeenth-century treatises by Frenchman François Poulain de la 
Barre and Englishman John Locke, to demand from men “our right 
of sharing with them in public action.”8
Sophia’s essay, thought by some to have been written by the En-
glish bluestocking Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, continued to have 
an impressive national and international reception into the 1830s, 
from Britain to France to Brazil. It may have even infl uenced Woll-
stonecraft, given the parallel between its subtitle, “Vindication of the 
Natural Rights of the Fair-Sex,” and the title of her 1792 Vindication 
of the Rights of Woman. But by that point, a new public discourse on 
the “rights of man” and the “rights of woman” had emerged in the 
wake of the American and French Revolutions. It was the discourse 
on rights spurred by the French Revolution, and the debate over it in 
Britain, that served as the immediate and pressing political backdrop 
for Wollstonecraft’s extended philosophical argument for the exten-
sion of equal “civil and political rights” to the degraded “half of the 
human species.”9
Eighteenth-century rights discourse—which became prominent 
in Britain, America, and France—promoted the individual and, 
more often, the group rights of male political subjects or citizens in 
challenge to the prevalence of absolute monarchy in early modern 
Europe. On an abstract level, these rights were variously concep-
tualized as basic powers, liberties, wants, needs, and entitlements of 
human beings. In particular legal systems, these rights were institu-
tionalized for particular groups, such as land-owning men, so that 
they enjoyed protection for their property as well as political oppor-
tunities to participate in government and lawmaking. Philosophers 
infrequently dwelled on the question of how rights applied to female 
humans, until rights became the most salient political issue in the 
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North Atlantic world in the wake of the American Revolution in the 
1770s and the buildup to the French Revolution in the 1780s.10
In eighteenth-century British political thought, rights such as 
freedom of conscience were often paired with duties such as religious 
tolerance. In such moral pairings, rights were understood as correla-
tive, or refl exive and relational. Such correlative rights served as a 
kind of practical shorthand for abstract moral principles that defi ned 
ethical human relationships and obligations to one another within 
political communities. As condensed and concretized versions of ab-
stract moral principles that ought to govern human relationships, 
rights unsurprisingly came to be summarized in lists and preserved 
in public, political documents. The English Bill of Rights, produced 
by the Glorious Revolution of 1688–89, illustrates the trend to-
ward a public, itemized, interpersonal, and political understanding 
of rights. Rather than focusing on or even signifi cantly expanding 
the rights of individuals, the bill set forth a list of rules for legitimate 
relationships between the government powers of Parliament and the 
king. The related 1689 Act of Toleration made a selective form of 
religious toleration (benefi ting most religious groups besides Roman 
Catholics, nontrinitarians, and atheists) mandatory for England and 
its colonies.11
Particularly within eighteenth-century Protestant and dissenting 
Christian theologies, philosophers conceived rights as rooted in a 
rational human nature as designed by the divine Creator. Thinkers 
such as Kant and Wollstonecraft understood rights as a product of the 
human subjective mental capacity to use reason to construct abstract 
principles of ethical conduct. For Wollstonecraft and her theological 
mentor, the Reverend Richard Price, these principles derived from 
the universal, rational, moral law of God. Humans typically had ac-
cess to God’s law via reason once this mental faculty was suffi ciently 
developed through education. As necessary, adults could teach the 
content of the moral law to children or other persons without suf-
fi ciently developed rational faculties. For Kant, on the other hand, 
the epistemological divide between the noumenal and the phenom-
enal realms meant that the human mind could not know for certain 
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whether these universal moral principles derived from God’s moral 
laws. Despite their differences over epistemology and the possibility 
of knowing the divine basis of rights, both Kant and Wollstonecraft 
contributed to the deontological school of thought on human rights. 
Deontological conceptions of rights are derived from a set of moral 
rules or universally applicable duties (such as the Kantian ethical 
principle to respect human beings as ends in themselves), rather than 
justifi ed in terms of their actual or expected consequences.12
Sentience, suffering, and sympathy also emerged as a defi ning set 
of capacities of human beings that grounded late eighteenth-century 
arguments for rights. David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Jer-
emy Bentham began with the human subjective experience of pain 
and pleasure as the starting point for enacting ethical relationships, 
including rights and duties. The personal experience or sympathetic 
witness of pain encouraged human beings to develop an intersub-
jective (or overlapping subjective) consensus on the human right to 
relief of suffering and the corresponding duty to provide such relief. 
By the late eighteenth century, human subjective (and intersubjec-
tive) constructs of rational or sympathetic regard for self and other(s) 
came to be seen as the basis for defi ning the rights and duties of 
individuals in modern political communities.13
The Philosophical Origins of Subjective Rights for Women
The idea of subjective rights— or rights belonging to and exercised 
by the individual human subject or agent—extends further back into 
European religion and politics, however. As Richard Tuck’s work 
on medieval and Renaissance political thought has shown, the con-
cept of subjective rights has a complex historical development within 
the Catholic theological tradition of John Duns Scotus, William of 
Ockham, and Francisco Suárez, among others. In these theological 
debates, subjective rights were conceived as natural rights, or rights 
that obtained in the natural condition of humans prior to the Fall 
of humanity. In response to the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century 
church’s heated debate over the radical Franciscan commitment to a 
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life of poverty without private property, Scotus and Ockham devel-
oped arguments for a natural right to “simple use,” or a reasonable 
consumption of nature’s bounty, for purposes of survival. However, 
neither theologian applied these arguments for the natural right to 
simple use of nature beyond his philosophical ruminations on the life 
of prelapsarian man. Moreover, Scotus and Ockham primarily had 
Adam in mind. Although Ockham occasionally discussed Adam and 
Eve’s mutual natural rights to the simple use of nature before the 
Fall, it was Eve’s marital relationship to Adam that was the context 
for such hypotheses. In other words, Eve had rights only insofar as 
she was cleaved to Adam as his wife. In addition, Ockham claimed 
that, after the Fall, Adam’s and other men’s “power” rightfully ex-
tended to the personal appropriation of “temporal things,” including 
“rational beings” such as “women and children.” Despite her auspi-
cious beginnings as a free agent in the form of the inquisitive Eve, 
postlapsarian woman became a mere thing that man had a right to 
own and dominate.14
According to Tuck, this late medieval debate over the mean-
ing of “jus” (right) and “dominium” (property) contributed to the 
 Renaissance-era conception of subjective rights. The turn of the 
 seventeenth-century Spanish Jesuit philosopher Suárez further de-
veloped the idea of rights as belonging to and exercised by the human 
subject. The exercise of rights was a robust expression of the individ-
ual will. Suárez even spoke of “human rights” and applied the idea to 
women, if only in a limited way. He defended “a maiden’s right to her 
own freedom” before marriage, paying heed to the Roman Catholic 
culture’s patriarchal view of female chastity as a precondition for a 
woman’s entry into marriage. Yet he described it as “her” right and 
freedom. By implication, her freedom to be a maiden and to enjoy 
bodily integrity was not the right of her father or suitors to give or 
take away but rather a right that she possessed and exercised as a fe-
male human, which other human subjects (including men in power) 
were morally obligated to respect. Although Suárez said nothing 
about women’s natural right to abstinence (or other forms of sexual 
freedom) in marriage, his defense of a maiden’s right to maintain her 
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chastity is a signal moment for feminist ethics. He at least implied a 
natural right for a maiden to be free from sexual coercion or violence 
as a girl child. He also implied a natural right to a maiden’s control of 
the sexual functioning of her body, at least in the negative sense—a 
signifi cant power in an age when female mortality via maternity and 
venereal disease was high. Suárez’s emphasis on rights as an exercise 
of human will or power, even in the case of a chaste maiden, was 
an important precursor to the seventeenth-century Protestant rights 
theories of such thinkers as Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke.15
Partly infl uenced by Roman Stoicism as well as Jesuit Scholastics 
such as Suárez, Grotius was a Dutch theorist of natural law and natu-
ral rights who put the freedom of the individual human will at the 
center of his ethics and political theory. In his 1625 treatise The Rights 
of War and Peace, he argued that both women and men had a right to 
use deathly force to defend their chastity against the threat of rape, 
on the grounds of the inalienable natural right to self-preservation 
that belongs to and may be justly exercised by all human persons. Al-
though suicide was generally prohibited according to his Protestant 
moral theology, Grotius made an exception for women to commit 
suicide to protect their chastity if it was the only option available 
for self-defense against such heinous physical violation. This extreme 
example of female self-assertion against male sexual violence high-
lights the importance of the expression of the human will for guar-
anteeing moral outcomes in his Christian ethical system. By freely 
choosing to kill herself to protect her chastity, a woman willed what 
was moral at great earthly cost to her, but with greater heavenly re-
ward for adhering to God’s moral law even unto death. As in the case 
of Suárez’s defense of the right of a maiden to maintain her chastity 
before marriage, Grotius’s defense of the right of a woman to kill 
herself to maintain her chastity revolves around the idea that women 
can and should exercise their God-given wills in order to freely re-
alize Christian virtue. On the other hand, both of these examples 
conceive of women’s moral agency primarily in terms of preserving 
their chastity and only extend a narrow conception of natural rights 
to women. Most disturbingly, the Grotian case required a woman to 
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die as a consequence of exercising her natural right to protect her 
chastity. The very act of using the right extinguished the possibility 
of enacting rights further.16
Grotius drew from Cicero the case of the woman who must kill 
herself to preserve her honor. Other Roman and Stoic sources 
shaped his ethics and politics, and within them, his theory of natural 
rights and its limited applications to women. Although Grotius cited 
the early Christian Roman thinker Lactantius to establish that “what 
is unlawful for Women is as much unlawful for Men, and one and 
the same Obligation is thought to lie equally on both,” he also made 
moral and social distinctions between the sexes on the grounds of 
their different sexual natures and functions. He quoted the fourth-
century Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus to support the view 
of women as generally childlike in reason and thus fundamentally 
unequal to men in mental capabilities. Therefore women, on the 
whole, required adult male guidance in intellectual and ethical mat-
ters. Despite the universality of the natural moral law and its equal 
applicability to the sexes, women did not function as equal moral 
agents alongside men but rather functioned as dependent creatures 
needy of protection and guidance from men in times of war and 
peace. Along these lines, Grotius typically construed women’s worth 
not as intrinsically rooted in their nature as persons but rather as 
extrinsically related to their reproductive and sexual functions as 
mothers and wives. In war, women had a natural right to be secure 
from male violence because of the broader social need to protect 
female reproductive powers for a nation’s own self-perpetuation. 
In peace, the sexes had a common right to monogamous marriage, 
the criminalization of polygamy, and the restriction of divorce to 
cases of adultery, because such contractual legal arrangements es-
tablished a kind of equilibrium between them despite their sexual 
inequality. Such marital laws prevented the sexual exploitation of 
women by men at the same time as they established a legitimate 
outlet for overpowering male heterosexual desire (which, according 
to Grotius, made celibacy unrealistic for most men). He thus based 
his handful of arguments for women’s rights on the extrinsic value 
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of women’s sexual attractiveness and  reproductive powers for men 
and for maintaining peace in society at large. Because he predicated 
his notion of women’s rights upon the sexual functioning of women 
and its value for others, especially men, these arguments exposed the 
limits of Grotian theory for conceptualizing women’s rights in any 
noninstrumental and nonpatriarchal sense, whether in domestic or 
international politics.17
Like Suárez and Grotius before him, Hobbes in his De Cive (1642) 
and Leviathan (1651) gave a striking example of how women could 
wield natural rights—but took the concept of women’s freedom in 
a far more radical direction. Hobbes theorized a right of mothers in 
the state of nature prior to the establishment of government, or any 
kind of positive law. He posited that infants in the state of nature were 
fully dependent on their mothers for nourishment and other aspects 
of survival. Given that the children could not defend themselves, 
mothers thus had the right to choose to “expose” or to “care for” 
their offspring. Hobbes’s conception of mother right was tied to his 
defi nition of power as the “present means to obtain some apparent 
good” and his defi nition of freedom as “the absence of Opposition.” 
Women in the state of nature took “the right of Dominion over the 
Child” to its logical extreme when they no longer perceived the care 
of the dependent child to be worthwhile, and there was no obstacle 
to the act of infanticide. This violent conception of a female natural 
right set Hobbes apart from other early theorists of women’s natural 
rights. But it also opened the door to imagining a more vigorous set 
of rights for women, particularly in their natural state.18
Not until the mid- to late seventeenth century, particularly in 
the aftermath of the English Civil Wars over religious freedom, did 
a Protestant theory of the rights of human subjects emerge in full 
force. Focused on the individual rights to private property and reli-
gious conscience, this Protestant political discourse sought to propel 
reform of Catholic absolutist monarchical government. Locke’s Sec-
ond Treatise of Government (1690) was the paradigmatic work on the 
issue. It refl ected many of the political trends embodied in the Glori-
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ous Revolution of 1688–89, including the English Bill of Rights that 
institutionalized the Protestant succession, constitutional monarchy, 
and stronger legislative powers of Parliament.
In addition to these political rights, Locke also outlined the natural 
rights of individual human agents, inside and outside government. 
Locke’s theory of natural rights echoed the debates of Scotus and 
Ockham, who had puzzled over the questions of individual rights to 
consumption and property in a prelapsarian, or natural, state. On the 
other hand, Locke’s emphasis on personal entitlement to the work 
of one’s hands—at least in the state of nature before government—
paid homage to the late seventeenth-century Protestant equation of 
subjective rights with the right to own and build private property.19
Likely inspired by Hobbes, Locke addressed the powers of women 
in the family within the context of the state of nature. He assigned 
women equal “parental power” to care for the children, so the mother 
and father shared authority over their offspring in the state of nature. 
The mother and father also had equal freedom to leave each other 
once their children were grown. There were no further moral duties 
to bind them together in the shared project of child rearing, and 
no positive laws or government to legally inscribe them within the 
bonds of marriage.20
Although Locke did not use the term “right” in direct relation to 
women, his arguments for these equal parental and spousal powers and 
freedoms in the state of nature implied that women held some natu-
ral rights alongside men, at least beyond the patriarchal restrictions 
of positive law. As with the brief accounts of women’s natural rights 
by Suárez, Grotius, and Hobbes, Locke’s consideration of women’s 
natural freedoms and powers focused on their sexual roles. As Su-
san Okin demonstrated, this early modern trend of conceptualizing 
women’s natural rights, freedoms, or powers in terms of their sexual 
functions was the latest iteration of the deep patriarchal dimension of 
Western political thought, extending back to ancient Greece.21
For the bulk of the eighteenth century, rights-bearing subjects 
were typically assumed, in theory and practice, to be adult white 
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male landowners. Even a progressive thinker like Locke, who sought 
to restore the rights of the people against tyrannical government, 
stopped short of extending the full slate of rights to children, adult 
females, or slaves taken in a defensive war. Since he reserved most 
of his speculations about women’s powers and freedoms to the state 
of nature before the institution of government, he avoided the ques-
tion of whether women should be political subjects in his ideal state, 
a limited constitutional monarchy. In private correspondence with 
Mrs. Mary Clarke in 1684, Locke acknowledged that girls had the 
same capability for mental improvement as he would later outline for 
boys in his published treatise Some Thoughts on Education (1693).22
Although Wollstonecraft built on Locke’s educational principles 
to argue for boys’ and girls’ equal right to free public coeducation, 
such an egalitarian conception of the sexes’ learning capabilities was 
hardly the norm in the late eighteenth century. Even Kant’s radical, 
a priori, metaphysical view of the absolute moral equality of humans 
as rational beings, bound by universal duties from which they derived 
their universal rights, did not keep him from espousing a patriarchal 
view of women’s ethical and mental potential. In his Observations on 
the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), Kant bluntly stated 
that women could not act morally, or according to a rational grasp 
of universal principles of duty. In his Metaphysics of Morals (1797), he 
elaborated the political implications of this view of sex inequality by 
arguing that women could not be “active,” self-governing citizens 
of a republic, because, like children, they were excluded by nature 
from autonomous conduct. Patriarchal prejudice had clearly proven 
to be a persistent, though adaptable, feature of modern theories of 
rights, including the fundamental rights to education and political 
participation.23
Modern Western Patriarchalisms
In his groundbreaking book Patriarchalism in Political Thought 
(1975), Gordon Schochet made the infl uential case that there were 
varieties of patriarchalism in early modern British and European 
Y6872.indb   38 1/6/16   10:37:59 AM
A  P H I L O S O P H I C A L  G E N E A L O G Y  O F  W O M E N ’ S  H U M A N  R I G H T S
39
political thought. Most famously defended by Robert Filmer, the 
 seventeenth-century patriarchalism of the divine right of kings posed 
absolute monarchs as the legitimate heirs of the power bequeathed 
to Adam by God to control and dominate nature, as well as Eve. 
What was left sexually ambiguous was the status of queens, or female 
monarchs, whose legitimacy as heirs of Adam’s power was gener-
ally undisputed. The confl ation of paternal power with monarchical 
power meant that political patriarchalism, in cases such as Queen 
Elizabeth I and Queen Anne, occasionally manifested in history as 
political matriarchalism.24
Filmer’s brand of patriarchalism, and its legitimation of absolute 
monarchies through a genealogy of power rooted in Genesis, gave 
way to a new political and philosophical order after the Wars of Re-
ligion in Europe and the British Isles. According to Schochet, the 
political confl icts and ideological debates of the Glorious Revolution 
led to the transformation of patriarchalism in the eighteenth century. 
Eighteenth-century patriarchalism was focused less on the legitima-
tion of monarchical power and more on the inclusion of new classes 
of men in powers of governance. The issue of the expansion of the 
male political classes, amid the rise of republican discourses in early 
eighteenth-century Britain and its Atlantic colonies, precipitated a 
more overt concern with the problem of women’s relationship to 
politics. This concern was often directed toward explicitly patriar-
chal arguments for the formal exclusion of women from otherwise 
egalitarian visions of a new republican political order.25
The extension of natural rights arguments to other groups, includ-
ing African slaves and women, became more prominent around the 
time of the American and French Revolutions and the rise of Brit-
ish abolitionism. As suggested by Wollstonecraft’s repeated symbolic 
invocations of the 1789 fall of the Bastille in Paris, the liberation of 
the masses through political rebellion became a model for the lib-
eration of people oppressed by their social status. Yet the masculine 
gender of rights was consolidated and reinforced in the transatlantic 
public sphere at precisely the moment when the idea of rights be-
came more than a tool of white male landowners’ power. The late 
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medieval,  Renaissance, and early Enlightenment “natural rights” of 
God’s human creatures, which were generally patriarchal in implica-
tion or application, openly became “the rights of man.” Philosophi-
cally growing in the seventeenth century but politically dominating 
Europe and America in the late eighteenth century, the rights of man 
doctrine was for white, middle-class, tax-paying, property-owning 
male subjects who wished to enjoy the powers of self-governing re-
publican citizens.26
There is some explicit evidence of white middle-class men’s jeal-
ous defense of their growing rights against the prospect of sharing 
them with other historically marginalized groups, including women. 
In response to his spouse Abigail Adams’s March 1776 request for 
him to “remember the ladies” in the crafting of the new constitu-
tion for revolutionary America, congressional delegate John Adams 
wrote: “As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot help but 
laugh. We have been told that our Struggle has loosened the bands of 
Government everywhere. That Children and Apprentices were dis-
obedient—that schools and Colledges were grown turbulent—that 
Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes grew insolent to their 
Masters. But your Letter was the fi rst Intimation that another Tribe 
more numerous and powerfull than all the rest were grown discon-
tented. . . . Depend upon it, We know better than to repeal our Mas-
culine systems.” With less irony and more anxiety than Adams, the 
Genevan philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau also had posed elabo-
rate arguments against the inclusion of women in the “masculine 
systems” of modern republicanism in his widely read literary and 
political writings from the 1750s and 1760s. Rousseau asserted that 
the arbitrary sexual domination of women over men in the domes-
tic realm was reason to not permit them formal political power. In 
April 1776, Adams likewise concluded, in his reply to his wife, that 
he hoped General George Washington would not allow the “Despo-
tism of the Petticoat” to engender a new form of political tyranny on 
American soil, so soon after the colonies’ rebellion from Britain.27
The confl uence of social contract ideas and neo-Stoic ideas in 
Rousseau’s political thought reinforced the patriarchal biases in his 
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theory of republicanism as the best, or only legitimate, state. Indebted 
to Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau’s version of social contract theory 
was distinctive for giving explicit reasons why women should not be 
rights-bearing citizens in his ideal republican regime. His theory of 
republicanism required a robust practice of sex-role differentiation, 
such that men were formal citizens in the public realm and women 
focused on the rearing of future male citizens and female denizens 
in the domestic sphere. Any mixing of the sexes in politics would 
undermine the stability of society and government. To prevent this 
outcome, Rousseau followed the ancient Romans in prescribing the 
disenfranchisement of women from republican civil rights. While he 
proclaimed that popular sovereignty was the basis for legitimate, or 
republican, government, Rousseau narrowly defi ned the sovereign 
lawmakers as the adult men of the community. According to Carole 
Pateman, Rousseau rationalized a fraternal social contract in which 
men bonded together as autonomous citizens while women stood on 
the outside of government, without real access to freedom, power, 
or rights.28
Despite his harsh criticisms of Grotius, Rousseau’s appropriation 
of Stoicism also proved to be discriminatory toward women, when 
read in conjunction with his social contract theory. The virtue of 
human passivity in the face of misfortune was a theme of Seneca that 
ran through Rousseau’s literary writings, but in a way that undercut 
the place of female agency in his ethics and politics. Stoic acceptance 
of one’s negative circumstances may be empowering to a man oth-
erwise endowed with civil and political rights, as in the case of the 
lowly Swiss tutor St. Preux’s choice to live under the watchful eye 
of the aristocratic Wolmar in Rousseau’s novel Julie (1761). For a 
woman without such rights, a Stoic resignation to fate could possibly 
extinguish her freedom altogether, as when Julie unhappily obeyed 
her father in entering a loveless arranged marriage to the much older 
Wolmar, instead of eloping to England with her true love, St. Preux. 
In a kind of Stoic epiphany, Julie came to see her choice as not tragic 
but actually liberating for its fulfi llment of patrimonial duty, despite 
her lingering feelings for St. Preux: “Tied to a husband’s destiny, 
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or rather to a father’s intentions by an indissoluble bond, I enter 
upon a new career which is to end only with death.” Alongside his 
fraternal social contract theory, Rousseau’s neo-Stoic storytelling 
not only permitted but also encouraged women’s passivity under pa-
triarchal rule.29
Indebted to the philosophical ideas of Rousseau and his Social 
Contract (1762), which formally excluded women from an otherwise 
radical vision of popular sovereignty, the 1789 French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen embodied the overt masculinization of 
rights ideology in the revolutionary era. At the same time, it helped 
to trigger an international discourse on the rights of man in which 
women played a leading and subversive role. During the early 1790s, 
female political theorists such as Wollstonecraft and de Gouges pub-
licly questioned the masculine biases of the rights of man doctrine.
Wollstonecraft’s treatise A Vindication of the Rights of Men—the 
fi rst published response to Irishman Edmund Burke’s Refl ections on 
the Revolution in France in late 1790—contained the seeds of her 
philosophy of women’s human rights. Against Burke’s conservative 
critique of the political dangers of the revolutionary rights of man 
doctrine, Wollstonecraft suggested that the real danger lay in not 
expanding the concept to include women: “Who will pretend to say, 
that there is as much happiness diffused on this globe as it is capable of 
affording?” She then strongly implied that the education of women’s 
rational capacities was part of the “recognition” of the “full force” of 
the “native unalienable rights of men.” Human happiness and “social 
virtue” would be maximized for every person “if she could gain the 
strength that she is able to acquire.” In a few short sentences, Woll-
stonecraft synthesized the basic principles of her theory of women’s 
human rights: (1) women must be granted rights because they are 
entitled to them on the basis of their humanity; (2) the right to edu-
cation is fundamental because it enables the development of women’s 
ability to successfully use other civil and political rights; and (3) the 
granting of rights without distinction of sex is a precondition for the 
well-being and virtue of humanity as a whole.30
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On a rhetorical level, Wollstonecraft’s explicit switch to the femi-
nine pronoun “she” was a telling critique of the male bias of the 
rights of man discourse that she sought to supplant with her univer-
salistic philosophy of human rights. By moving from the masculine 
language of the “rights of men” to a specifi cally feminine pronoun, 
Wollstonecraft underscored the special and urgent need for civic 
recognition of women’s human rights, especially to education. Us-
ing a similar rhetorical technique, de Gouges’s 1791 Parisian pam-
phlet “Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen” uncovered 
the patriarchal bias of the 1789 Declaration, by rewriting the list of 
French republican rights with the female sex included.
From the Rights of Man to the Rights of Woman
Some of the earliest extensions of the revolutionary-era rights of 
man doctrine to women are found in political essays of the French 
republican tradition: Condorcet’s 1790 essay “On the Admission of 
Women to the Rights of Citizenship” and, a year later, de Gouges’s 
aforementioned “Declaration” asked for women to be granted the 
same civil and political rights as men in the new French republic. 
Their arguments began with the premise that republican citizenship 
rights ought to extend to all adults, not simply men.
Joan Scott has illuminated how early French feminist activists such 
as de Gouges played on the paradoxical character of women’s rights 
discourse within modern patriarchal republicanism. Through their 
robust involvement in the liberal stage of the Revolution from 1789 
to 1792, Frenchwomen signaled the disconnection between the idea 
of natural, individual rights and the exclusion of half the human spe-
cies from them. As the ex-bishop and French revolutionary Charles 
Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord had observed in his 1791 Rapport 
sur l’instruction publique, “To see one half the human race excluded 
by the other from all participation of government, was a political 
phenomenon that, according to abstract principles, it was impossible 
to explain.” This paradox, or tension between abstract principles 
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of justice and the patriarchal culture in which women were bound, 
was the inspiration for Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman, which she 
pointedly dedicated to Talleyrand-Périgord in the hope that he and 
his new republic might push past it.31
Wollstonecraft’s 1792 Rights of Woman shaped a new, international 
political rhetoric and public discourse on rights. It was quickly trans-
lated into French and published in Paris and Lyon in the same year. 
In 1793, a Parisian reviewer argued that Wollstonecraft’s book put in 
theoretical form what had transpired in the early stage of the Revolu-
tion in the form of women’s highly visible participation in republican 
politics: “So many Frenchwomen have already fulfi lled the wishes 
of Mrs. W! Did they not work arduously in the excavation of the 
Champ de Mars? How many came armed for the defense of their 
country?” Seen from the French republican perspective, Wollstone-
craft’s treatise illustrated what Hegel would later describe as philoso-
phy’s tendency to articulate what recently has passed: “The owl of 
Minerva begins its fl ight only with the onset of dusk.”32
Wollstonecraft’s book may have captured the political spirit of the 
immediate past, but it also directed the trajectory of women’s rights 
discourse across Britain, Europe, and the United States. Janet Todd’s 
estimate that fi fteen hundred to three thousand copies of the Rights 
of Woman were sold between 1792 and 1797 may be low, as Susan 
Branson has discovered that fi fteen hundred copies of the book were 
printed in Philadelphia alone in 1794. At the turn of the nineteenth 
century, there were more copies of the Rights of Woman in American 
libraries than of Paine’s Rights of Man. In addition to two further edi-
tions in London and several reprintings in Boston and Philadelphia, 
the book was published in Dublin in the 1790s.33
The Rights of Woman also spread across Continental Europe. Se-
lections from the French edition were translated for Diario de Madrid 
in September 1792, despite the repressive character of the Spanish 
monarchy and its censorship policies. This review and translation 
may have infl uenced other Spanish articles on women’s education 
in the 1790s. In 1793–94, George Salzmann—the Schnepfanthal 
educator whose children’s stories Wollstonecraft had translated into 
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English in 1790—arranged the publication of the fi rst German edi-
tion of the Rights of Woman. His lengthy introduction to the book 
presented many of Wollstonecraft’s ideas as friendly to his own pro-
gressive ideas on children’s coeducation, especially through outdoor 
play. Salzmann distanced himself from Wollstonecraft’s stronger 
feminist arguments, however, by emphasizing the need for a benevo-
lent paternalism in education and focusing on the instrumental value 
of women’s education for the well-being of husbands. His German 
edition of the Rights of Woman was translated into Dutch in 1796 and 
into Danish in 1801. Accented with a satin binding and pink ribbon, 
the Danish edition delicately affi rmed Salzmann’s conservative read-
ing of the book’s compatibility with traditional gender roles.34
It was the popularity of Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman in 1790s 
America that marked a tipping point toward the enthusiastic public 
embrace of the idea of equal rights for the sexes. The September 
1792 issue of Philadelphia’s Lady’s Magazine devoted nine pages to 
excerpts and analysis of Wollstonecraft’s book. The editor’s intro-
duction to this piece proudly announced: “This lady is known to the 
world, by her answer to Mr. Burke, and we now behold her employ-
ing her pen on behalf of her own sex.” In his 1793 Fourth of July ora-
tion, New Jersey congressman Elias Boudinot took note of a striking 
shift in political discourse: “The Rights of Woman are now heard as 
familiar terms in every part of the United States.” Wollstonecraft’s 
book had an almost immediate impact on the formation and spread 
of women’s rights discourse in America.35
Prior to 1792, the idea of women’s rights had been bandied about 
in Anglo-American public discourse in a more satirical than seri-
ous fashion. As with John Adams’s 1776 letter to Abigail Adams, a 
1791 poem in the United States Chronicle poked fun at the idea that 
women would even want the “Rights of Man” that Thomas Paine de-
fended, since they already enjoyed absolute sexual power over their 
husbands:
But have not women greater rights than these;
Do they not rule and govern as they please?
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The servile men of every age and nation,
Are always slaves to female legislation.
Several of the earliest responses to the Rights of Woman, especially in 
London, were similarly indisposed to taking the issue of sex equal-
ity seriously. Thomas Taylor, the Cambridge Platonist, penned 
a parodic Vindication of the Rights of Brutes in 1792. He used crude 
sexual humor to suggest that extending rights to women was as silly 
and perverse as attributing rights to elephants, by envisioning a fu-
ture egalitarian society in which women freely chose to breed with 
rights-bearing pachyderms. Another satirical pamphlet in London 
that year thanked “Mrs. Mary with the hard German name” for her 
ideas on “the general rights of girls,” and exclaimed “Oh! Mr. Paine, 
what do we not owe you” on the matter of “the general rights of 
boys.” In October 1792, a Philadelphia newspaper published an ar-
ticle entitled “The Rights of Woman,” which directly scorned Paine 
for ignoring the rights of woman but indirectly derided Wollstone-
craft’s egalitarian conception of rights. The pseudonymous Susannah 
Staunch instead declared a satirical list of rights of wives—including 
retaliatory adultery and an “unquestionable and uncontrollable right 
in the kitchen, the laundry, and the dairy.” Such humorous gender-
ing of Anglo-American rights discourse, with Paine often associated 
with the rights of men and Wollstonecraft often linked to the rights 
of women, belied the cultural resistance to a truly egalitarian concep-
tion of human rights.36
Wollstonecraft’s Christian Metaphysical 
Foundation for the Rights of Women
Even as secularization began to shape the cultures of the North 
Atlantic states, philosophical and rhetorical appeals to the God-
given nature of rights were common in the eighteenth century. As 
in the natural religion of Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Indepen-
dence (1776), sometimes God and nature were equated or equivo-
cated in Enlightenment thought. In that foundational document of 
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the American Revolution, he appealed to the rights of the American 
people over and against the laws of the British Empire, and framed 
the former’s rights as grounded on “the laws of nature and of Nature’s 
God.” The three dominant schools of thought on natural rights in 
the late eighteenth century—Protestant Christianity, social contract 
theory, and Enlightenment-era appropriations of Stoicism—to vari-
ous degrees built on this premise, that the natural rights of human 
beings were dictates of reason and as such derived from God’s natu-
ral law of morality.37
Wollstonecraft dove straight into these debates on the basis of 
rights as a young professional writer and translator in London in 
the early 1790s. Born in 1759, to a middle-class Anglican family in 
East London, she was privately tutored and mentored by several 
Protestant intellectuals in her youth: John Arden, a dissenter and 
scientifi c lecturer whose daughter Jane befriended Wollstonecraft in 
Yorkshire in their mid-teens; Mr. Clare, a clergyman who served as 
her informal teacher in north London in her late teens; and the Cal-
vinist turned unitarian Reverend James Burgh and his wife, Hannah 
Harding, who assisted her in establishing a coeducational day school 
on Newington Green in north London in her mid-twenties. Around 
1784, Wollstonecraft met the Reverend Dr. Price, a rational dis-
senter and abolitionist preaching at the Newington Green church. 
Although she continued to attend Anglican services, she soon the-
orized the foundation of human rights similarly to this dissenting 
minister. Given that she was raised Anglican, found her teachers 
among Protestant ministers, and wrote extensively on theology as an 
adult, it is not surprising that Wollstonecraft took a broadly Protes-
tant Christian approach to theorizing a theological and metaphysical 
foundation for women’s human rights.38
Although social contract and neo-Stoic ideas have been identi-
fi ed in her writings, Wollstonecraft is not typically categorized as 
belonging to either of these schools on natural rights. Her exten-
sive critique of Rousseau in her Rights of Woman provides ample evi-
dence of her dislike of his brand of social contract theory. The 1755 
Second Discourse’s model of the “state of nature” was an “unsound” 
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starting point for political theory, since it was “reared on a false hy-
pothesis.” There was no evidence for Rousseau’s (or other theorists’) 
fanciful claims about human beings before society and government. 
Perhaps because of her skepticism of the imagined divide between 
nature and society proposed by Rousseau, she did not regularly ap-
peal to the concept of “natural rights.” Instead, she preferred such 
terms as “rights of humanity,” “civil and political rights,” “sacred 
rights,” “rights and duties,” “rights of men,” and “rights of woman.” 
Her favored terms defi ned human rights not in relation to what was 
supposedly natural but rather to what actually established people as 
rights-bearing subjects: their humanity, the laws of their govern-
ments, and morality itself.39
Further distancing herself from the social contract tradition, 
Wollstonecraft only mentioned the concept of the “social compact” 
four times in her writings—referring to either current forms of con-
stitutional mixed government (Britain and France) or a future “truly 
equitable” form of republicanism in which the sexes were equal con-
tributors to civic virtue because “women were educated by the same 
pursuits as men.” At the beginning of the Rights of Men, her single 
abstract description of the “social compact” merely represented 
her ideal republican state as one that guaranteed “the birthright of 
man”: “such a degree of liberty, civil and religious, as is compatible 
with the liberty of every other individual with whom he is united 
in a social compact.” Unlike Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, 
 Wollstonecraft never employed contract theory to explain the rea-
sons for the formation of societies, governments, or systems of inter-
national law.40
As for Enlightenment-era appropriations of Stoic ideas, Woll-
stonecraft at times seemed to embrace their value for women, espe-
cially those who fared badly in society. In an anonymous 1790 review 
of Catherine Macaulay’s Letters on Education signed “M” and subse-
quently attributed to Wollstonecraft, the “doctrines of the Stoics” 
were praised as deserving of “respect.” Beyond this tenuous evidence 
of Wollstonecraft’s approval of Stoicism, Richard Vernon has cited 
the Rights of Woman’s dramatic representation of the bereft widow as 
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the best mother as more conclusive proof of her Stoic brand of femi-
nism. Wollstonecraft pictured a young woman of virtue who, in the 
wake of her husband’s death, chose to focus on her children rather 
than pursue the awakening of new sexual love: “She is left a widow, 
perhaps, without a suffi cient provision; but she is not desolate! The 
pang of nature is felt; but after time has softened sorrow into mel-
ancholy resignation, her heart turns to her children with redoubled 
fondness, and anxious to provide for them, affection gives a sacred 
heroic cast to her maternal duties.” At fi rst glance, the Wollstone-
craftian widow’s melancholy yet moral state might suggest her Stoic 
disposition in the face of personal tragedy. Yet her “heroic” fulfi ll-
ment of her duties to her children despite her sadness at the loss of 
her husband and her competing feelings for another man was also 
broadly compatible with Protestant Christian ethics. Even Vernon, 
who has made the strongest case for Wollstonecraft’s Stoicism, has 
conceded that these ideas would have been fi ltered through her re-
ception of the rational Christian theology of her mentor Price.41
Wollstonecraft’s apparent Stoicism might be better explained in 
terms of currents in late eighteenth-century Protestant Christian 
ethics, especially the kind that Kant systematized on a purely ratio-
nal plane in his moral philosophy. Like Kant’s theory of the dutiful 
reasons for ethical conduct in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
 Morals (1785), Wollstonecraft’s story of the widow made it clear that 
morality depends not on happiness but rather on the intention to ful-
fi ll obligations. Despite this basic commonality, Wollstonecraft never 
took the stronger Kantian position that the autonomous, or duty-
oriented, performance of moral rules required the outright rejection 
of heteronomous, or happiness-producing, motives. On the other 
hand, she agreed with Kant that happiness could be a by-product of 
making moral choices. The widow ultimately experienced happiness 
in her devotion to the care of her children, even given the loss of her 
spouse and the opportunity for a second marriage. As Wollstonecraft 
imagined, “I see her surrounded by her children, reaping the reward 
of her care.” The emotional authenticity of Wollstonecraft’s widow 
can thus be contrasted with Rousseau’s Julie, whose Stoic denial of 
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her unhappiness in her arranged marriage to Wolmar only led to 
her death-bed revelation of her eternal love for St. Preux. In a letter 
intended for her lover that her husband found after her death, Julie 
disclosed the truth that she always loved St. Preux the most: “Nay, 
I leave thee not, I go to await thee. . . . Only too happy to pay with 
my life the right to love thee still without crime, and to tell thee so 
one more time.” The Wollstonecraftian widow, by contrast, partook 
of worldly love plus the promise of otherworldly joy: “Her children 
have her love, and her brightest hopes are beyond the grave, where 
her imagination often strays.” Her rational control of her passions al-
lowed her to emotionally fl ourish in this world as a prelude to eternal 
happiness in the next life.42
Indeed, Wollstonecraft presumed neither a Stoic nor a Kantian 
tension between reason and the passions in her ethical system. In-
stead, she followed the British empiricist Hobbes in understanding 
the passions as “necessary auxiliaries of reason.” “Auxiliaries,” in 
the eighteenth-century English lexicon, were helpers or assistants 
(sometimes referring to military assistance but originally referring to 
intellectual relationships, such as the productive role of mathemat-
ics for physics). The passions, especially the primary “impulse” to 
self-preservation, were thus the helpers or assistants for the proper 
development of human reason. For Wollstonecraft, as for Hobbes, 
the development of human reason was not open-ended or morally 
neutral but rather aimed toward the realization of a circumscribed 
set of human goods. The passions assisted reason’s development 
such that adult humans came to understand the value of their ratio-
nal “struggle” with passion as constitutive of the goods that defi ned 
their lives as ones worth living and preserving. Even if it was diffi cult 
to negotiate the “game” of life—partly because of the impulses of 
passion—a person could rationally grasp the most important (and 
often unexpected) moral lessons from the process of playing the 
game. Reason was not only transformed in this cooperative relation-
ship with the passions but also strengthened in the process. To put 
this point into sharp relief, Wollstonecraft offered the hard case of 
the widow, whose long-term and genuine happiness depended upon 
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reasonably controlling her grief and fi nding comfort and pleasure in 
enacting her duty to her children.43
Given their male biases and general sidelining of women, Chris-
tian sources for natural rights theories were as problematic for Woll-
stonecraft’s philosophical purposes as neo-Stoic and social contract 
theories. Just as Wollstonecraft rejected the conceptual divide be-
tween the state of nature and the social contract, she also rejected 
scriptural accounts of an original state, such as the story of Adam and 
Eve, as productive for ethics or politics. Such origin stories were em-
pirically unverifi able and thus prone to distorting the facts of the hu-
man condition. This was especially true in the case of understanding 
the relationship between the sexes, as the story of Adam and Eve had 
been repeatedly used to defend women’s subordination to men, even 
by great minds such as the poet John Milton. According to Woll-
stonecraft’s feminist biblical hermeneutics, “Man, from the remotest 
antiquity, found it convenient to exert his strength to subjugate his 
companion” through “inventions” such as “Moses’ poetical story” 
about Eve being made from Adam’s rib.
Rather than rely on scriptural accounts or conjectural stories about 
the origins and progress of humanity, Wollstonecraft established a 
few “fi rst principles” by which humans and their rights might be 
rationally understood from a metaphysical/ethical perspective. In 
the opening chapters of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft defi ned 
rights as “the privilege of moral beings.” Moral beings are human 
beings, who are designed by God to achieve “pre-eminence over the 
brute creation” and to acquire “virtue” and “knowledge” through the 
exercise of “reason.” She argued that women might “procure” rights 
through the “exercise of reason.” By using reason to gauge moral 
action toward others, women would “obtain the sober pleasures 
that arise from equality.” She insisted that such “sober pleasures” 
were secondary to the primary reason for women’s understanding of 
themselves as rights-bearing subjects: women’s “fi rst duty is to them-
selves as rational creatures.” The subjective rights of women were 
therefore derivative from their duties, especially the duty to develop 
their moral and intellectual potential as rational creatures of God.44
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Responding to the defi ciencies of Christian, neo-Stoic, and social 
contract theories of natural rights for securing freedom and well-
 being for women, Wollstonecraft thus developed an alternative theo-
logical and philosophical foundation for the full inclusion of women 
in the rights of humanity. In crafting a universalistic and egalitarian 
understanding of human rights, she drew on a variety of schools of 
thought within the rational Christian dissenter tradition. Dissenting 
Christians were the non-Anglican Protestants in England who had 
gained the right to practice their alternative forms of Christianity 
under the Toleration Act of 1689.
Wollstonecraft’s intellectual exposure to rational Christian dissent 
of the sort espoused by Price took place between 1784 and 1786, 
when she heard his sermons at the Newington Green church. Her 
fi rst publications on issues such as female education, marriage, and 
family—Thoughts on the Education of Daughters (1787), Mary, a Fic-
tion (1788), and Original Stories from Real Life (1788)—show the deep 
Augustinian infl uence of Anglican Christianity on her early politi-
cal thought. Yet these major writings before the French Revolution 
also indicate her growing engagement with the alternative school 
of religious and political thought represented by rational Christian 
dissenters such as Burgh and Price. It was Wollstonecraft’s two Vin-
dications, published in 1790 and 1792, that refl ected her full adoption 
of the Pricean approach to grounding human rights on a rational 
theological foundation.45
Price was the son of a Presbyterian minister. His Newington 
Green church was founded as a Presbyterian church in 1708. In the 
late eighteenth century, this church became more strongly associ-
ated with the broader dissenting Christian movement from trinitar-
ian to unitarian theology. Price’s own theological views on the trinity 
moved in this direction. He considered himself an Arian: he viewed 
Jesus not as cosubstantial with God but rather as a creature made by 
God before his physical incarnation. For this reason, he thought Je-
sus should not be worshipped, because worship ought to be reserved 
for God.46
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Wollstonecraft, by the time she wrote the Rights of Men, seems to 
have pushed beyond Price’s Arianism toward a Socinian, or unitar-
ian, view of God. Rebuffi ng Burke’s hypocritical combination of elit-
ism and Christianity, she implied that the Irish statesman respected 
Jesus for his regal “lineage” from David, whereas her devotion to 
“the carpenter’s son” depended only on his appointment by “Di-
vine authority.” Like other late eighteenth-century Socinians such 
as Joseph Priestley, Wollstonecraft revered Jesus as a mortal man (a 
“carpenter’s son”) who was chosen by the one God to serve as the 
greatest moral exemplar for humanity. Her antitrinitarian theology 
did not make her any less devoutly Christian, however. In the Rights 
of Men, she proclaimed a deep personal and emotional bond with the 
one God of the Old and New Testaments, alongside a piety toward 
the moral example of Jesus, in a way that revealed the resilience of 
orthodox elements of her Protestant faith.47
On matters of moral theology, Price and Wollstonecraft argued 
against voluntarism and empiricism in favor of rationalism. Volunta-
rists, such as Ockham, had argued that the moral law was an expres-
sion of God’s will. Empiricists, such as Hobbes, had argued that there 
was no stable enforcement of the laws of nature (beyond the constant 
right to practice self-defense) until government and positive law 
were established by the will of the absolute sovereign. Both schools 
presumed that morality was an expression of the will of a sovereign 
ruler, divine or mortal. Both Price and Wollstonecraft rejected these 
schools of thought on the grounds that they made morality arbitrary. 
Wollstonecraft critically read Burke’s defense of political institutions 
as sources of moral authority along these lines: “Nature and Reason, 
according to your system, are all to give place to authority; and the 
gods, as Shakespeare makes a frantic wretch exclaim, seem to kill us 
for their sport, as men do fl ies.” If moral rules were merely expres-
sions of divine or personal will, then morality could be reduced to 
the subjective volitional whims of the Creator or human rulers.48
Instead, Price and Wollstonecraft took a rationalistic approach to 
conceptualizing God and humanity’s relationships to the moral law. 
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For both of them, the moral law is objective, because it is rational 
and has this ontological property independently of God’s will. If 
the moral law was merely an expression of God’s will, then morality 
could be reduced to the whims of an all-powerful sovereign Creator 
who failed to subject himself to the rules of reason. To avoid this pit-
fall of theological voluntarism, Price and Wollstonecraft set forth a 
two-part rationalistic account of the basis of morality that pertained 
to both God and humankind: (1) the moral law exists independently 
of God’s will but as part of his nature as the supreme rational being, 
and (2) the moral law is universal in its application to all humans, 
who may grasp it via reason because they are made in the image of 
God. As Wollstonecraft explained in theological terms in the Rights 
of Men, “I fear God! I bend with awful reverence when I inquire on 
what my fear is built—I fear that sublime power, whose motive for 
creating me must have been wise and good; and I submit to the moral 
laws which my reason deduces from this view of my dependence on 
him.—It is not his power that I fear—it is not to an arbitrary will, 
but to an unerring reason I submit.—Submit—yes . . . to the law that 
regulates his just resolves.” Price’s and Wollstonecraft’s theological 
and metaphysical defi nition of the moral law as part of God’s es-
sence, but independent of his will, had roots in Thomas Aquinas. It 
also had Enlightenment Protestant expressions among rights theo-
rists such as Locke.49
This idea of the moral law as grounded on reason, independently 
of any being’s will, gave the idea of human rights the possibility of 
an objective and universal foundation. Following Price, Wollstone-
craft in her Rights of Men posited a theological and metaphysical ac-
count of the grounding of “sacred rights” on the “eternal foundation 
of right.” This foundation was found in “the immutable attributes 
of God”: fi rst and foremost, the reason which God and his human 
creatures shared. In his 1767 theological Dissertations, Price had de-
fended a conception of God as rational, providential, and caring: “A 
God without a Providence is undoubtedly a contradiction. Nothing 
is plainer than that a Being of perfect reason will in every instance 
take such care of the universe as perfect reason requires.” Wollstone-
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craft likewise opened her Rights of Woman with a similar theodicy: 
“Firmly persuaded that no evil exists in the world that God did not 
design to take place, I build my belief on the perfection of God.” For 
Wollstonecraft as well as Price, the realization of the “sacred rights” 
of humanity was part of God’s rational and benevolent providential 
plan for the development of human potential within creation.50
For Price and Wollstonecraft, human beings had moral rights and 
moral duties—in short, ethical relationships with one another—
because they had access, via reason, to understanding the universal 
principles of morality. These principles were part of God’s nature as 
the supreme rational being, but they were principles to which God 
voluntarily subjected his will. Humans, too, had a choice: a choice 
to direct their freedom of will and rationality to the understanding 
and application of these principles in their interactions with each 
other. As Wollstonecraft argued in the Rights of Men, “The more 
man discovers the nature of his mind and body, the more clearly 
he is convinced, that to act according to the dictates of reason is to 
conform to the law of God.” The human subject’s freedom of will, 
combined with her rationality, empowered her to enact the moral 
duties derived from the objective and universal law of God, and the 
rights derived from such duties.51
Both Price and Wollstonecraft thus reserved a robust place for 
freedom of the will in their accounts of moral theology, ethics, and 
human rights. Rational Christian dissenters typically emphasized the 
freedom of the will’s legitimate expression in the civil and political 
rights to freedom of conscience and religious toleration. This En-
glish nonconformist tradition grew in power after the Toleration Act 
of 1689, which had permitted non-Anglican Protestants to establish 
churches such as the one on Newington Green.52
Price had developed a strong human rights theory while preaching 
in various capacities at Newington Green since 1758. He supported 
the abolition of chattel slavery and backed the American and the 
French Revolutions. In 1776, he argued that among the “inalienable 
rights of human nature” was the right to exercise free will through 
participating in the social compact; through such willful popular 
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participation, governments would fi nally be rendered legitimate in 
their powers. Furthermore, the practice of moral liberty, religious 
liberty, and civil liberty raised human beings above the level of “a 
poor and abject animal.” Price defi ned moral liberty as the exercise 
of free will and reason in order to put God’s moral law into action. 
Moral liberty, for Price as for Wollstonecraft, was the rational self-
governance of individual human beings according to universal prin-
ciples of morality. This concept of moral liberty undergirded their 
ideal conceptions of citizenship as participation in a self-governing 
republic with a popular legislative assembly. Although they thought 
that moral liberty was an important component of civil and political 
liberty, it was not a precondition for one’s entitlement to civil and 
political rights. The case of chattel slavery illustrated this point: the 
slave was not allowed to be either physically or morally free but still 
deserved to be granted her liberty so that she could learn to be free 
physically, morally, civilly, and politically.53
Wollstonecraft’s rational theological approach to universal human 
rights built on Price but extended the argument explicitly and sys-
tematically to women. While Price repeatedly referenced the “in-
alienable rights of humanity” in his sermons and political writings, 
he never seems to have made a public, recorded plea for women’s hu-
man rights. His abolitionist arguments against human slavery only 
implied women’s human right to be free from slavery. Wollstone-
craft, on the other hand, began to specifi cally and systematically ar-
gue for women’s human rights alongside the abolition of slavery in 
her earliest political treatise, the 1790 Rights of Men.
Before penning the Rights of Men, Wollstonecraft did not often 
use the language of rights in the sense of subjective, or individu-
ally held and exercised, rights. The infl uence of Price at Newington 
Green seems to have triggered a shift in Wollstonecraft’s conception 
of rights. As a student, teacher, and theorist, she long had an interest 
in the issue of female education—but she had not previously framed 
education as a right of each and every human individual. In her early 
publications, she conceptualized education as a moral duty of adults 
to be performed in relation to their children; on the obverse side, it 
Y6872.indb   56 1/6/16   10:37:59 AM
A  P H I L O S O P H I C A L  G E N E A L O G Y  O F  W O M E N ’ S  H U M A N  R I G H T S
57
was a moral duty of children to follow their parents’ instruction to 
ensure their own development toward consistent practice of God’s 
moral law. By the time she composed the Rights of Men, Wollstone-
craft had begun to theorize an egalitarian view of universal human 
rights—beginning with education and leading to republican politi-
cal participation. Her view followed Price in its grounding in the 
theology of rational dissent. Her specifi c application of the concept 
of subjective rights to women, however, was a philosophical mile-
stone in the realization of the concept’s universalistic and egalitarian 
potential.
Mill’s Secular Alternative to Religious and 
Metaphysical Theories of Rights
It was also in this late eighteenth-century intellectual context that 
classical utilitarian thought, as set forth by Jeremy Bentham and 
James Mill, began to be developed. Utilitarianism— or the view that 
happiness is the only good, and suffering the only bad, and right ac-
tion is that which maximizes this good understood in this way—was 
a philosophical expression of the secularization of high culture in the 
late Enlightenment. John Stuart Mill, born in 1806 in the Penton-
ville neighborhood of London, was a product of this secular utilitar-
ian school of thought, beginning with his earliest education by his 
father, James. James Mill was raised Presbyterian but wholly rejected 
religion as an adult, not only because of his personal lack of faith 
but also because of his broader ethical conviction that religion was 
the primary cause of suffering. Utilitarianism posed the competing 
objective of reducing pain by promoting the greatest pleasure for 
the greatest number of people and other sentient beings. Debunking 
religion was one step that both Bentham and James Mill adopted as 
part of the diffusion of happiness around the globe.54
Bentham had famously declared the idea of natural rights as 
“nonsense on stilts.” Viewed from his wholly sensory and empirical 
utilitarian perspective on happiness, religion was nonsense. Conse-
quently, any religious or other metaphysical justifi cations of rights 
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were doubly absurd: propped up by shoddy arguments, natural rights 
were destined to fall down from their lofty heights once subjected 
to rigorous scientifi c scrutiny. Although he agreed with Bentham 
that metaphysical foundations for rights were nonsense, John Stu-
art Mill did not abandon the project of justifying rights on alterna-
tive grounds. Rather, his philosophical convictions about the nature 
of morality and rights brought him to the conclusion that enslaved 
people and women (including enslaved women) have rights. These 
rights he called “moral rights” to distinguish them from the “le-
gal” or positive rights that typically had been granted only to men 
in power, and often with the purpose of oppressing groups such as 
slaves and women. His nearly lifelong political concern for advanc-
ing the rights of women and other historically oppressed groups 
such as African slaves encouraged him as a philosopher to move in 
this radical direction. Mill accordingly developed an abstract ratio-
nal justifi cation for the moral rights of humans, which rested upon 
a secular and nonmetaphysical (meaning a posteriori and empirical) 
utilitarian conception of the individual human being as a “progres-
sive being.” Such a progressive being was capable of and entitled to 
liberty and free and full self-development toward the happiness of 
herself and other sentient beings. In order to realize such free devel-
opment toward happiness for each and all, humans needed to have 
their moral rights to freedom and self-development enshrined in and 
ensured by law. Hence, Mill made a case for the institutionalization 
of moral rights as legal rights, so that legal rights could be a force for 
the happiness of humanity and sentient life as a whole. Mill’s concep-
tion of moral or human rights thus served as a nonmetaphysical and 
rationally justifi ed normative standard according to which the law 
and other man-made institutions ought to be critically judged and 
ultimately reformed.55
Attention to Mill’s biography (and autobiography) is instructive 
for understanding the roots of his nonmetaphysical approach to jus-
tifying human rights. James Mill raised his son John Stuart in a de-
liberately secular way, educating him at home and apart from any 
religious schools or universities. Although he was baptized and oc-
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casionally sent to services at a local Anglican parish as a young child, 
John Stuart later recalled, “I have never believed in Christianity as a 
religion.” In correspondence with his friends and fellow intellectuals 
Auguste Comte and Thomas Carlyle, Mill represented himself as 
exceptional for his utterly secular upbringing and consistent lack of 
faith.56
In contrast to his fellow Londoner Wollstonecraft—who died 
about nine years before he was born in 1806—Mill received a train-
ing in moral philosophy that was entirely secular. Written in several 
versions between 1853 and 1870, his Autobiography famously chron-
icled his “unusual and remarkable” education. Most distinctively, 
Mill noted, “I was brought up from the fi rst without any religious 
belief.”57
From 1810 to 1813, Mill’s family lived near Newington Green. 
Unlike Wollstonecraft’s exposure to the abstract metaphysics of ra-
tional dissent at Price’s church on the green, Mill’s education was 
deliberately situated on entirely scientifi c and empirical grounds. 
Between the ages of four and seven, Mill took daily walks with his 
father, James, from the green to the countryside. During these earli-
est remembered encounters with nature, he was expected to present 
accounts of “what I had read the day before.” James Mill focused 
his young son’s attention on learning from the historical examples 
of great “men of energy and resource in unusual circumstances.” 
Among these great men was James himself, whose views on “civili-
zation, government, morality, [and] mental cultivation” John Stuart 
was expected to restate “in his own words.” Religion was treated as 
a subspecies of history, with a focus on the exemplary history of 
Protestant reformers—such as John Knox and the Quakers—who 
had challenged clerical and aristocratic power. The remainder of 
John Stuart’s unusually early and intensive intellectual education 
concerned classical languages, mathematics, experimental natural 
science, logic, and, most important, the modern empirical “science” 
of political economy.58
As foundations for human knowledge, James Mill had rejected both 
revealed religion and natural religion, including deism. He taught 
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John Stuart that “concerning the origin of things nothing whatever 
can be known.” The question “‘Who made me?’ cannot be answered, 
because we have no experience or authentic information from which 
to answer it”; furthermore, it raises the question “Who made God?” 
Faced with such unanswerable questions, arguments about the ori-
gins of the universe failed to provide foundational evidence for either 
religious or scientifi c worldviews. At a very young age, John Stuart 
adopted his father James’s secular philosophical approach to episte-
mology: if “nothing could be known” about the remote origins of 
the universe, then more immediate and material grounds for under-
standing oneself and nature must be sought.59
This alternative empirical grounding for human knowledge, in-
cluding morality, was Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy. John Stuart 
described his father as “the earliest Englishman of any great mark, 
who thoroughly understood, and in the main adopted, Bentham’s 
general views of ethics, government, and law.” James Mill’s “stan-
dard of morals” was utilitarian in Bentham’s sense, by “taking as the 
exclusive test of right and wrong, the tendency of actions to produce 
pleasure or pain.”60
John Stuart recalled that as early as the age of seven he also had a 
close personal relationship to Bentham. In the winter of his fi fteenth 
year, John Stuart’s worldview was transformed by reading Dumont’s 
Traité de législation (1802), a redaction of Bentham’s Introduction 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). Dumont’s treatise, 
as guided by Bentham’s principles, demystifi ed religion and other 
metaphysical views (including the ideas of natural law and right rea-
son) as “dogmatism in disguise.”61
John Stuart, from that point onward, understood Bentham’s “prin-
ciple of utility” as the only certain and systematic foundation for a 
modern, scientifi c, and thus secular approach to ethics, economics, 
and politics: “The ‘principle of utility,’ understood as Bentham un-
derstood it, and applied in the manner in which he applied it through 
these three volumes, fell exactly into its place as the keystone which 
held together the detached and fragmentary component parts of my 
knowledge and beliefs. It gave unity to my conception of things. I 
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now had opinions; a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among 
the best senses of the word, a religion.” Bentham’s utilitarianism 
gave the young Mill a secular creed or philosophical orientation 
that inspired him with a kind of religious zeal to “to be a reformer 
of the world.” If the happiness of humans and other animals could 
be calculated from their experience of pleasure and their avoidance 
of pain, the planned realization of broadly benefi cial laws and poli-
cies seemed within practical reach. Mill devoted the next fi ve years 
to such projects, in writing, debate, and leadership of the Utilitar-
ian Society of young male intellectuals who shared his expectation 
that the systematic application of principles of utilitarian political 
economy could reform the world. During this time, he identifi ed his 
“own happiness” with that of the realization of the greatest good for 
all in every sphere of life.62
Then, in the fall of 1826, the twenty-year-old Mill faced what 
he later called the “crisis in my mental history.” He asked himself: 
If “all your objects in life were realized” would you be happy? “An 
irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, ‘No!’” He de-
scribed this devastating psychological experience in terms of the loss 
of all foundations, including the philosophical architecture of utili-
tarianism: “The whole foundation on which my life was constructed 
fell down.”63
The consequence of this loss was Mill’s rebuilding of his sense of 
self and his philosophy upon restructured utilitarian foundations. He 
began by theorizing the defects in both his own early education and 
the Benthamite utilitarian outlook, particularly their lack of personal 
affect: “My education, I thought, had failed to create those feelings 
in suffi cient strength to resist the dissolving infl uence of analysis.” 
Without the subjective emotional sympathies and pleasures that 
could make his commitment to utilitarianism meaningful for him, 
he was like a “well-equipped ship” without a “sail.” He had the goal, 
the greatest aggregate pleasure for humanity, but not the motive, his 
own sense of pleasure in life, or even a sense of the subjective value 
of his own life. Mill’s mental crisis taught him that defi ning one’s life 
by a telos, or ultimate goal, is not enough. One needs a grounding or 
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a centering point, which can only be one’s subjective sense of self and 
its value. From this psychological grounding, one may set sail toward 
a goal, without losing a greater sense of purpose upon arrival. The 
journey was not over with the accomplishment; rather, the process of 
self-development continued with the new set of experiences waiting 
on the horizon.64
His fresh connection with his “irrepressible self-consciousness” 
motivated John Stuart to develop his own utilitarian moral philoso-
phy, which put the value of the human individual’s self-development 
at its core. He still believed that happiness was the “test of all rules 
of conduct, and the end of life,” but that it was “only to be attained 
by not making it the direct end.” He made an inward turn to con-
templating and valuing “the internal culture of the individual” more 
than external and material signs of human well-being. Such contem-
plation of one’s self, and human selfhood in general, was the source 
of “real, permanent happiness.” This inward turn did not require a 
“turning away” from “the common feelings and common destiny of 
human beings” but rather required a “greatly increased interest in” 
such common human experiences. The latter insight came from his 
reading of the poetry of William Wordsworth, which Mill felt was 
an expression of the poet’s own “spontaneous overfl ow of powerful 
feeling” in the face of the natural beauty of everyday human life. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s conception of the best education as 
cultivating the complex and many-sided character of individuals was 
another inspiration for the young Mill in his time of recovery.65
His discovery of this indirect route to personal happiness al-
lowed Mill to conceive a general view of self-development as the 
indirect route to the greatest happiness for the greatest number. 
Self- development of individuals was the necessary fi rst step toward 
the end of realizing the greatest happiness for all. The aggregate 
benefi cial effects of a law or policy were not suffi cient grounds for 
meeting Mill’s revised utilitarian test of morality. In his primary test 
of the morality of the law or policy, the benefi ts for individual self-
 development had to be articulated. This new formulation of utili-
tarianism was liberal, or oriented toward the reciprocal protection 
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of the liberty of individuals in ethical and political relation to others’ 
liberty. His liberal utilitarianism understood the conditions for in-
dividual liberty and free and full self-development as necessary for 
generating an authentic global utility.
Two of Mill’s major political writings fl eshed out the process by 
which this liberal utilitarian approach to promoting happiness could 
be put into practice. On Liberty (1859) presented the fi rst step as the 
recognition of the “principle” of individuality, or the view that spon-
taneous self-development was “the chief ingredient of individual and 
social progress.” Once individuality was articulated in “civilization, 
instruction, education, [and] culture” as “a necessary part and condi-
tion of all those things,” its realization could be understood as the 
indirect, though morally correct, path to the greatest happiness of 
the whole.66
In On Liberty and The Subjection of Women (1869), Mill identifi ed 
education as the primary practical tool by which an aesthetic and 
moral appreciation of individuality could be cultivated in people 
over time and across generations. Properly understood in the broad-
est sense, education was not merely socialization or social control. 
Rather, it was a long-term process of realizing the rich range of 
capabilities of human beings, fi rst as individuals, and secondly as a 
species. According to Mill’s liberal utilitarian principles, it was espe-
cially crucial for education to cultivate the individuality of women in 
addition to inculcating men’s appreciation for women’s virtuous yet 
varied self-development. Without nurturing a culture in which indi-
viduality would thrive among women as much as men, society would 
miss out on “doubling the mass of mental faculties available for the 
higher service of humanity.”67
Less diffi cult than such deep cultural reform in the long run, but 
perhaps as complicated in the short term, the next step was to reform 
the law. For this task, Mill assigned “one very simple principle”: the 
view that moral rightness was acting so that the consequences of 
one’s action maximized happiness (or minimized suffering). In the 
domain of law, he advocated that legislators and jurists use this harm 
principle as a conceptual device for assigning the appropriate “legal 
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penalties” to those who, whether individually or collectively, enacted 
harm upon others. Consequently, only the harmful conduct by the 
individual that “concerns others” could be subject to legal scrutiny 
and rightful punishment. The liberal political import of the harm 
principle was to demarcate a legal space within which the individual 
could experience an expansive self-regarding liberty, conducive to 
his or her free and full self-development, without “encroaching on 
the rights of others.” Individual human rights, including women’s 
rights to education and suffrage, ought to be legislated according to 
thoughtful applications of the harm principle, since its aim was to 
encourage the fl ourishing of an other-regarding ethic of individual 
freedom under the law. The last, long-term, and most visionary step 
of this twofold, educational and lawmaking, process was letting peo-
ple spontaneously self-develop according to established moral and 
legal rules of their “rights as human beings” so that a virtuous happi-
ness for all might prevail.68
Around the same time that Mill discovered these indirect routes to 
personal and global happiness, he was becoming practically and phil-
osophically engaged with the question of women’s rights and related 
issues such as sexual education concerning contraception. In 1823, 
the young Mill was arrested for distributing pamphlets on birth con-
trol. In the Autobiography, he dated his interest in the issue of women’s 
rights to his second decade of life, when he critically responded to his 
father James Mill’s Essay on Government (1820). He dissented from 
the elder Mill’s claim that “women may consistently with good gov-
ernment, be excluded from the suffrage, because their interest is the 
same with that of men.” Mill insisted that his father could not escape 
the charge that this abstract point about  representation—which as-
sumed homogenous interests across a group—had problematic im-
plications for ethics and politics, especially in the age of suffrage re-
form. In his Autobiography, Mill favorably recounted how William 
Thompson’s 1825 “Appeal in behalf of women” pitted its arguments 
against his father’s assumption that married women’s interests were 
identical to their husbands’ interests. New England suffragist John 
Neal later recalled how he debated John Stuart Mill in London on 
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the issue of women’s rights in the late 1820s, in the wake of the pub-
lic discussion of James Mill’s failure to adequately address women’s 
rights.69
John Stuart’s early pondering of the woman question was also in-
debted to Bentham. In his Autobiography, Mill reported that on the 
“important point” of women’s suffrage, Bentham was “wholly on our 
side.” By addressing the woman question as part of their philosophi-
cal calculus of how to maximize happiness for all sentient beings, 
James Mill and Bentham set the stage for John Stuart’s more robust 
philosophical and political engagement of the issue over the course 
of his career.70
The young Mill’s deepening concern with the woman question 
has usually been linked to his profound intellectual relationship with 
the female friend who would eventually become his beloved wife, 
Harriet Taylor. The pair exchanged their unpublished essays on 
marriage in 1831 or early 1832. In these tantalizingly short works of 
philosophical prose, Taylor and Mill set forth their distinctive views 
on reform of marriage and the social status of women. As Alice Rossi 
argued in her edition of the couple’s writings on the equality of the 
sexes, Taylor was more in the school of the Unitarian Radicals of 
1830s London, whose keen interest in using rationalistic theology for 
advancing women’s rights extended from Wollstonecraft to Harriet 
Martineau; Mill, on the other hand, was shaped by the Philosophical 
Radicals of Britain, in taking a secular, utilitarian, and Romantic ap-
proach to the issue of realizing women’s equality with men.71
Taylor’s essay shows her to be the more radical feminist of the two 
at the time. Mill’s essay defended a Romantic vision of a more equal 
form of marriage, in which the wife inspired the husband intellectu-
ally as well as through the beauty of the domestic environment she 
created for them. As he poetically opined, “The great occupation of 
woman should be to beautify life: to cultivate, for her own sake and 
that of those who surround her, all her faculties of mind, soul, and 
body; all her powers of enjoyment, and powers of giving enjoyment; 
and to diffuse beauty, elegance, and grace, everywhere.” Mill’s es-
say concluded with worries about protecting women outside such 
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beautiful and enjoyable marriages, especially against the forces of 
public opinion that judged their sex quite harshly for assertions of 
independence. To his credit, he endorsed an equal right to divorce 
so that women would not be “forcibly united to one of those who 
make the opinion.”72
Taylor’s response delved deeper into an assessment of patriarchal 
power relations. She critiqued the gendered divide between public 
and private, which placed men in civil and political roles outside the 
home and women predominantly within the private space of the fam-
ily. Even liberals with radical leanings like Mill understood women’s 
roles as focused on caring for others, as when he claimed women’s 
“great occupation” is to “beautify” life for everyone. Taylor ironically 
remarked, as Wollstonecraft had done, on the similarity of the plight 
of prostitutes and wives: “Women are educated for one single object, 
to gain their living by marrying—(some poor souls get it without the 
churchgoing. It’s the same way—they do not seem to be a bit worse 
than their honoured sisters).” Taylor’s essay also defended women’s 
“most entire equality with men, as to all rights and privileges, civil 
and political.” She emphasized the rights to divorce, to be single and 
childless, and to have careers outside the home, on the grounds that 
recognition of such rights would open the door for further social 
reforms that would promote the equality of the sexes in society and 
law. Poignantly, the friends privately exchanged these manuscripts 
on marriage during the early days of their platonic relationship. Both 
in their mid-twenties, Mill was single, but Taylor was married to her 
fi rst husband, John, and raising their three young children.73
Mill’s early criticism of his father’s assumption of the homogeneity 
of spousal interests within marriage led him to publically challenge 
the view that male heads of families could adequately represent the 
interests of women in politics. The logic of the “indirect route” to 
happiness could be applied to this case of justifying women’s rights 
within utilitarianism. Male heads of household cannot be substituted 
for their wives, as though they held equivalent functions in the calcu-
lus of utility; rather, individual wives may differ from their husbands 
in the subjective assessment of their own and their family’s interests. 
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Harriet Taylor’s differences of opinion from her “upright, brave, and 
honorable” fi rst husband were a poignant case in point; John Taylor’s 
interests were not the same as Harriet’s, despite his “steady and affec-
tionate” friendship with her. Mill reasoned that all adult individuals, 
including women, must be allowed political conditions under which 
they can represent their subjective perception of their interests, such 
as via the right to vote. The self-development and individual human 
rights of women, therefore, were preconditions for the good of the 
whole political community.74
Beyond his inspiration by Bentham, his father, and his future wife, 
Mill was aware of Wollstonecraft’s work on women’s rights, too. In 
1843, his friend and correspondent Auguste Comte—the French 
positivist philosopher—wrote to him about his youthful fascination 
with her work in the late 1790s. Comte expressed how she played a 
role in his early philosophical engagement of the relationship be-
tween the sexes: “All thinkers who seriously like women as some-
thing more than pretty playthings have nowadays passed through a 
similar phase, I believe. In my turn, I well recall the time when the 
strange book of Miss Mary Wollstonecraft—written before she mar-
ried Godwin—infl uenced me strongly.” Mill and Comte’s ensuing 
correspondence on the woman question was later published in 1860s 
St. Petersburg and 1870s Paris, stirring further feminist debates.75
Despite his early interest in Wollstonecraft’s philosophy of sex 
equality, Comte later positioned himself against the Wollstonecraft-
ian school of thought on the common humanity and rights of the 
sexes. In his 1843 letters to Mill, Comte instead posited a “natu-
ral hierarchy” of men over women that translated into separate and 
unequal social roles for the sexes. He went so far as to claim that 
women—by virtue of their “organic” sexual inferiority—were in a 
“state of radical childhood” and thus incapable of management roles, 
inside or outside the household.76
Mill’s epistolary response to Comte illustrated the impact of the 
past decade of theoretical discussions with Taylor on marriage and 
the sources of female subordination. Mill defl ated Comte’s claim 
of a female incapacity for management by pointing out women’s 
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 comparative strength in running households, and even industries, 
in En gland. Via a comparison of Western European women with 
the Russian serfs, Mill argued that women’s secondary status to men 
was a product of socialization: “The servitude of women, although 
milder [than that of the serfs], is a servitude without respite, en-
compassing all of their activities, which discharges them, much more 
completely than was ever true for the serfs, from all essential plan-
ning for the future and from all active direction of their own conduct 
with respect to society but even in the way of individual interest.” 
By 1843, Mill was clearly developing a more comprehensive political 
theory of how society imposed inequality on the sexes. His refl ection 
on the moral psychology of women’s oppression opened the door to 
his deliberation on the necessity of social and economic reforms, es-
pecially educational and workplace opportunities, to unlock women 
from their ascribed position of total subordination.77
While Mill never cited Wollstoneraft as a source for his work, we 
know that his intellectual partner Taylor read the Rights of Woman. 
She also shared the book with her adolescent daughter, the future 
women’s suffragist Helen Taylor, in the early 1840s. Harriet Taylor’s 
brand of feminist liberalism had much in common with Wollstone-
craft’s ideas, as well as the growing organized feminist movement 
in the 1840s United States. Taylor’s 1851 essay “The Enfranchise-
ment of Women,” published in London’s Westminster Review, paid 
homage to the recent, path-breaking women’s rights conventions in 
Seneca Falls, New York, and Worcester, Massachusetts. Taylor made 
a strong public demand for women’s formal political incorporation 
as an essential aspect of social justice, nationally and internation-
ally. Recalling the language of Wollstonecraft’s appeal to Talleyrand-
Périgord, Taylor pointedly asked: “For with what truth or rationality 
could the suffrage be termed universal, while half the human species 
remain excluded from it?” In an undated, cowritten essay from this 
period, Taylor and Mill together answered the question with even 
more rhetorical and philosophical force: “the rights of women 
are no other than the rights of human beings.” This may be the fi rst 
direct formulation of the proposition that women’s rights are human 
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rights—and it was a joint production, like so much in the couple’s 
life together. For example, it was Taylor’s early advocacy on behalf of 
the women’s suffrage cause that launched Mill’s leadership roles, as 
an author and politician, amid the international fl ourishing of femi-
nist activism in the 1860s.78
Both Mill and Taylor were in all likelihood philosophically in-
debted to the ideas of Wollstonecraft, who was the most famous 
(and infamous) women’s rights advocate in the world in the mid-
nineteenth century. Other feminist authors such as Sophia, Madame 
de Staël, Frances Wright, Martineau, and Margaret Fuller enjoyed 
international receptions, particularly in the Atlantic world, but none 
was so strongly associated with the concept of women’s rights as 
Wollstonecraft. All too transparent in its honest biographical treat-
ment of Wollstonecraft’s premarital sexual relationships, her husband 
William Godwin’s well-meaning Memoirs of the Author of A Vindi-
cation of the Rights of Woman (1798) continued to be scandalous in 
Victorian Britain. It may have been Wollstonecraft’s special infamy 
as a fallen woman in her homeland that made Mill and Taylor reluc-
tant to overtly relate their feminist liberal ideas to their predecessor. 
Regardless, Mill quickly eclipsed Wollstonecraft as the best-known 
feminist political philosopher around the globe, with the publica-
tion of The Subjection of Women in six languages, eight countries, and 
twelve editions or printings in 1869 alone.79
Another reason for Mill’s silence with regard to Wollstonecraft 
might be the fundamental difference in their approaches to defi n-
ing and justifying women’s human rights. Wollstonecraft’s rational 
Christian metaphysics stood in stark contrast to Mill’s practical and 
secular liberal utilitarianism. Despite their relative proximity in time 
and place, they erected two alternative foundations for women’s 
human rights. Chapter 2 comparatively assesses the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of their theories of rights for addressing feminist 
questions of justice, then and now.
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FOUNDATIONS OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
WOLLSTONECRAFT’S RATIONAL THEOLOGY 
AND MILL’S LIBERAL UTILITARIANISM
The Problem of Foundations, Revisited
Natural rights theories—from the late medieval era to the late eigh -
teenth century—had sidelined women for the most part. As shown in 
chapter 1, these theories had limited value for understand ing women 
as rights-bearing subjects. The era of the French Revolution saw the 
rise of new theories of rights that conceived of women as moral, 
social, and political equals alongside men. Most notably, Mary Woll-
stonecraft revised the rational dissenting Protestant theology of her 
mentor Richard Price so that it explicitly justifi ed the inclusion of 
women in the “rights of humanity.” Moreover, she theorized rights 
in deontological terms, like her contemporary Immanuel Kant, to 
fortify their status in ethics and politics. As correlates of moral du-
ties prescribed by God’s rational and universal moral law, human 
rights were moral absolutes for Wollstonecraft. In this respect she 
anticipated the liberal philosopher Ronald Dworkin’s view of “rights 
as trumps,” in the sense that she ascribed to rights the power to over-
ride any competing ethical or political demands. In an alternative 
approach, John Stuart Mill sought to correct classical utilitarian-
ism’s neglect of individual rights while accepting its secular frame 
and grounding of utility. Unlike Jeremy Bentham’s dismissal of the 
idea of justifying rights independently of positive law as “nonsense 
on stilts,” Mill’s liberal utilitarianism aimed to institutionalize in law 
the rationally justifi ed moral rights of women and other historically 
oppressed groups as an indirect yet necessary step toward realizing 
the greatest happiness of all.1
Each of these revisions of earlier philosophies of rights came with 
their own problems. Wollstonecraft faced a dilemma born of the fact 
of religious pluralism. In its theoretical justifi cation, her capacious 
metaphysics staked a big tent under which all members of human-
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ity could be assured coverage for their rights. In rhetorical practice, 
however, the Christian elements of her system of thought made it 
more persuasive than not to people who shared those same or similar 
theological beliefs. Mill confronted a different problem, since the 
moral beliefs required for persuading people to accept his secular 
utilitarian approach to grounding human rights were minimalistic in 
comparison to Wollstonecraft’s metaphysics. Mill’s main issue was 
rather one related to the justifi cation of rights: namely, the insecure 
status of rights within his liberal utilitarianism. Because he followed 
Bentham in understanding utility as the sole foundation for morality, 
Mill conceptualized rights as instruments for promoting the utility 
of the whole. Rights could not function as trumps for Mill. Rights 
could only serve as tools for realizing the greatest happiness through 
the indirect route of encouraging the free and full self-development 
of each and every individual. Although he sought to improve upon 
the classical utilitarian neglect of individual rights, his liberal utilitar-
ianism nonetheless returned to the same moral problem that plagued 
his father, James, and Bentham. Can the good of any given individual 
be rightly sacrifi ced for the greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber? Wollstonecraft could answer this question with a defi nitive no, 
because of her deontological grounding for human rights and theo-
logical view of the intrinsic worth of human creatures. While the 
secular Mill escaped Wollstonecraft’s demanding metaphysics and 
theological biases, he failed to defend individual human rights in any 
absolute sense that would unconditionally protect people from per-
sonal sacrifi ce for the sake of the happiness of the majority. Whether 
such sacrifi ce was supererogatory—arising from a heroic sense of 
duty— or forced upon the individual from without, Mill’s theory 
of rights could not completely rule out the moral validity of such 
an extreme utilitarian demand. As John Rawls argued, utility could 
potentially trump rights even in Mill’s liberal revision of classical 
utilitarianism.2
Despite their different fl aws and foundations, Wollstonecraft’s 
and Mill’s alternative justifi cations of human rights are examples of 
what Charles Beitz calls “naturalistic” theories of rights, which are 
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predicated on conceptions of the nature of the human being. Both 
Wollstonecraft’s rational theology and Mill’s liberal utilitarianism 
offer “naturalistic” theories of rights in the sense that they posit that 
all human beings hold equal rights “by virtue of their humanity,” or 
what makes them human. The defi nition of the human person thus 
becomes crucial for both Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s theories of uni-
versal human rights. In particular, their explicit inclusion of women 
in their respective defi nitions of the human gave Wollstonecraft 
and Mill each a basis for the idea of women’s human rights. From 
Wollstonecraft’s religious and metaphysical perspective, women’s 
human rights were grounded in women’s natures as human creatures 
made in the rational image of God. Regardless of sex, humans were 
equally subject to their divine Creator’s universal, rational moral law. 
As moral equals, men and women were obliged to put the rational 
moral law of their divine Creator into practice through the dutiful 
respect of each other’s human rights. From Mill’s secular perspec-
tive, women’s human rights were based on a conception of utility 
that was nonmetaphysical (meaning a posteriori and empirical) yet 
abstract and normative (specifi cally, eudaimonic or virtue oriented). 
Mill followed Bentham and Auguste Comte in rejecting the type of 
abstractions found in metaphysical and ontological philosophies in 
favor of proceeding with phenomenal and experiential data as the 
basis for the explanation of facts about the natural world. He thought 
that he had abstracted from the empirical study of sentient life a 
conception of utility that had strong, though nonmetaphysical, nor-
mative implications. His conception of utility revised classical utili-
tarianism by positing a eudaimonic or virtue-oriented conception of 
happiness as the normative end point of its ethical system. In Mill’s 
liberal utilitarianism, the virtuous happiness of each individual hu-
man being, especially his or her robust sense of personal agency and 
self-development, would be maximized if the equality of the sexes 
was recognized in culture and law through the institutionalization of 
human rights for women and men alike. Although his naturalistic ac-
count of the human being derived from empirical observation rather 
than metaphysical speculation, it was a normative ideal in the sense 
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that it posited a thick moral conception of virtuous happiness as the 
goal of individual human development.3
From a contemporary liberal philosophical perspective, each of 
these views of the foundations of universal human rights is problem-
atic for similar and different reasons. Similarly, Wollstonecraft’s and 
Mill’s theories today encounter the problem of foundations itself. 
Since Rawls made his turn toward a political liberalism that explicitly 
avoids appeals to any comprehensive doctrines (such as metaphysical 
or religious views, or other robust normative conceptions of human 
development, happiness, or the good life), a number of liberal think-
ers have followed suit with nonfoundationalist approaches to justify-
ing human rights. Such Rawlsian nonfoundationalist theories defi ne 
human rights without relying on deep, demanding, or divisive moral 
doctrines. The purpose of these “purely political” defi nitions of hu-
man rights is to establish a broad yet thin consensus upon which a 
stable international conception of rights can be built. This consensus 
is historically rooted in legal practices of human rights but may also 
be projected into the future, as in the case of Rawls’s hypothesis of an 
international league of liberal and decent peoples bound together by 
established human rights norms. Rawlsian approaches tend to pro-
ceed from the analysis of the ongoing public articulation and under-
standing of human rights in politics and law in the wake of the 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen and especially the 1948 
Universal Declaration. For example, Beitz and Jack Donnelly have 
based their normative arguments about the appropriate scope and 
content of human rights upon the international legal consensus that 
has snowballed since 1948, rather than appealing to potentially divi-
sive naturalistic foundations for rights as do Wollstonecraft’s rational 
theology and Mill’s liberal utilitarianism.4
By a nonfoundationalist approach to human rights, Donnelly means 
that he takes human rights as socially constructed “givens” from a 
particular historical and legal context. He begins his narrative of the 
evolution of universal human rights with the 1789 French Declara-
tion, which established equal rights for most men in the revolution-
ary republic. Since then, national and international laws and policies 
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concerning the rights of humans have broadened, ever so gradually, 
to include blacks, women, and other marginalized groups.5
The problem with Donnelly’s nonfoundationalist approach is that 
it fails to address the practical need (and historic practice) of ap-
peals to naturalistic foundations for rights in a time prior to the in-
stitutionalization of such rights for marginalized groups. By 1789, 
women’s human rights had only been barely and murkily concep-
tualized in European political thought. As Olympe de Gouges and 
Wollstonecraft demonstrated, the idea of the rights of woman was so 
visionary that just to change the gender of a pronoun or a noun in 
the dominant rhetoric of the rights of man was a radical move.
Yet de Gouges and Wollstonecraft both had to do more than 
change pronouns from masculine to feminine. Confronted with the 
fact of their social and political marginalization in even postrevolu-
tionary republicanism, they felt pressed to appeal to a conception 
of the common humanity of the sexes in order to persuade men in 
power that women were in fact worthy of the same civil and politi-
cal rights as men possessed. De Gouges grounded her arguments on 
the idea of human rights that grew out of the Rousseauian tradition 
of natural religion, while Wollstonecraft employed the Anglophone 
discourse of rational dissenting Christianity to make the case for 
women’s human rights. Regardless of their belief (or possible nonbe-
lief ) in such foundations, their philosophical and rhetorical appeals 
to kinds of natural or metaphysical bases for women’s human rights 
(such as their respective conceptions of the human being) were po-
litically necessary in their contexts.
Rawlsian nonfoundationalist approaches take for granted a cultural 
and legal institutionalization of human rights that Wollstonecraft 
and even Mill could not presume, especially in the case of women. 
Back then, the idea of women’s rights was just that—an idea, and a 
laughable one even in the wake of the French Revolution. In order 
for one to take rights as a “given,” those rights need to be recognized 
as a “societal given,” in culture and law. There is an important dis-
tinction between having rights and having those rights recognized 
and respected by other people or protected by state power. Woll-
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stonecraft and Mill understood this distinction and the problems it 
raised for human rights advocacy. They were faced with the struggle 
of convincing people that women were humans with the same rights 
as men, and as such were deserving of popular recognition and legal 
protection of their rights like men. It made sense to them that they 
had to provide a solid moral foundation for this radical view, to give 
it philosophical validity. As masterful rhetoricians poised to fi ght a 
battle for the losing side, Wollstonecraft and Mill also knew that the 
coherence of their arguments for the foundations of universal human 
rights had implications for their persuasiveness in the public sphere. 
Their simple and elegant logic was in many ways their most powerful 
weapon in the rhetorical and political battle for the public recogni-
tion and legal institutionalization of women’s human rights.
Neither Wollstonecraft nor Mill had the luxury of starting with 
the given of universal human rights; rather, each had to construct an 
argument for the establishment of rights as legal and cultural givens 
for all humans. Pablo Gilabert has defended the ongoing relevance 
of such foundationalist (or what he calls “humanist,” and what  Beitz 
calls “naturalistic”) arguments as “working in tandem” with con-
temporary Rawlsian nonfoundationalist, or purely political, human 
rights approaches. Foundationalist arguments for human rights may 
productively work in tandem with such nonfoundationalist argu-
ments in the sense that the former are better equipped to advance 
human rights prior to their cultural and legal institutionalization, 
while the latter are better suited for the articulation of human rights 
within positive law and offi cial public policy. First, foundationalist 
arguments establish an abstract yet robust normative standard by 
which the defi ciencies of current institutions, in culture and law, 
may be judged with respect to rights. In the words of Gilabert, a “hu-
manist perspective is crucial to recognize the signifi cance of institu-
tions, frame their shape and impact, and explain why their creation 
or transformation is needed.” In addition to such critical assessment 
of current institutions, foundationalist arguments enable a visionary 
perspective from which new or unrealized human rights might be 
imagined and demanded for “enjoyment” in the future.  Alongside 
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Amartya Sen, Gilabert conceives of such foundationalist arguments 
for human rights as critical tools for “alleging” or advocating how 
new or unrealized rights ought to be prospectively specifi ed and ul-
timately realized in law and policy. The justifi cation of human rights 
via humanistic/naturalistic foundations therefore has important 
practical implications for persuasive allegation and subsequent dis-
semination of human rights.6
Wollstonecraft and Mill thus began with foundationalist ap-
proaches to the abstract rational justifi cation of universal human 
rights. Their respective theological and secular methodologies con-
tinue to be relevant to contemporary politics, particularly because of 
their persuasive powers for audiences in different cultural contexts. 
Although Wollstonecraft’s particular brand of theological argument 
for women’s human rights is not as salient today, other religious 
variants of this type of metaphysical foundationalism have become 
important. Non-Western cultures, animated by religions such as 
Islam, Confucianism, and Hinduism, seek to incorporate the lan-
guage of women’s human rights into their systems of religious and 
political beliefs. Some Western religious women have looked back to 
Wollstonecraft and other early women’s rights advocates as sources 
for their own bridging of feminism with Judaism, Christianity, and 
other world religions.7
But it is Mill’s secular liberal utilitarian foundation for human 
rights that continues to wield the most infl uence today, in both a 
negative and a positive sense. Positively, it has helped to produce a 
global idiom for arguing for women’s human rights in universalistic 
terms that do not necessarily privilege any particular religion and are 
easily adaptable in a variety of legal and political systems. Mill’s hu-
manistic/naturalistic approach derived human rights from a secular 
yet normatively rich account of human individuality and its potential 
for virtuous yet varied moral development. His abstract defi nition 
of individual rights by way of a secular account of human nature al-
lowed Mill to use rights claims as a critical tool for judging the in-
suffi ciency of current schemes of justice. Such political criticism, in 
turn, should generate positive claims for specifi c rights that society 
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ought to institutionalize for women in order to realize justice for the 
“disqualifi ed half of the human race.”8
Negatively, the political infl uence of the Millian approach has 
been matched with its practical failures. First, secular naturalistic 
conceptions of human rights do not necessarily address the cultural 
preference of many humans for their deeply held religious beliefs 
to resonate with their principled political conception of the equal 
dignity of human beings. Second, liberal utilitarian foundations for 
human rights might also express (often latent) secular biases, espe-
cially for Western models of economic and civilizational progress. 
Both of these dimensions of Millian liberal utilitarianism may im-
pede the nuanced and ethical application of universalistic women’s 
human rights arguments in situations of religious or other forms of 
cultural difference.
In what follows, I set forth analyses of Wollstonecraft’s theologi-
cal and Mill’s secular approaches to justifying women’s human rights 
arguments, expounding their strengths as much as their weaknesses. 
Despite their fl aws, Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s foundationalist ap-
proaches to justifying human rights remain salient in different ways 
for liberal and feminist approaches to advocating for human rights. 
In particular, they offer distinct yet often complementary models for 
how to ethically and persuasively allege and defend women’s human 
rights in situations of religious or cultural confl ict, by attending to 
those religious and other cultural differences in one’s approach to 
human rights advocacy. To test and compare their value for human 
rights advocacy, I assess the advantages and disadvantages of both 
approaches in the context of historic and contemporary debates on 
religious polygamy considered as a women’s human rights issue.
Wollstonecraft’s Theological and Deontological 
Foundation for Universal Human Rights
Two puzzles confront any reader who wishes to understand Woll-
stonecraft’s theory of rights. First, one fi nds a preponderance of refer-
ences to duties, both general and specifi c, over references to specifi c 
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conceptions of rights, across Wollstonecraft’s corpus of writings. In 
the Rights of Woman alone, Wollstonecraft used the term “rights” 
thirty-two times but employed the term “duties” about three times as 
often. This trend seems curious for a book that declares on its cover 
to be a vindication of the rights—not the duties— of woman.9
Second, readers notice Wollstonecraft’s tendency to make conse-
quentialist arguments for the benefi ts of granting rights to women. 
Wollstonecraft frequently discussed the extrinsic, social benefi ts of 
granting civil and political rights to women, often for men: “Would 
men but generously snap our chains . . . they would fi nd us more 
observant daughters, more affectionate sisters, more faithful wives, 
more reasonable mothers—in a word, better citizens.” As for the in-
trinsic, personal benefi ts of human rights for individuals, Wollstone-
craft reverently spoke of the “sober pleasures” of thinking and acting 
as a rational moral agent and rights bearer. While these consequen-
tialist forms of argument are not in themselves problematic, they 
seem to stand in tension with her overall concern with moral duty. If 
human beings have God-given duties to respect each other’s human 
rights, then the performance of duty would matter far more than the 
consequences of performance. In other words, the obligation to pro-
vide human rights to others obtains independently of the intrinsic 
or extrinsic consequences of the act of provision. Yet Wollstonecraft 
often ostensibly argued the reverse: in particular, that the public 
benefi ts of granting rights to women are what justify their provi-
sion. On this reading, she paradoxically appears to defend rights for 
women on condition of their generating benefi ts for society at large, 
especially the men who currently run it.10
A common resolution to these twin puzzles can be found via a 
deontological and theological reading of Wollstonecraft’s theory 
of human rights. Understanding Wollstonecraft’s deontological (or 
duty-based) justifi cation for human rights better accounts for her 
rhetorical and philosophical emphasis on the concept of duty, even 
in treatises that aim to vindicate the rights of men and the rights of 
women. By deontological, I mean the defi nition of moral rightness 
(what is absolutely right) as logically and ethically prior to the moral 
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good (what is contingently benefi cial). Deontological conceptions 
of human rights are grounded on an idea of their moral rightness, 
fi rst and foremost. Human rights are thus seen as derivative from an 
abstract, rational, universal, and obligatory moral rule or principle. 
In other words, people ought to recognize and respect human rights 
because it is their moral duty to do so.
Following Kant, such deontological theories of rights are typically 
justifi ed in strict opposition to consequences. Under the Kantian 
view, one ought to recognize and respect rights because it is morally 
right to do so in an absolute and universal sense, not because they 
produce good social outcomes. Furthermore, one is morally obliged 
to recognize and respect rights even when the practice of such rights 
might produce bad social outcomes. Wollstonecraft shared the Kant-
ian deontological conception of human rights as primarily defi ned 
by their absolute (and rational) moral rightness. Her mentor Price 
has been called a Kantian moral philosopher; I also situate Woll-
stonecraft within a family of Kantian approaches to ethics.11
Wollstonecraft distinguished herself from Kant and other strict de-
ontological theorists, however, in her regular recourse to consequen-
tialist arguments for the intrinsic and extrinsic benefi ts of granting 
human rights to individuals. At the same time, she agreed with Kant 
that rights are justifi ed not in terms of their consequences but rather 
in terms of their derivation from universal, rational moral duties. 
And yet, both Wollstonecraft and Kant recognized that happiness 
and other benefi cial consequences may be by-products of perform-
ing duties and respecting the corresponding rights of oneself and 
others. Although the performance of duty does not necessarily lead 
to happiness, and the expectation of happy consequences does not 
morally justify the performance of duty in the fi rst place, the exercise 
of duty may be pleasurable (as in Wollstonecraft’s aforementioned 
“sober pleasures” of thinking and acting as a rational being). Al-
though Kant is often starkly caricatured as rejecting any relationship 
between morality and happiness, his Groundwork for the  Metaphysics 
of Morals (1785) opened with the example of a man with painful gout 
who chose to take care of his health rather than indulge his love 
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of rich food, not because it relieved pain or increased pleasure, but 
because it was the right and rational thing to do. His consequent ex-
perience of health brought him a happiness that was a by-product of 
performing this self-regarding duty for the right reasons.12
Given their broad agreement on the relationship between mo-
rality and happiness, the key difference between their systems of 
 deontological ethics was that Kant’s metaphysical approach to defi n-
ing duties and corresponding rights was a priori yet nontheological, 
whereas Wollstonecraft’s was a priori yet theological. In Kant’s epis-
temology, the human mind constructed its rational understanding of 
reality and morality without reference to the noumenal realm (which 
includes the fundamentally incomprehensible God’s-eye point of 
view). Because she did not make such an epistemological distinction 
between the noumenal and the phenomenological, Wollstonecraft’s 
metaphysical theory of rights could and did ground itself on theo-
logical principles. Her theologically informed metaphysics also al-
lowed her to defi ne humanity in broader terms than Kant’s strictly 
a priori, nonempirical, nontheological, metaphysical approach to de-
fi ning humans as rational and moral beings.13
Wollstonecraft’s rational theology, as set forth in her two Vindica-
tions, provided the grounding for several levels of her theory of hu-
man rights. First, it provided Wollstonecraft with an a priori, meta-
physical conception of the human being: humans are creatures of 
God, endowed with reason and the potential to use it to mentally 
access and put into practice the divine moral law. Second, this con-
ception of the human being served as the starting point for her 
 perfectionistic account of human development. Wollstonecraft 
understood the ultimate purpose of human life as the learning and 
practice of moral virtue in social and political relationships. Third, 
and most important for her ethical system, was her theological con-
ception of the rationality and benevolence of God’s providential plan 
for human development. Wollstonecraft affi rmed this view of provi-
dence in chapter 1 of the Rights of Woman: “Firmly persuaded that no 
evil exists in the world that God did not design to take place, I build 
my belief on the perfection of God. Rousseau exerts himself to prove 
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that all was right originally: a crowd of authors that all is now right: 
and I, that all will be right.” This belief or article of faith, which 
Wollstonecraft professed at the time she wrote her two Vindications, 
provided a psychological basis or motive for the human pursuit of 
rational and virtuous self-development in society.14
Wollstonecraft’s rational theology, especially its premise of a be-
nevolent and rational providential plan for human development, 
seamlessly accommodated the benefi cial consequences of rights into 
her moral and political philosophy. Her broadly metaphysical/ ethical 
view of human development allowed her to defi ne human rights pri-
marily as morally right and secondarily as personally and socially 
benefi cial. Her consequentialist arguments for women’s human 
rights were therefore supplemental to her fundamental deontologi-
cal justifi cation for them. These dual, rank-ordered justifi cations of 
human rights rested on her metaphysical conception of humanity’s 
purpose within God’s creation. As Wollstonecraft wrote in the Rights 
of Woman, “The grand end of [human] exertions should be to un-
fold their own faculties, and acquire the dignity of conscious virtue.” 
This theologically informed ethical framework encouraged her to 
articulate how the recognition and respect of human rights generate 
benefi ts for people that are rational, right, and good for the develop-
ment of the human species in both the short and long term.15
As with the Kantian view, Wollstonecraft’s deontological concep-
tion of human rights was correlative: “Rights and duties are insepara-
ble.” Within this correlative account of rights, duty remained foun-
dational. While all rights derived from duties, not all duties entailed 
rights. Moreover, for Kant as for Wollstonecraft, only rational be-
ings had duties and therefore held rights. As she wrote to Talleyrand-
Périgord in the dedication to the Rights of Woman, “a duty” cannot 
“be binding which is not founded on reason.” A rational being would 
only recognize a duty as binding if it was rational and universally ap-
plicable to all rational beings; furthermore, any rights derived from 
such a duty would belong only to rational beings.16
Moving far beyond Kant, Wollstonecraft pushed this correlative 
and rational account of the relationship between duties and rights 
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in an explicitly feminist direction, by addressing the practical asym-
metry between empowered male rights bearers and disempowered 
female rights claimers. Near the end of the Rights of Woman, she ar-
gued that men have no basis for expecting women to perform any 
duties without acknowledging their rights. If “women have not any 
inherent rights to claim,” then “by the same rule, their duties vanish, 
for rights and duties are inseparable.” For Wollstonecraft, the con-
cept of duty defi ned what our relational obligations are to others, as 
moral and rational equals governed by the same moral rules. These 
obligations included our duty to respect other people’s rights regard-
less of their social status (a step that Kant, disappointingly, did not 
take to its logical conclusion, particularly in the case of women).17
In the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft upheld rights as “the privi-
lege of moral beings” but underscored that holding such privilege 
required the exercise of the duty to respect oneself. She particularly 
stressed to her female readership, who had often been degraded by 
the limited options for self-development afforded by patriarchal so-
ciety, that their “fi rst duty is to themselves as rational creatures.” The 
fundamental recognition and self-respect of one’s ontological status 
as a moral, rational, and equal human being, capable of rational as-
sessment of one’s moral relationships with other human beings, was a 
psychological precondition for three dimensions of Wollstonecraft-
ian ethics. First, it allowed one to understand oneself as a duty-
 bearing and rights-bearing subject. Second, it enabled understand-
ing of one’s rights and duties as bearing on other people’s rights and 
duties. Third and ultimately, it promoted the exercise and realization 
of human rights and duties on a broader social and political scale.18
Wollstonecraft’s view of humans as “moral beings,” whose “fi rst 
duty” was to respect themselves as such, parallels Kantian ethics. In 
his second formulation of the categorical imperative (or conception 
of universal duty), Kant set forth an infl uential view of humans as 
“rational beings,” who are moral ends in themselves and not mere 
means to other ends. As such moral ends in themselves, humans 
hold and are obligated to reciprocally respect “the rights of human 
beings.” In her reading of Kant’s ethics, Onora O’Neill has argued 
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that the primary content of his categorical imperative is this abstract 
ethical principle that humans ought to respect themselves and others 
as moral equals. It is this ethical principle that also stands at the core 
of Wollstonecraft’s deontological theory of human rights and duties. 
In her Rights of Men, we fi nd a negative formulation of this principle 
according to her Pricean moral theology: “Every thing looks like a 
means, nothing like an end, or point of rest, when we can say, now 
let us sit down and enjoy the present moment.” Wollstonecraft went 
on to argue that if people consider themselves only in terms of their 
material needs or means, rather than as rational beings striving to 
follow the moral law, then they will exit this life without the “con-
scious dignity” of moral virtue.19
As we have seen, Wollstonecraft’s rational theology furnished a 
view of human beings on a purely metaphysical level, as moral ends 
in themselves. At the same time, her theologically informed meta-
physics opened up a wider perspective on humans, not solely as 
rational beings, but also as embodied, affective, yet rational crea-
tures capable of both morality and happiness. Ensconced within her 
broader metaperspective on the nature of humanity, her view of the 
human-rights-bearing subject as embodied, affective, and rational 
was both empirically grounded and normatively rich. It was an ac-
count of sentient human bodies and their moral relationship to other 
sentient bodies in the divinely created natural world. For example, 
her practical theory of physical education began with empirical ob-
servation of girls as they are embodied, and then proceeded to the 
normative question of how they ought to experience embodiment: 
“If girls were allowed to take suffi cient exercise,” then they would 
exhibit a bodily and mental self-confi dence that would thwart essen-
tialist explanations of their supposed natural “imbecility.”20
For Wollstonecraft, the affective capacities of humans, in particu-
lar their sympathy for other creatures’ feelings, worked with reason 
to produce appropriate moral judgments, including rights claims. 
In her fi rst Vindication, Wollstonecraft described her personal expe-
rience of “reverence” of the “rights of men” as a process in which 
she drew on both her mind and her body: “Sacred rights! for which 
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I acquire a more profound respect, the more I look into my own 
mind; and, professing these heterodox opinions, I still preserve my 
bowels; my heart is human, beats quick with human sympathies—
and I fear God!” Abstract contemplation of human rights and their 
grounding in God’s moral law led her to sense her own embodiment 
as a human and capacity for heartfelt sympathy with other human 
beings.21
With this empirically grounded yet normatively rich approach to 
defi ning the human being in the natural world, Wollstonecraft situ-
ated the fact of human embodiment within her broader metaphysi-
cal/ethical system. Unlike Kant, who has been criticized by feminist 
philosophers for positing an “idealized” conception of a rational male 
agent at the core of his ethical theory, Wollstonecraft advanced an 
approach to ethics that remained abstract yet resisted such a built-in 
sex bias. Her philosophical anthropology of human beings and their 
rights specifi cally accounted for biological sex differences across the 
species. Girls and women, for example, had a right to education con-
cerning reproduction, pregnancy, childbirth, and infant care. They 
might have faced the physical challenge of biological motherhood 
and the consequentially “grand” duty to intensively care for their de-
pendent offspring “in their infancy” despite their own vulnerability 
while recovering from childbirth. The capacity for biological moth-
erhood entailed women’s human right to know what to expect from 
such a physical and moral challenge, should it be posed.22
At the most abstract level, Wollstonecraft’s view of human rights 
bearers was purely metaphysical and theological: it was an account 
of human beings as rational and moral beings, subject to following 
God’s moral law via the faculty of reason. As shown in chapter 1, this 
view had its roots in Price’s rational theology, especially the univer-
salism of his moral theology. From this religious context, Wollstone-
craft crafted her own metaphysical vision of reality that was, at least 
in theory, open to accommodating a variety of theological positions 
within it. She made it clear in her two Vindications that the orthodox 
Christian ontological claim that Jesus was God was not a necessary 
premise for her account of human rights. She alluded to what was 
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likely her own Socinian view of Jesus as a man—not God or even 
a preincarnational creature of God—who was the greatest human 
exemplar of morality.23
The presentation in the Vindications of Jesus as a moral exemplar 
is now widely recognized as compatible with a variety of world re-
ligions, including Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, which 
acknowledge him as such. Indeed, Christian denominations since 
the nineteenth century, including orthodox sects, have often em-
phasized the “human” or “embodied” Christ alongside other dimen-
sions of his nature. The theological generality of Wollstonecraft’s 
metaphysical outlook made her argument for universal human rights 
potentially appealing to people from a variety of faith perspectives, 
especially within monotheistic traditions. Theoretically, her account 
of human rights was a big tent under which all people, religious or 
not, could fi nd shelter. And yet, its rational dissenting Christian 
framework made it in rhetorical practice more persuasive to those 
who shared at least some of Wollstonecraft’s religious belief system, 
as the conclusion of this chapter explores with the example of her 
feminist followers in nineteenth-century Mormon Utah.24
Viewed from the vantage of either the empirically grounded or 
the most abstract metaphysical level of her thought, her conception 
of the human being allowed Wollstonecraft to apply the concept of 
subjective rights to each and every human due to his or her poten-
tial for rational agency. Her privileging of rationality as the defi ning 
trait of human beings understood as moral beings made her ethics 
vulnerable to several criticisms, however. Like Locke and Kant, 
Wollstonecraft appeared to idealize an adult rational human being 
as the model for her moral agent who bears rights and duties. Unlike 
in Locke and Kant, this agent was not an idealized male, nor was it 
an idealized disembodied being. Nevertheless, like Locke and Kant, 
Wollstonecraft in her presumption of the human agent’s potential 
for rational autonomy might lead one to think that her moral theory 
cannot accommodate a place for either the cognitively disabled or 
the uneducated. Are persons who are not yet capable of exercising 
reason—because they lack education—and persons who cannot 
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 develop those capacities—due to disability—not entitled to rights? 
In fact, her distinction between the potential to use reason and the 
actual practice of reason enabled her theory of human rights to cover 
these cases. For Wollstonecraft, the potential for reason, not the ac-
tual use of reason, strongly but not exclusively defi ned the nature 
of humanity. For example, Wollstonecraft lamented that the mind 
of a woman of her time was “scarcely raised by her employments 
above the animal kingdom.” Despite their irrationality, the women 
of her day were nonetheless human because they had the potential to 
“acquire the qualities that ennoble a rational being.” Even if women 
did not develop their reason suffi ciently to rise “above the animal 
kingdom,” they retained their moral status as human creatures made 
in the image of their rational God. Her metaphysical perspective 
on human beings and their purpose in the universe allowed Woll-
stonecraft to categorize even the most “degraded” people, women 
and slaves, as fully human despite society’s attempts to dehumanize 
them. Her 1798 novel Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman illustrated this 
point with the fi rst-person testimony of a female servant, Jemima, 
who worked in an asylum where another woman, Maria, had been 
imprisoned by her husband. Recalling her destitute teenage years as 
a household servant, Jemima explained to Maria how her abusive 
family treated her like a “creature of another species.” Raped by her 
master at the age of sixteen, she was expelled from his home while 
pregnant, leaving her only the guilty and desperate choice to drink a 
potion for abortion. Nevertheless, such abuse and impoverishment 
could not actually strip Jemima of her moral status as a human being. 
Indeed, Jemima overcame her feeling of estrangement from the “hu-
man race” by fulfi lling her moral duty to aid another woman in need. 
Using her powers of reason to strategize a way out of the asylum for 
both of them, she not only helped Maria escape but also heroically 
reunited her friend with her infant daughter.25
Beyond the potential for reason, Wollstonecraft had an expansive 
understanding of the variety of capabilities that defi ne the human 
experience, such as sympathy, love, play, and bodily integrity. This 
complex view of the physical joys and freedoms of embodied human 
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life was captured in her Rousseau-inspired account of child develop-
ment: “Every young creature requires almost continual exercise, and 
the infancy of children . . . should be passed in harmless gambols, 
that exercise the feet and hands, without requiring very minute di-
rections from the head, or the constant attention of a nurse.” Ac-
cording to this wide-ranging conception of human development, a 
cognitively disabled child might actualize her love of play and bodily 
integrity alongside other human capabilities even if reason never 
manifested in her adult self.26
Although Wollstonecraft could fi nd shelter for nonrational and 
uneducated people under the big tent of human rights, her insistence 
that reason is the basis of human morality made her theory of educa-
tion open to the charge of paternalism. If a girl lacks reason, and yet 
reason is necessary for directly accessing the law of God, then the 
girl is dependent upon the moral judgment of her rational superiors 
to instruct her about right and wrong. In accepting such paternal-
ism as a necessary part of educating a child toward the autonomy of 
adulthood, Wollstonecraft ran the risk of reinforcing the very pat-
terns of male domination that her egalitarian theory of rights sought 
to undercut. Her answer to this problem was practical: establishing a 
free public system of “national education” that treated boys and girls 
identically from age fi ve through nine. If children were treated as 
equals in primary school, then they would be equally subject to pa-
ternalism. Such equitable paternalism was fully justifi ed only insofar 
as it limited itself to developing reason and other human capabilities 
such as play during childhood and adolescence, so that the girls and 
boys would grow up to become self-governing and mutually respect-
ful adults.27
Wollstonecraft’s capacious metaphysical/ethical system enabled 
the emergent Enlightenment-era conception of human rights to 
become universal. All humans, viewed from Wollstonecraft’s broad 
metaphysical perspective, have the potential to use reason to grasp 
the moral law; therefore all humans have the rights that derive 
from the moral law. These rights are universal in another sense: 
they are morally universal, insofar as they apply in all times and 
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places,  regardless of what positive law, culture, or religion says about 
particular people’s eligibility for claiming them. Humans hold these 
rights even if their societies do not recognize and respect them as 
holding them.
Wollstonecraft, as a human rights advocate, was faced with the 
political predicament that arises from the application of such an 
abstract and universalistic moral view. She neatly summarized this 
predicament as “asserting the rights which women in common with 
men ought to contend for” in the hostile context of a patriarchal 
society that educated women to be subordinate to men, and encour-
aged men to treat women as their subordinates. Speaking as a voice 
in the wilderness, she had no choice but to cultivate the sympathy 
of men in power—“O ye men of understanding!”—in the hope that 
they might grant at least some of the rights (such as equality of edu-
cation) to which women had claim as humans. One of her rhetorical 
strategies was to supplement her abstract, duty-based demands for 
human rights with pragmatic appeals to the benefi cial consequences 
that men would reap from extending such rights to women.28
Wollstonecraft preceded Sen in treating the “allegation” of rights 
as a moral step toward justice, regardless of the “feasibility” of the 
“fulfi llment” of rights claims. For Sen as for Wollstonecraft, this step 
is ethically valuable no matter whether people are actually granted 
such rights in law or policy, but it might also prompt the benefi cial 
consequence of their establishment in the short or long run. The 
allegation of women’s human rights has moral value independent of 
the consequences of asserting such rights. Even if women were never 
given the same education as men, it would always be morally right 
to provide an argument for their right to education. Conversely, if 
women were given the same education as men, the benefi cial con-
sequences would indicate to Wollstonecraft the working of divine 
providence in the world to direct human development toward its 
proper ends of reason, virtue, and knowledge. Despite appearances 
to the contrary, Wollstonecraft’s rational theology allowed her de-
ontological justifi cation for human rights to be consistently supple-
Y6872.indb   88 1/6/16   10:38:01 AM
F O U N D AT I O N S  O F  U N I V E R S A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S
89
mented with consequentialist (as well as pragmatic) reasoning for the 
establishment of such rights.29
Mill’s Complex Consequentialist Foundation 
for Universal Human Rights
Much as in the case of Wollstonecraft, a set of puzzles faces any 
interpreter of Mill’s theory of rights. First, scholars have noted the 
relatively diminished place of rights in Mill’s political philosophy 
as compared to ideas such as individuality, liberty, and self-control. 
Although Mill used the term “rights” or “moral right” twenty-one 
times in his Subjection of Women, the concept of individuality more 
frequently appeared in this extended defense of the free and full 
self-development of women. On the face of it, this is an unexpected 
rhetorical pattern for a book that aims to justify women’s provision 
of “equal rights” with men in order to overcome their historically 
subjected status.30
Second, many a reader of Mill’s On Liberty (1859) and Utilitarianism 
(1861) has reasonably wondered whether the texts have incompatible 
objectives. Mill’s favorite work, On Liberty sought to establish “one 
very simple principle” by which the liberty of the individual is secured 
from unjustifi ed interference by law and government. According to 
the harm principle, the only reason for placing “legal penalties” upon 
the actions of an individual is “to prevent harm to others.” Utilitari-
anism, fi rst published as a series of essays in Fraser’s Magazine, aimed 
to defend utilitarianism against some common criticisms, includ-
ing the charge that its “Greatest Happiness Principle” undermined 
 justice by prioritizing the utility of the greatest number over individ-
ual rights. Such critics asked how, if utility is taken to be “the founda-
tion of morals,” can utilitarianism serve as a basis for securing rights 
and liberties for the individual? Rights cannot function as trumps 
if their benefi cial consequences determine their value, for then the 
utility of the greatest number could legitimately override the rights 
of the individual. In this light, it seems that  utilitarianism—whether 
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 Bentham’s classical formulation or Mill’s liberal revision—is at best a 
shoddy foundation for either positive rights already enshrined in law 
or alleged rights that have yet to be instituted.31
The solution to these two puzzles lies in understanding how Mill’s 
liberal revision of classical utilitarianism relied upon the “principle” 
of “the free development of individuality” set forth in the opening 
paragraphs of chapter 3 of On Liberty. Just as Wollstonecraft’s more 
frequent references to duties than to rights can be explained by her 
deontological conception of morality, Mill’s relative lack of “rights 
talk” can be explained by the foundational place of individuality in 
his moral and political philosophy. As he argued in On Liberty, “It 
is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can pro-
duce, well-developed human beings.” Whereas for Wollstonecraft 
we claim rights as moral absolutes, for Mill we claim rights prag-
matically as tools for the realization of individuality. In Mill’s liberal 
utilitarianism, the “principle” of individuality established a “rule of 
conduct” by which the greatest happiness of the greatest number was 
best achieved through the indirect route of respecting the liberty, 
free and full self-development, and equal rights of individuals. If 
Mill can be thus understood as an indirect utilitarian who maximizes 
utility via the principle of individuality, then his version of utilitari-
anism succeeds in providing a more secure foundation for human 
rights than the classical formulation of Bentham. In addition, Mill’s 
indirect utilitarianism steered clear of the metaphysical speculations 
and theological demands of Wollstonecraft’s deontology, rendering 
it more useful for human rights advocacy from a secular and em-
pirical perspective. Both Mill’s defi nition of the good as happiness 
and his defi nition of the right as the maximization of the good were 
nonmetaphysical claims in the sense that they are grounded on his 
secular, a posteriori, empirical conception of utility. In the tradition 
of David Hume and other British empiricists, Mill sought to defi ne 
morality by way of sensory experience and empirical observation of 
the natural world. He abstracted from these experiences and obser-
vations the idea of utility as the maximization of pleasure and the 
minimization of pain for all sentient life via the principle of indi-
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viduality. Though abstract and richly normative, Mill’s empirically 
grounded conception of utility is not metaphysical because it is not 
based on supernatural ideas or a priori reasoning.32
Unlike Wollstonecraft, who favored deontology, Mill contin-
ued in the utilitarian tradition of justifying morality in terms of the 
consequences of actions (making individuals free and happy), not 
in terms of intentions (individual attempts to do the right thing). 
His Utilitarianism began with a consequentialist critique of Kant’s 
metaphysical, a priori, and nonempirical ethics. According to Mill, 
the Kantian categorical imperative generated universal moral rules 
for rational beings (such as “don’t lie”) that are impractical due to 
their abstract, strictly deontological form. In contrast, a utilitarian 
would productively judge such rules as right or wrong in terms of 
their projected consequences. For example, a Kantian would legis-
late that every rational being, including herself, ought always to tell 
the truth. Yet a utilitarian would helpfully evaluate the morality of 
this rule by judging its potentially “outrageously immoral” social 
consequences. For example, take Kant’s own hypothetical case of the 
duty to respond truthfully to a murderer at the door who wishes to 
confi rm that her intended victim is inside your home. Mill would ar-
gue that an “outrageously immoral” consequence could be to enable 
the murderer’s crime. Contra Kant, Mill held that consequentialist 
reasoning is a necessary facet of determining the right thing to do, 
and utility is the ultimate standard by which such reasoning is done. 
If the consequences of truth telling will cause suffering or enable 
wrongdoing, then lying (or at least opaqueness) is in those cases jus-
tifi ed for Mill. Furthermore, any rule of morality against lying ought 
to be nuanced in light of these outcomes. Mill was not claiming that 
Kant’s moral theory indirectly requires consequentialist reasoning 
but rather claiming that Kantian ethics fails to generate “actual du-
ties of morality” precisely because it does not engage in moral assess-
ment of outcomes.33
Having rejected Kantian deontology, Mill turned to his refi ne-
ment of the idea of utility. He followed Bentham in taking utility 
to be the “ultimate appeal,” or deciding principle, “on all ethical 
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 questions.” From his secular and empirical perspective, there was no 
advantage to invoking “the idea of abstract right”—such as a Kant-
ian categorical imperative or a Wollstonecraftian moral law—“as a 
thing independent of utility.” In addition, Mill shared Bentham’s 
general hedonistic view of utility as the greatest happiness (or plea-
sure) for the greatest number of sentient beings. Bentham and Mill 
held that “the whole sentient creation,” including nonhuman ani-
mals, is capable of pain and pleasure. While humans, as rational ani-
mals, gauge the maximization of utility on behalf of all sentient life, 
their calculations ought to include nonhuman animals in the effort 
to reduce pain and increase pleasure globally, “so far as the nature of 
things admits.” Because animals, like children, “require being taken 
care of by others,” they “must be protected against their own actions 
as well as against external injury.” Putting this inclusive principle of 
benevolent paternalism into practice, Mill advocated for the “rights 
of animals” to be conferred by humans to prevent “any practice” that 
“causes more pain to animals than gives pleasure to man.”34
Despite his fundamental hedonistic concern with increasing the 
pleasure and decreasing the pain of the whole sentient creation, Mill 
privileged the well-being of human individuals in his “theory of life.” 
Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism sets forth his reasoning for the “elevated” 
moral status of human individuals over nonhuman animals: the be-
nevolent calculation of utility for all creatures depends upon the free 
and full self-development of people into rational, self-governing, yet 
other-regarding adults. To clarify why human individuals held an 
elevated place in his liberal utilitarianism, Mill gave the concept of 
utility more specifi c meaning beyond the generic greatest happiness 
principle. In chapter 1 of On Liberty, Mill defi ned utility “in the larg-
est sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progres-
sive being.” In the next sentence, he identifi ed these interests to be 
“individual spontaneity” and freedom from unnecessary “external 
control” so that spontaneous self-development is possible. His use of 
the masculine noun “man” was generic, not gender specifi c. He later 
stated in chapter 3 of On Liberty that the principle of individuality 
applied to “all human existence.” In fact, until individuals of both 
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sexes had an equal opportunity for free and full self-development, 
the principle would apply in practice “to man, and still more the 
woman,” because females historically had been subjected to the ty-
rannical force of custom to a greater degree than males.35
In chapter 2 of Utilitarianism, Mill further refi ned the defi nition 
of utility with his distinction between the higher and the lower plea-
sures. The higher pleasures were “mental,” or “derived from the 
higher faculties” of the mind, and thus were “preferable in kind” to 
the lower, or merely “sensual” or “bodily,” pleasures. He famously 
summed up the practical difference between these kinds of pleasure 
by saying, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfi ed than a pig 
satisfi ed; better to be Socrates dissatisfi ed than a fool satisfi ed.” Al-
though the higher, Socratic pleasures may not be felt at the same 
intensity, duration, or quantity as the lower, swinish pleasures, it 
was rational to prefer the former to the latter once one experienced 
the qualitative difference. The moral goal of Mill’s liberal revision 
of utilitarianism was not a crude and brutish hedonism but rather 
a process of dignifying humans as progressive beings who are ca-
pable of rational preference of the higher pleasures over the lower 
pleasures.36
Mill proceeded to reformulate Bentham’s greatest happiness prin-
ciple so that it employed the distinction between the higher and the 
lower pleasures: “According to the Greatest Happiness Principle . . . 
the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other 
things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that 
of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, 
and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and 
quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quan-
tity, being the preference felt by those who, in their opportunities of 
experience, to which must be added their habits of self- consciousness 
and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of compari-
son.” This, his second and more precise defi nition of the governing 
principle of his liberal utilitarianism, made it clear that the greatest 
happiness was measured not only by how many sentient beings felt 
pleasure but also in terms of the quality of the pleasure felt, and the 
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quantity of such pleasure felt by individuals. The “test of quality” 
ought to be performed by people with the “experience” and “habits” 
of mind requisite for comparing, judging, and ranking pleasures in 
qualitative terms. The “verdict” of such “competent judges” of the 
higher pleasures would contribute to the development of subsidiary 
“rules and precepts for human conduct” that, when followed, would 
lead people on the indirect path to realizing the greatest quality and 
quantity of happiness for the whole sentient creation.37
As Rawls argued in A Theory of Justice (1971), Mill’s refi ned defi ni-
tion of utility presumed “circumstances of liberty” for women and 
men to choose a way of life befi tting a progressive being. According 
to Rawls, these Millian circumstances of liberty included an edu-
cation toward individual freedom, legal protection of equal rights, 
and living under free institutions of government. In chapter 3 of On 
Liberty, Mill gave a trio of reasons why free institutions were neces-
sary for realizing the “permanent interests” of humans as progressive 
beings. First, free institutions (such as representative government or 
the option of public schools) provided the political and cultural in-
frastructure for the development of human capabilities on the broad-
est scale. Second, the experience of participating in free institutions 
gave individuals an opportunity to develop rational preferences for 
liberty and self-control and to make good choices accordingly. Third, 
people in all times in history have rationally preferred freedom to 
subjection. Rawls concluded that Mill believed “a considerable de-
gree of liberty is a precondition of the rational pursuit of value,” or 
the pursuit of utility properly understood. In this way, Mill’s norma-
tive commitment to liberty guided and animated his indirect pursuit 
of the permanent interests of progressive beings—namely, sponta-
neity and freedom from unnecessary external control. Rawls went 
on to show, however, that Mill’s arguments for free institutions did 
not “justify an equal liberty for all,” although they “might justify 
many if not most of the equal liberties.” He concluded that the basic 
utilitarian requirement to maximize happiness on the greatest scale 
meant that “it is liable to fi nd that the denial of liberty for some is 
justifi ed in the name of this single end.” Although he admired the 
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force of Mill’s reasoning for the necessity of free institutions in order 
to realize utility “in the largest sense,” he did not think it suffi cient to 
justify the equal rights of individuals. Having rejected Mill and other 
forms of utilitarianism as viable options for justifying equal rights, 
Rawls turned to the social contract tradition as a resource for his 
liberal theory of justice.38
Mill understood his indirect and therefore complex form of con-
sequentialism to be the best available approach to reconcile utilitari-
anism with a secular though “sacred,” or paramount, commitment 
to equal rights. Although in theory utility could trump rights, the 
defi nition of utility in terms of the permanent interests of man as 
a progressive being made the freedom of individuals a paramount 
moral value. Assuming this value could be inculcated in people and 
institutionalized in law, equal rights would eventually prevail in prac-
tice. Although he remained vulnerable to the abstract philosophical 
criticism that his liberal revision of utilitarianism failed to justify 
equal rights as trumps, Mill thought that his theory of rights—when 
pragmatically applied in culture and law—would secure rights suf-
fi ciently for guaranteeing norms of justice for individuals. Indeed, 
his Utilitarianism went so far as to say that “a right residing in the in-
dividual” was “essential” to “justice,” which was “the chief part, and 
incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality.” By 
establishing such rights in culture and law, a society protected “the 
most vital of all interests.” Competent judges of the higher pleasures, 
like Mill himself, had concluded over time and through experience 
that reciprocal respect for rights improves both the quality and the 
quantity of the happiness of the whole.39
Rawls’s critique of Mill raises the question of whether Mill should 
be understood as an act utilitarian or a rule utilitarian. These two 
versions of utilitarianism are products of twentieth-century moral 
philosophy and thus can only be read back upon Mill’s thought. This 
anachronistic application of rule utilitarianism and act utilitarian-
ism to interpret the case of Mill might explain why there is not yet a 
scholarly consensus on which school he best fi ts. Because of the su-
premacy of utility over other standards of right in his political theory, 
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Mill has often been interpreted as an act utilitarian. On this reading, 
he followed Bentham in defi ning the morality of each and every act 
in terms of its maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain for 
the greatest number of sentient beings. Although Mill appealed to 
the principle of individuality as a rule of conduct to establish a place 
for equal rights in his utilitarianism, he plainly stated that utility is the 
ultimate appeal for deciding right from wrong, including the scope of 
rights. The latter view of utility could be described as act utilitarian. 
It is famously suspect for its allowance of what Derek Parfi t called 
the “repugnant conclusion” that the overall quality of life may be 
sacrifi ced for the more equal, yet minimalistic, distribution of utility 
across a larger population. If rights are understood as instrumental to 
utility, then the minimization of rights could be justifi ed in the name 
of a more equal though minimal distribution of utility overall. The 
even spread of utility would thereby justify the erosion of the quality 
of life for all, including their access to rights.40
To avoid these grave problems, Mill’s complex consequentialism 
defi ned utilitarian moral outcomes by way of a variety of intermedi-
ary practical rules for social behavior: fi rst and foremost, the prin-
ciple of individuality, whereby the “person’s own character” and not 
“the traditions or customs of other people” were the “rule of con-
duct.” Mill argued that following this principle or rule of conduct 
was “the principal ingredient of human happiness, and quite the 
chief ingredient of individual and social progress.” Ideally, culture 
should be shaped in a way that encouraged people to develop accord-
ing to this principle, such that they grew in diverse and eccentric 
ways, displaying a range of talents and capabilities within society. A 
related practical rule, more narrowly tailored by Mill for the domain 
of law, was the harm principle. This “one very simple principle” 
defi ned wrong in terms of “interfering with the liberty of action” of 
any individual except when such interference would “prevent harm 
to others.” Mill’s harm principle strove to draw a bright line between 
individual behavior that could be subject to legal penalties versus 
individual behavior that would be merely subject to disapprobation 
in the court of public opinion or condemnation by one’s own con-
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science. If an action unnecessarily interfered with the self-regarding 
actions of another individual, then it was both wrong and subject to 
legal penalties. If an action refrained from such interference, then it 
was not wrong and was not subject to legal penalties, and was at least 
right in the thin sense of allowing individuals freedom from direct 
harm. For Mill, “tastes and modes of life” that were primarily self-
regarding (such as choosing to drink alcohol at a restaurant) should 
be informally regulated by public opinion and/or conscience and not 
be subjected to legal penalties. Hence, Mill’s harm principle, though 
focused on the question of determining fair legal regulation of the 
individual by the state, helped to demarcate an alternative cultural 
space in which respect for individuality served as the prevailing rule 
of conduct. Although one’s free and full self-development might be 
appropriately reigned in by public opinion or personal conscience, 
one’s behavior could not rightfully be punished by the state except to 
prevent harm to others.41
Such cultural and legal noninterference in the self-regarding ac-
tions of the individual might also generate right outcomes in the 
thick sense, especially if practiced on a broad scale and for the long 
run. Nancy Hirschmann has argued that Mill’s complex consequen-
tialism posited a thick conception of positive liberty (freedom to be 
self-sovereigns) as at least one moral by-product of a thin concep-
tion of negative liberty (freedom from unnecessary interference). 
For Bentham as for Mill, the consequences always determined the 
morality of the act. Yet Mill’s principle of individuality (and its le-
gal cognate, the harm principle) established constraints on the set of 
utilitarian outcomes that were both moral and benefi cial. Following 
these practical rules of social conduct and legal regulation would en-
able us to take the indirect yet individually oriented route to realize 
the permanent interests of humans as progressive beings, by asking 
us to prioritize the value of the individual’s self-development in our 
calculations of what is good and bad for sentient life. The moral re-
sult should be the realization of self-sovereignty, or virtuous indi-
vidual self-development across the human species, for the benefi t of 
all sentient creation.42
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In this light, Mill’s indirect utilitarianism looks more like rule 
utilitarianism than act utilitarianism. According to J. O. Urmson’s 
groundbreaking interpretation, Mill understood the moral right-
ness of any given action to be determined by its accordance to a rule 
(or what Mill often called a “secondary principle”). Mill provided a 
list of such rules in chapter 5 of Utilitarianism, including “the moral 
rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another,” such as “breach of 
friendship” and “breach of promise.” These practical rules of con-
duct were correct for Mill insofar as they tended to promote util-
ity. Any confl icts between these practical rules of morality could be 
adjudicated only by reference to the ultimate standard of rightness, 
the greatest happiness principle. Consequently, Mill allowed for re-
form of rules (such as “the aristocracies of colour, race, and sex”) that 
failed in practice to maximize the quality and quantity of happiness 
for the whole. He furthermore argued that widely accepted rules of 
morality (such as “don’t break a promise”) were the best practical 
indicators of what people took to be happiness. A utilitarian could 
thus rely on such moral rules, alongside legal rules such as justly in-
stituted rights, as means toward achieving the greatest happiness. In 
his Methods of Ethics (1874), Henry Sidgwick criticized the aforesaid 
argument for its confl ation of moral preferences (such as “promise-
keeping is good”) with beliefs about effects on happiness (such as 
“promise-keeping produces happiness”). Nevertheless, Sidgwick as-
sumed like Mill that the greatest happiness principle could only be 
applied in practice via a “fairly detailed and specifi c set of directives 
or rules.” Even if common moral rules were not in themselves ex-
pressions of people’s preferences concerning happiness, rules in gen-
eral (both moral and legal) were necessary practical instruments for 
the successful application of the greatest happiness principle.43
The use of subsidiary moral rules to determine right from wrong 
produces a dilemma for the utilitarian, however. On the one hand, it 
becomes unclear how rule utilitarianism is practically different from 
act utilitarianism. If moral rules can be revised in light of the de-
mands of utility, then the former would seem to collapse into the lat-
ter, making each and every act subject to evaluation according to the 
Y6872.indb   98 1/6/16   10:38:01 AM
F O U N D AT I O N S  O F  U N I V E R S A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S
99
greatest happiness principle. Rule utilitarianism would then seem to 
be as vulnerable as act utilitarianism to producing Parfi t’s “repug-
nant conclusion” in practice. On the other side of the dilemma, strict 
compliance with rules appears to be inconsistent with the ultimate 
goal of utilitarianism. If following a rule is taken to be right, de-
spite generating less utility than another action, then it would seem 
to contradict the overriding utilitarian requirement to pursue the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number.44
As for the fi rst horn of the dilemma, Mill would respond that 
while the best rules aim to apply to all cases, they must be open to 
revision on the basis of their consequences in order to be cemented 
as general and correct standards of right and wrong. Such revision of 
rules would not be arbitrary but rather be guided by people’s experi-
ence of pain and pleasure, and gradually regulated by institutions of 
culture and law. Furthermore, this experiential revision of rules over 
time would indirectly lead to the greatest happiness in the long run. 
As Mill argued in different ways across his Autobiography, On Liberty, 
and Utilitarianism, a “permanent” happiness for each and all can only 
be achieved through the indirect path of the human pursuit of virtue 
and, in this pursuit, learning to prefer the higher pleasures over the 
lower ones. The subsidiary rules that come to govern this complex 
process of consequentialist moral reasoning might be best envisioned 
as nested within Mill’s ultimate commitment to the greatest hap-
piness principle. Rights are the most “sacred” form of such nested 
moral rules because their cultural acceptance and legal enforcement 
are paramount for individual liberty and thus offer the opportunity 
to make the moral choices necessary for virtuous self-development. 
Rights and other rules achieve political inertia over time: while sub-
ject to revision with respect to consequences, rules gain a kind of 
stability through the social process of their moral refi nement. For 
Mill, this stability provided enough security for human rights on the 
whole, while allowing for the necessary revision of unjust yet legal 
rights (such as a husband’s total ownership of his wife’s property un-
der the law of coverture) that had been unrefl ectively accepted for 
centuries.45
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To navigate past the second horn of the rule-utilitarian dilemma, 
Mill would similarly appeal to his theory of the necessarily indirect 
path to utility. The indirect realization of utility through adherence 
to rules (such as respect for equal rights) means that one may justifi -
ably sacrifi ce short-term pleasure for the sake of the permanent in-
terests of humans as progressive beings. For example, if the granting 
of women’s rights to property ownership in marriage would initially 
decrease the freedom and power of husbands yet potentially increase 
the liberty of both sexes, the choice of the latter, complex conse-
quence would be better than simply avoiding the former, short-term 
outcome. For example, Mill chose the more complex path to hap-
piness in establishing the egalitarian terms of his late-life marriage 
to Taylor, by signing a document that promised her equal rights to 
the proceeds of the books published under his name. The complex 
good of recognizing their collaborative intellectual relationship out-
weighed any short-term benefi ts he could have derived from merely 
keeping the proceeds for himself.46
Thus read as a subtle rule utilitarian, Mill can be understood as 
offering a complex consequentialist foundation for universal human 
rights. It is complex in the sense that it has several mutually rein-
forcing levels of moral concerns. The benefi cial outcome is the far-
reaching concern; the application of the principle of individuality 
and its legal cognate, the harm principle, is the more immediate and 
practical concern; and the fl ourishing of individuality remains the 
underlying concern at each stage of the process. In this multilevel 
moral framework, rights function as moral and legal tools that fa-
cilitate the permanent happiness of human individuals. Mill defi ned 
human (or “moral”) rights as fundamental rules of morality that de-
rive from self-regarding and other-regarding duties, requiring that 
obligations be paid and justice be done to the individual. Over time, 
some conceptions of moral rights become institutionalized as “legal” 
rights. The realization of utility through the recognition and respect 
of moral rights and the legal rights justly instituted from them is the 
only sure path toward a genuine happiness for everyone, not solely a 
minority or majority of the whole.47
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Mill’s overall moral system was secular and empirical, not theo-
logical and metaphysical like Wollstonecraft’s. Nonetheless, both 
Mill and Wollstonecraft presented normatively rich accounts of the 
human being as the basis of their theories of rights. While Woll-
stonecraft’s moral view of the embodied human being in nature was 
ensconced within her metaphysics, Mill’s conception of individuality 
began and ended with humans as they were in the natural world but 
imagined how they might develop in a moral way if allowed the right 
constellation of social conditions in which to grow in “eccentric” 
diversity. As Mill poetically expressed it in chapter 3 of On Liberty, 
“Different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual 
development; and can no more exist healthily in the same moral, 
than all the variety of plants can in the same physical, atmosphere 
and climate.” People, like plants, required diverse environments and 
the freedom to thrive in those personally suitable conditions. Mill’s 
principle of individuality indirectly cultivated a diversity of human 
capabilities through the social construction of a broader “moral cli-
mate” in which people learn to abide by each other’s equal rights.48
In their respectively secular and theological approaches to ground-
ing human rights on abstract and robust normative conceptions of 
the human being, Mill and Wollstonecraft both represent versions of 
what Rawls called “comprehensive liberalism.” According to Rawls, 
Mill’s theory of individuality may even be read as “metaphysical,” 
in the sense that it makes controversial moral claims about what all 
human beings are and should become. Such universalistic norma-
tive claims about human nature look “metaphysical” from Rawls’s 
strictly “political” perspective, which accepts the “fact of reason-
able pluralism” on morality and religion even among peoples who at 
least respect basic international human rights norms. The problem 
with this broad use of the term “metaphysical” is that it neither ac-
counts for the differences between a priori and a posteriori approaches 
to reasoning nor distinguishes between theological and secular, or 
even supernatural and empirically grounded, ideas. It assumes rather 
that any abstract normative idea that may be subject to moral debate 
is metaphysical. To better capture the similarities and differences 
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across Wollstonecraft’s theory of rights and Mill’s, I describe Mill’s 
abstract conception of the human being and its free and full self-
development as secular, nonmetaphysical, empirically grounded, 
yet normatively rich. Wollstonecraft’s metaphysical/ethical system, 
on the other hand, affords a multilevel view of the human being: 
at the most abstract level of analysis, it is a theological and purely 
metaphysical conception of the person as a moral and rational be-
ing made in the image of God; but from an empirically grounded 
vantage point, it is a richly normative conception of the embodied 
human being as ensconced within the divinely created natural world. 
Although Mill also used an abstract and normative conception of 
the person as the basis of his theory of rights, he made no appeal to 
metaphysical ideas.49
For Mill, the rights held by human beings are either moral or legal. 
A “moral right” is derived from a duty, or a widely accepted moral 
rule that entails the fulfi llment of a “perfect,” or mandatory, “obliga-
tion” toward self or others. For example, the duty to keep promises 
to others generates the corresponding right not to have one’s own 
promises breached. With this correlative theory of the basis of moral 
rights, Mill coincided with both Wollstonecraft and Kant, without 
sharing their metaphysical/deontological foundations for the view. 
Rather, in the concluding chapter of Utilitarianism, Mill theorized 
duty in complex consequentialist terms as grounded upon utility “in 
the largest sense”: “I account the justice which is grounded on utility 
to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding 
part, of all morality. Justice is a name for certain classes of moral 
rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, 
and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules 
for the guidance of life; and the notion we have found to be of the 
essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, 
implies and testifi es to this more binding obligation.” This passage 
provides the best evidence of Mill’s rule-utilitarian conception of 
justice, since it conceives the following of “certain classes of moral 
rules” as producing the “essentials of human well-being” better than 
“any other rules.” The rights “residing in an individual” are one such 
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class of utility-enhancing moral rules. As such, moral rights “testify” 
to the “binding obligation” we have to abide by the rules of justice, 
because moral rights are derived from duty. Rights are thus “the es-
sence of the idea of justice” because they are correlates of duties or 
obligatory moral rules that are justifi ed by way of a conception of 
utility in the broadest sense.50
Mill understood moral rights as rationally justifi ed independent of 
positive law because they need not have a formal means of enforce-
ment to be justly held and demanded by individuals. Claims of moral 
rights may hypothesize how the marginalized or powerless (such as 
women) need access to public goods that would enable their individ-
ual self-development, when society has in fact failed to recognize its 
duty to provide such rights. Wollstonecraft had predominantly made 
such moral arguments (or what Sen calls “allegations”) for women’s 
rights as humans, since women in Britain and beyond had relatively 
few socially or legally recognized rights as compared to men in the 
late eighteenth century. By the time Mill embarked on his political 
career in the 1860s, Britain had institutionalized more legal rights 
for women (such as divorce in cases of domestic violence as of 1857), 
but even then most rights claims for women (such as national-level 
suffrage) were moral and thereby alleged.
On the political level, Mill understood legal rights to be just when 
they derived from a correlative moral obligation, rather than from a 
bad law. In his 1869 treatise The Subjection of Women, he contrasted 
the unjust but legal rights of husbands to commit regular “bodily 
violence” against their wives with the moral rights of individual 
women to be free from “personal violence.” Here, he strongly im-
plied that sexual violence against women in marriage was shamelessly 
and unjustly treated as an exception to the criminal law against rape. 
Through practical applications of the harm principle, legislators 
could gradually replace such bad patriarchal laws with egalitarian 
laws that prescribed legal penalties for unjustifi ed interference with 
the rights of individuals, regardless of color, race, or sex. Examples of 
the establishment of such legal rights in Britain were the 1830s acts 
of Parliament that expanded working men’s suffrage and set slaves 
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free in most regions of its empire. Allegations for moral rights might 
still be made in reference to these legal rights. If some but not all 
groups enjoy a legal right, then the excluded groups might make 
moral claims for social or legal inclusion in the use of such rights. If 
access to legal rights for some groups is more extensive than others, 
then the group with less access might make moral claims for legal 
inclusion in the full use of such rights. In his early 1830s unpublished 
correspondence with Harriet Taylor on marriage, Mill had alleged 
women’s equal right to divorce, at a time when only men, such as his 
friend’s husband, legally held this right. Dramatizing the gap be-
tween moral rights and legal rights on the political stage, Mill alleged 
women’s human right to vote by formally representing in Parliament 
the 1867 suffrage petition signed by thousands of disenfranchised 
women. His Subjection of Women alleged the “equal moral right of 
all human beings” to the free choice of occupation, so that women 
would no longer be subjugated to the opinion that their proper roles 
belonged only in the family. Such public and private, written and 
oral, political and personal allegations of women’s human rights con-
tributed to the growth of individual, elite, and popular concern with 
their institutionalization.51
Both moral rights and the legal rights that are based on them are 
human rights for Wollstonecraft and Mill, because both types of 
rights are grounded upon their respective conceptions of the human 
being as a moral being. Although Wollstonecraft takes a theological 
and metaphysical approach and Mill a secular and nonmetaphysical 
one, they both offer robust normative accounts of the human be-
ing’s organic and ethical development through freedom and rights. 
This is the most important commonality in their theories of univer-
sal human rights: their joint grounding of rights claims on norma-
tively rich accounts of what it means to be human. Their respective 
conceptions of humanity gave them strong normative standards by 
which they could judge the defects of culture and law with regard 
to the rights of humans, and subsequently advocate for reform that 
would advance justice for each and all through the equal provision 
of rights. We now turn to a comparative assessment of the practical 
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value of their two foundationalist schools for advocating the moral 
rights of women that are not yet recognized or respected by people 
within a culture or protected by the law.
Theological and Secular Approaches to Alleging Women’s 
Human Rights: The Issue of Religious Polygamy
Rawlsian nonfoundationalist approaches to justifying human 
rights assume rights as cultural and legal givens that ought to be 
articulated and developed further in law and policy, particularly in 
the context of the post-1948 international political landscape of the 
Universal Declaration and the other institutions and policies of the 
United Nations. From a feminist perspective, the problem with 
this assumption is that many human rights of women have not yet 
achieved the status of cultural or legal givens. Women’s human rights 
have not even been fully realized in the domain of international law, 
in which the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, CEDAW, is taken more seriously 
than in nation-states such as the United States and Iran, which are 
still among the mere seven countries in the world that have yet to 
ratify it. In contrast to Rawlsian nonfoundationalist approaches to 
justifying human rights, foundationalist approaches to justifying 
women’s human rights allow for extralegal and extracultural claims 
about women’s desert of rights on the basis of their human nature. 
Such naturalistic claims about women’s shared humanity with men 
have been politically instrumental in the allegation and advancement 
of women’s human rights, especially since the time of de Gouges and 
Wollstonecraft.52
Moving beyond an analysis of the role of naturalistic foundations 
in Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s rational justifi cations for human rights, 
I now respond to a practical moral and political question raised by 
each of their systems of feminist thought. When women’s human 
rights are not yet recognized in law or policy, or are culturally or 
religiously controversial even to allege, which of these foundational-
ist approaches works best as a moral basis for advocacy and  political 
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persuasion? Religious polygamy poses a serious test of both the ethi-
cal and the rhetorical value of these approaches for human rights 
advocacy, as it has been morally controversial in a variety of cultures 
since Wollstonecraft’s time and often has been seen as incompatible 
with women’s rights. Furthermore, practices of religious polygamy 
continue to raise questions of which women’s rights (for example, 
the right to divorce) ought to be respected in culture and protected 
under the law. By applying Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s theories to 
assess the human rights of women within religious polygamy, I il-
luminate how their respectively theological and secular foundations 
may serve as ethical and effective platforms for alleging the rights of 
women in distinctive yet complementary ways that are sensitive to 
religious and other cultural differences. When I speak of polygamy, 
I mean a kind of plural marriage in which a man has more than one 
wife. This is technically called polygyny.
Wollstonecraft advanced moral views on polygamy early in her 
writing career. When she wrote for the Analytical Review in London 
from 1788 to 1792, she acquired a taste for travel memoirs, especially 
those concerning North African Muslim peoples. She researched 
works by the German explorer Johann Reinhold Forster and the 
English theologian James Cookson, who discussed the practice of 
polygamy in Africa. Following the French Enlightenment philoso-
pher Montesquieu, Forster even made theoretical claims about why 
polygamy seemed to be more prevalent in warm climates. In her 
Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft philosophically challenged Forster’s 
argument that the natural environment determined polygamy. By re-
jecting the natural necessity of polygamy, she sought to discredit the 
patriarchal view that woman “must be inferior to man, and made for 
him” and his sexual pleasure. This critique of polygamy supported 
her general moral argument in favor of monogamous marriages in 
which women were respected as ends in themselves, not merely used 
as means to other ends.53
In her Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft set forth an extended 
moral justifi cation of marriage as primarily a relationship between 
equal moral beings and secondarily a relationship that concerned 
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natural functions such as sexual reproduction. She defended marital 
pairs over multiple spouses, for the reason that marriage is ideally a 
dyadic, perfectionistic (or virtue-oriented) friendship. Polygamy or 
polyandry might be permissible if marriage was meant to be like a 
business or corporate contract, in which maximum productivity for 
the group was the goal. In a perfectionistic friendship, however, the 
goal was the mirroring and mutual inspiration of the higher virtues 
in one another.54
Like Aristotle, Wollstonecraft upheld the dyadic form to be the 
best, or virtue-oriented, friendship, but she explicitly and unequivo-
cally extended this idea of higher friendship in an egalitarian way 
to male-female marital relationships. Beyond the practical consider-
ation that such lofty virtue might prove more diffi cult to achieve in 
plural marriages, her defense of the smaller dyadic form belied her 
normative assumption that the process of sexual reproduction itself 
produced supplemental reasons for the moral practice of monogamy. 
The best evidence of this assumption is found in her 1797 Lessons, 
which envisioned and even idealized the active roles of biological 
parents in joint childcare of their toddler. More broadly, her meta-
physical perspective allowed for Cookson’s view that divine provi-
dence mandated monogamy as a benefi cial moral ideal for humanity. 
Wollstonecraft disagreed, however, with Forster’s culturally biased 
and morally relativistic claim that God ordained monogamy for Eu-
rope, while nature dictated polygamy for Africa.55
In theory, Wollstonecraft’s metaphysics should accommodate a 
variety of religious and secular conceptions of monogamous mar-
riage, under the condition that all people are treated as ends not 
means within marriage and the broader laws of their societies. Woll-
stonecraft’s novel Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman vividly represented 
how her deontological theory of human rights would absolutely pro-
hibit any exploitation of women by their husbands, regardless of the 
cultural or religious context. When her husband attempted to sell 
her into prostitution, Maria fi nally sought a way out of the bad rela-
tionship. Her escape symbolically alleged for the eighteenth- century 
audience a married woman’s human right to protect her bodily 
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 integrity. As illustrated by Maria’s response to her predicament, 
Wollstonecraft’s deontological approach to defending women’s hu-
man rights would be an appropriate basis for strong criticism of any 
cases of marriage, whether monogamous or polygamous, which are 
exploitative of women’s bodies.
Wollstonecraft’s broader theological approach uncovers a deeper 
level from which polygamy could be strongly judged: the immanent 
feminist perspective on patriarchal oppression. Such an immanent 
feminist perspective speaks against a patriarchal practice from within 
a culture for the benefi t of women in that culture and potentially 
beyond it. For example, when a Muslim woman, such as the Iranian 
feminist lawyer Shirin Ebadi, challenges polygamy on metaphysical 
grounds—as in, the Koran states I am equal to man, thus I should 
be legally treated as a moral equal to man and not as “‘half ’ a hu-
man being”—she is enacting a broadly Wollstonecraftian critique 
of the institution from within. Islamic polygamy as it is practiced in 
her homeland of Iran requires that polygamous wives be legally sub-
sumed under and subordinate to their husband, thus undercutting 
the Koran’s theological view of the sexes as moral equals. Interest-
ingly, Wollstonecraft had used a mathematical metaphor similar to 
Ebadi’s to critique how Rousseau’s theory of education perversely 
turned woman into a “half-being” who was primarily defi ned by her 
marital relationship to her husband rather than her independent on-
tological status as a moral, rational, and equal human being made in 
the image of God.56
As the Indonesian Muslim feminist activist Lily Munir explains, 
the Koran supports polygamy only as a “privilege” of widows and 
children in times of need, not a general “right” of men. Striving to 
return her Muslim culture and Islamic religion to their moral roots, 
the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize winner Ebadi continues to criticize Ira-
nian laws as “discriminatory and misogynist” for allowing “a man to 
marry four wives . . . and divorce his wife at will,” while women do 
not have the same access to divorce. In her Muslim feminist view, 
these laws are “not Islamic” because they “cannot be found in the 
Koran.” She advises her fellow Muslim feminist critics of religious 
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polygamy: “It is essential for women to master religious discourse 
because patriarchal culture is usually protected and strengthened in 
the name of Sharia law, and by political forces who exploit Muslims’ 
ignorance of various interpretations.” Such a sacred-text-based ap-
proach may not, however, work as well for religious and other cul-
tural outsiders, who run the risk of seeming imperialistic by making 
such arguments from without.57
Mill’s secular approach to justifying and subsequently alleging 
women’s human rights poses its own set of challenges for judging 
the issue of religious polygamy. Mill shared Wollstonecraft’s philo-
sophical view of marriage as ideally conceptualized and practiced as a 
perfectionistic, or virtue-oriented, friendship between moral equals. 
On a nonideal and personal level, Mill appeared to be tolerant of 
polyamory, if sexual intercourse is not understood as essential to its 
practice. Harriet Taylor was married to another man for most of 
their platonic and perfectionistic friendship. This was a forced choice 
for Mill, as he would have preferred to have an exclusive relationship 
with Harriet under ideal circumstances. Harriet and Mill appear to 
have refrained from intercourse for the duration of their intellectu-
ally and emotionally passionate affair and late-life marriage. Harriet 
ceased to have a sexual relationship with John Taylor once their last 
child was born, soon after she met and fell in love with Mill. Mill’s 
awkward domestic situation with the Taylors compelled his tolera-
tion of a type of sexually restrained, Victorian polyamory even when 
he personally considered it morally defi cient.
In chapter 4 of On Liberty, Mill’s application of the individuality 
and harm principles to the issue of Mormon polygamy explained his 
tolerance of this particular plural form of religious marriage under 
two conditions. First, the practice may be tolerated at “a remote cor-
ner of the earth” where such “barbarism” or cultural backwardness 
may be practiced without becoming widely institutionalized. His 
use of the culturally biased, liberal imperial language of “barbarism” 
was consistent with his Subjection of Women, in which he identifi ed 
patriarchal marriage as a “relic of primitive barbarism” that caused 
women’s oppression worldwide.58
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Apart from his belittling attitude toward Mormonism, Mill’s 
moral concern with polygamy centered upon the inverse relation-
ship between women’s tendency to adapt to their culture and the 
heterogeneity of that culture. In other words, the more that women 
conformed to their culture, the less varied that culture would be; 
conversely, the more uniform a culture, the less diverse women’s life 
choices would be. It followed that if, generally, patriarchal culture 
teaches women “to think marriage the one thing needful,” then, in a 
polygamous community, women “should prefer being one of several 
wives, to not being a wife at all.” Consideration of this problem of 
adaptation elicited Mill’s second condition for the toleration of po-
lygamy: its practitioners must “allow perfect freedom of departure to 
those who are dissatisfi ed with their ways.” In these cases, his com-
plex consequentialist justifi cation for human rights provided a strong 
ground for alleging women’s human right to exit polygamy when 
the religious institution harmed their self-development. Education 
about exit options, likely provided by outsiders to the polygamous 
community, would be one way to combat the problem of women’s 
adaptation to conditions of patriarchal domination.59
Mill’s secular liberal utilitarian approach to advocating for wom-
en’s human rights might be most useful to reformers from outside 
the polygamous community. On Liberty proposed such reformers 
could use educational writings to shape Mormon polygamists’ criti-
cal understanding of the ethical implications of their own religious 
practice, just as women’s rights advocates used education to chal-
lenge their own brands of patriarchal “barbarism” in Britain. Wittily 
playing both sides of the argument, Mill inveighed, “Let them send 
missionaries, if they please, to preach against it; and let them, by any 
fair means (of which silencing the teachers is not one), oppose the 
progress of similar doctrines among their own people.” If taken, this 
secular educational approach would rely not on controversial reli-
gious or metaphysical views to make its moral claims but rather on 
a comparatively thinner, nonmetaphysical and nontheological, set of 
values such as human individuality and freedom. It would also need 
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to be applied to similar problems in the outsider’s own culture, in 
order to be morally consistent and not hypocritical.60
For societies that do not value individuality or freedom in a liberal 
sense, this secular educational approach to women’s human rights 
advocacy may not work from without or within. In these cases, Mill’s 
secular liberal utilitarianism theoretically generates a long-term re-
formist approach to human rights advocacy: observation of the issue 
from afar, so as to ensure that women’s human rights are not sacri-
fi ced for the utility of the patriarchs of the commune. This remote 
observational model is implicit in Mill’s recommendation of tolera-
tion of polygamy on the Utah frontier instead of making it “a scandal 
to persons some thousands of miles distant.” Although his spatial 
appeal to distance had imperial implications (as in, the unconquered 
frontier was the nadir of civilization), it also may be read in more ab-
stract psychological terms: maintaining a reasonable sense of cultural 
and emotional distance from other people’s cultural practices.61
The latter mode of reasonable psychological distance might ani-
mate the work of a Millian reformer who is monitoring a polygamous 
religious culture from without. Mill did not assume that po lyg amy 
was inherently incompatible with women’s rights, but he remained 
concerned with protecting women against potential violations of 
their rights in this and other historically oppressive marital arrange-
ments. Consequently, he supported reformers’ remote observa-
tion of polygamy in Utah as a moral means of judging whether the 
practice was in fact harmful to women. If violations of female self-
sovereignty were tracked and verifi ed, then the monitoring Mill ian 
reformer faced a predicament: alleging women’s human rights on 
naturalistic grounds that might seem culturally insensitive or impe-
rial to the people she sought to aid. The allegation of women’s hu-
man rights, in these cases, is a Millian outsider’s last-resort act of 
political instigation. Ideally, this instigation would stir the local com-
munity to discussion of the ethics of their practice of polygamy and 
provoke critical refl ection on similar issues in the reformer’s home 
culture.
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Mill’s secular liberal utilitarianism produces indirect models of 
women’s human rights advocacy, such as toleration, education, ob-
servation, and instigation. In contrast, Wollstonecraft’s theological 
and deontological approach to justifying rights generates strong and 
direct moral judgments on the best content and scope for women’s 
human rights. It also enables the allegation of women’s human rights 
in universalistic terms that may resonate with a variety of religious 
worldviews. Mill’s indirect strategies for reform are better suited for 
cultural or religious outsiders to a morally controversial issue such 
as polygamy, whereas Wollstonecraft’s direct approach to rights 
advocacy would fare better with cultural and religious insiders who 
seek to effectively criticize or defend a morally controversial practice 
from within.
From 1872 to 1914, a group of female Latter Day Saints (LDS) 
in Utah modeled the latter mode of immanent defense. Their news-
paper, the Woman’s Exponent, made pro-polygamy arguments based 
on Mormon theology and contemporary women’s rights discourse. 
Its editor, Emmeline Wells, was a reader of Wollstonecraft, and, in 
1874, the paper defended the feminist ethical logic of the Rights of 
Woman against charges of its irreligion and immorality: “Eighty years 
ago Mary Wollstonecraft published her ‘Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman.’ It was a book laid under ban as irreligious and immoral. Yet 
it consists simply of a forcible and logical plea for the higher educa-
tion of women, and an exposure of the false sentimentality of Ros-
seau [sic].” Wells blended Wollstonecraft’s rational theological and 
deontological style of women’s human rights advocacy with her own 
Mormon conviction in the sacredness of women’s everyday work, 
starting in the family. In a relief society handbook, Wells argued that 
Mormon women’s duty in life was to help restore humanity’s origi-
nal, God-given equality: “Woman must be instrumental in bring-
ing about the restoration of that equality which existed when the 
world was created. Perfect equality then and so it must be when all 
things are restored as they were in the beginning.” The slogan of 
the Woman’s Exponent also fused Mormonism and women’s human 
Y6872.indb   112 1/6/16   10:38:02 AM
F O U N D AT I O N S  O F  U N I V E R S A L  H U M A N  R I G H T S
113
rights: “The Rights of the Women of Zion, The Rights of Women 
of All Nations.’’62
These LDS women’s internal support for Mormon polygamy 
from a gospel and feminist perspective warranted Mill’s caution-
ary approach to judging their community from the outside. Indeed, 
the women’s rights leaders Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton—who opposed polygamy on much the same grounds as 
Wollstonecraft—chose such a Millian pragmatic route in working 
with LDS women on their common cause of universal suffrage in 
Utah. An avid reader of On Liberty, Stanton criticized those femi-
nists who opposed the involvement of Mormons such as Wells in 
the national women’s suffrage convention of 1878: “I should think 
Mormon women might sit on our platform without making us re-
sponsible for their religious faith.”63
The Woman’s Exponent suggested the rhetorical and political power 
of Wollstonecraft’s theological approach to defending women’s hu-
man rights for cultural insiders who sought to reconcile religious 
commitments, such as to polygamy, with other normative commit-
ments, such as women’s right to suffrage. Plural marriage and uni-
versal suffrage had coexisted in Utah from 1870 to 1887. In 1887, the 
passage of the Edmunds-Tucker Act in the U.S. Congress took away 
women’s right to vote and the right to polygamy in Utah—partly be-
cause male legislators from other states were angry that LDS women 
did not “free themselves” from polygamy through the vote. In re-
sponse to the government’s attempt to strip their rights as women 
and as religious people, Wells and others argued in the Woman’s Ex-
ponent that polygamy and women’s suffrage were both morally con-
sistent and socially benefi cial in the context of democratic, feminist, 
and gospel values.64
The historic and contemporary controversies surrounding reli-
gious polygamy illustrate the ethical complexities of making argu-
ments for the institutionalization of the moral rights of women, 
 especially in cases where law and culture do not yet provide guides 
for reformist action. Because of these complexities, allegations of 
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women’s human rights must often refer to some kind of moral foun-
dation as a justifi cation for their broader public recognition as a 
valid claim for reform. A conception of humanity itself is one such 
foundation.
Foundationalist approaches to justifying human rights run into 
the problem of the pluralism of values across peoples, cultures, and 
nations, however. Not all peoples will agree on what it means to 
be human, or wish to dissociate religion or other cultural traditions 
from their defi nitions of humanity. Not all women will agree on 
policies that affect them, such as laws concerning marriage, suffrage, 
or health care. For example, a liberal pluralistic society such as the 
contemporary United States sees signifi cant gaps in public opinion 
emerge between women who primarily identify as religious and 
women who primarily identify as feminist. When faced with what 
Rawls called “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” a human rights ad-
vocate must attend to reasonable differences among people’s world-
views (or comprehensive doctrines) in adopting an ethical approach 
to judging how to respond to the disputed issue at hand. Under-
standing one’s own basic relationship to a contested issue is a crucial 
fi rst step toward making rationally justifi ed and culturally respectful 
claims for human rights.65
To allege women’s human rights in cases of strong disagreement 
may be a morally courageous act for a cultural insider such as Ebadi, 
but it is also a political step toward justice. Since 2009, Ebadi has 
been forced to live in exile from Tehran due to her successful yet 
controversial feminist activism; worse, the Iranian government has 
persecuted her family in order to try to stop her work for women’s 
rights in her Islamic nation. Such brave and persistent activism by 
cultural insiders puts the issue on the national or global agenda for 
cultural outsiders. This is Wollstonecraft’s gift to human rights ac-
tivism: modeling the value of people speaking up for women’s hu-
man rights from the foundations of their own cultural and religious 
traditions.66
With a comparatively thinner set of moral foundations than Woll-
stonecraft’s approach, Mill’s liberal utilitarianism lends itself more 
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to the outsider perspective for advocating women’s human rights. 
Pragmatically akin to Rawlsian nonfoundationalist theorists of hu-
man rights yet philosophically grounded in his foundational value 
of individuality, Mill provides another compelling secular model for 
judging and alleging women’s human rights. This liberal utilitarian 
approach to rights-based reform begins with a basic stance of toler-
ance toward other people’s cultural practices. If necessary, it educates 
people directly and indirectly affected by a women’s human rights 
issue. It proceeds to monitor violations of those human rights. The 
last resort is invoking a thin set of secular yet foundationalist human 
rights values in order to instigate reform. This outsider perspective 
on contentious women’s human rights issues ultimately strives to 
resist the strong imposition of one’s most contestable moral stan-
dards on different cultures. In the long run, the dynamic interplay 
of a variety of insider and outsider perspectives on human rights 
may lead to reform of laws and policies concerning controversial 
women’s human rights issues, such as those on religious polygamy. 
This dynamic of insider and outsider reforms might make liberal-
ism more accommodating to practices that at fi rst look incompatible 
with its principles of justice, while encouraging people to adapt their 
cultural practices such that they resonate with basic human rights 
values, both moral and legal.
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THEORIES OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
WOLLSTONECRAFT AND MILL ON SEX, 
GENDER, AND EDUCATION
Virtue Ethics and the Human Right to Education
Despite their contrasting religious and secular approaches to the 
justifi cation of universal human rights, Wollstonecraft and Mill saw 
the purpose of rights in a similar light. To claim any human right, 
moral or legal, was to simultaneously claim an even more expansive 
right to live, develop, and fl ourish as a human being. The enjoyment 
of some basic human rights—such as sustenance and security—was 
a minimal yet necessary condition for the sound growth of people, 
as individuals and in groups. However, many persons lacked the 
means—individually, socially, or politically—to initiate, let alone 
actualize, this process of human development. Wollstonecraft and 
Mill were keenly aware that systematic sexual discrimination posed 
formidable obstacles to girls’ and women’s exercise of basic hu-
man rights and thus their free and full self-development as human 
beings.
To solve this gender-infl ected political problem, Wollstonecraft 
and Mill knew that they could not stop at the general justifi cation of 
the equal moral rights of the sexes. Beyond this fi rst step, they had 
to make a case for why there was a specifi c human right by which 
human beings could best develop their capabilities as individuals, in 
groups, and as a whole. Each of them identifi ed education as this 
basic right, especially but not exclusively for children, and without 
discrimination as to sex. This universal right to education presumed 
the enjoyment of other basic human rights (such as sustenance and 
security), but it aimed at loftier moral and political goals than these 
bare necessities for survival. As Mill powerfully put it in On Liberty, 
it was a “moral crime” that women and children were not guaranteed 
a “right” to “education” in his supposedly advanced country, because 
not only “food” but also “instruction and training for [the] mind” 
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were necessary for individual well-being. While adequate provision 
of food could meaningfully satisfy the right to sustenance in the short 
term, the satisfaction of the right to education could be determined 
only in light of its long-term process of character development.1
Because of their joint concern with education as the perfection of 
moral character, Wollstonecraft and Mill drew from some of the an-
cient wisdom of Aristotelian ethics. For them, the Aristotelian telos, 
or fi nal goal, of human life is the realization of eudaimonic, or virtu-
ous, happiness. Wollstonecraft’s foundational conception of duty led 
her to defi ne “virtue” in universalistic and metaphysical terms: “to 
obtain a character as a human being, regardless of the distinction of 
sex,” by ruling oneself and respecting others through rational adher-
ence to God’s moral law. Mill’s complex consequentialist distinction 
between aggregate human happiness and the “real, permanent” hap-
piness of self-cultivation led him to think of virtue as asserting one’s 
individuality in a way that was conscientious of the freedom of oth-
ers. This, in On Liberty, he called “a Greek ideal of self-development, 
which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government blends 
with, but does not supersede.” In their liberal variants of virtue 
ethics, Wollstonecraft and Mill agreed that to experience virtuous 
 happiness— or the ultimate human good—was to cultivate an inde-
pendent yet caring moral character. Because people must learn how 
to be virtuous in their relationships to self and others, education is 
the most important human right in their perfectionistic ethics.2
Martha Nussbaum has made the point that Aristotle’s theory of 
eudaimonia may be read as allowing the perfection of a range of virtu-
ous characters, from the contemplative philosopher to the courageous 
warrior. I follow Nussbaum in understanding Mill as continuing this 
perfectionistic tradition of ethics even as he opens up the possibility 
of an even richer variety of virtuous outcomes for human character 
development. Mill’s liberal utilitarianism diversifi es eudaimonia by 
setting down the freedom, eccentricity, and higher pleasures of indi-
viduals as the expansive parameters for human fl ourishing.3
I further propose that Wollstonecraft should be understood as an 
important predecessor to Mill in developing this liberty-centered 
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school of virtue ethics. Although virtue ethics is often understood 
as an alternative to both deontology and consequentialism, Woll-
stonecraft and Mill demonstrated how a deep philosophical interest 
in character as the primary marker of virtuous happiness was in fact 
compatible with their respective duty-based and utilitarian justifi ca-
tions for human rights. Their resultant liberal school of virtue ethics 
is explicitly egalitarian and democratic in its political implications. 
Its egalitarianism—meaning, its applicability to each and every hu-
man being, regardless of gender, class, race, or other social status—
made it universalistic in scope in contrast to Aristotle’s ethics, which 
largely confi ned its attention to the character formation of elite men. 
Wollstonecraft and Mill aimed at nothing less than the inclusion of 
all people in the experience of eudaimonia through the establish-
ment of a universal human right to education. In her Rights of Men, 
Wollstonecraft explicitly contrasted her views on “democracy” with 
“Aristotle.” Specifi cally, she rejected Edmund Burke’s conservative 
interpretation of book 4 of the Politics to mean that democracy in-
evitably produces tyranny. In the spirit of the early, liberal stage of 
the French Revolution, she contended that “democracy” leads not 
to “tyranny” but rather to the empowerment of the people. In her 
Rights of Woman, she argued that representative democracy was the 
best political framework for instituting the “rights and duties” of 
humanity and the “human virtues (or perfections)” that “naturally 
fl ow” from them.4
In recent scholarship on Wollstonecraft and Mill, each of them 
has been independently assessed as a virtue ethicist. Virginia Sapiro’s 
landmark 1992 book A Vindication of Political Virtue: The Political The-
ory of Mary Wollstonecraft situated Wollstonecraft’s political theory 
in eighteenth-century republican discourse on virtue and laid the 
groundwork for the more recent turn toward reading Wollstone-
craft in terms of her moral theory of virtue. Philosophical readings 
of Mill’s Autobiography alongside his Utilitarianism, such as by Nuss-
baum, have underscored the centrality of virtue to his ethics, espe-
cially his theory of happiness. While a consensus has formed around 
conceptualizing each of their ethical systems in perfectionistic terms, 
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the status of rights in their moral and political thought continues to 
be debated. Scholars have lately emphasized Mill’s view of freedom 
as nondomination over his theory of rights, and Wollstonecraft’s 
conceptions of virtue and duty over her theory of rights. I seek to 
connect Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s well-discussed virtue ethics with 
their more contested theories of rights, via a comparative analysis of 
their views on the fundamental human right to education.5
Wollstonecraft and Mill ideally conceived education as broader 
in scope than a mere process of socialization and higher in pur-
pose than a simple system of discipline or social control. To apply a 
 distinction made by Alan Ryan (and Mill before him), they perceived 
that the “narrower” use of terms such as “education” and “socializa-
tion” discouraged the “wider” human quest for freedom and virtue, 
and even obscured the ways that people may be made unfree and 
vicious by learning and norms. As do Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, 
Wollstonecraft and Mill viewed education as a long-term process of 
realizing the abundant variety of capabilities of human beings, fi rst 
and foremost as individuals and secondly as a species.6
Wollstonecraft and Mill theorized the process of eudaimonic 
 human development as having several, mutually reinforcing levels: 
(1) the education of children in the habits of body, affect, and mind 
to become virtuously self-governing adults; (2) the simultaneous, 
refl exive reform of educational practices to better enable such free 
and full self-development; (3) the allegation, recognition, and insti-
tutionalization of the basic human right to education undifferenti-
ated by sex; and (4) the simultaneous, refl exive reform of policies and 
laws concerning the right to education, in order to promote virtuous 
human development. Each accepted that the various levels of human 
development would not always take place at the same intensity or 
pace, be linear, consistent, or progressive in results, or ever be fi nal. 
Yet for both thinkers, the goal of virtue remained the common point 
of moral orientation.
Although they were perfectionists in the Aristotelian sense that they 
posited virtue as the end of their ethical worldviews, they were not 
perfectionists in the contemporary psychological sense of  defi ning 
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one’s purpose in life in terms of an unrealizable excellence. The 
latter view was self-defeating and demoralizing, as Mill poignantly 
chronicled with his account of his “mental crisis” and subsequent, 
life-saving discovery of the “indirect” route to personal happiness. 
According to his Autobiography, a “real, permanent” happiness could 
only be found via an inward turn, to the culture and habits of the self, 
which would precipitate a virtuous shift in the public habits of indi-
viduals. It was education that would spread and solidify this virtuous 
shift in personal and public habits. The most important outcome of 
this educational process would be citizens’ development of the taste 
for higher-order utility (above all, the fl ourishing of individuality) 
over lower forms of utility (such as short-term personal pleasures).7
In a similar spirit, Wollstonecraft prescribed education as a political 
solution to the deeper moral problem of how to inculcate the virtues 
necessary for the practice of equal yet “ennobled” citizenship among 
men and women. As a starting point for this educational process, she 
consistently advised girls to focus on meaningful practical goals that 
enhanced their own sense of self-worth. Women should not defi ne 
themselves in terms of superfi cial markers of their sex’s prescribed 
social value, such as a passive feminine demeanor. As she surmised 
in the Rights of Woman, “If fear in girls, instead of being cherished, 
perhaps, created, were treated in the same manner as cowardice in 
boys, we should quickly see women with more dignifi ed aspects.” 
This shift in girls’ self-understandings would encourage boys to do 
the same, in their views of themselves and their female counterparts. 
In the long run, the cultivation of personal virtue would contribute 
to the global human good: a shared sense of human entitlement to 
reasonable conditions of equal dignity and respect.8
As a philosophical proponent of the capabilities approach, Nuss-
baum has argued that normative theories of human development 
must begin with an account of the fundamental capabilities of hu-
man beings and also establish the minimum threshold at which their 
actual or potential voluntary realization characterizes a life of human 
dignity. Whereas Sen has focused on the capability for freedom as 
a gateway to the growth of other human capabilities such as educa-
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tion or political participation, Nussbaum has provided a detailed list 
of ten basic human capabilities (life; bodily health; bodily integrity; 
senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affi li-
ation; relationships with other species; play; and control over one’s 
environment). Despite these differences in their defi nitions of the 
capabilities, both have argued that the Aristotelian ethical distinc-
tion between the actual and the potential—what humans can do, 
versus what they could do and should do—is vital for theories of just 
human development. If we judge human activity solely on an empiri-
cal basis, rather than also invoking a normative idea of what humans 
could and should choose to do, we will never gain a critical perspec-
tive on “what is” versus “what ought to be.” This application of the 
Aristotelian distinction between actuality and potentiality permits 
the derivation of rights from capabilities. For Nussbaum, the right 
to education may be derived from a number of human capabilities, 
including practical reason, play, bodily integrity, and the emotions. 
Because education typically empowers humans with the choice to 
potentially or actually exercise their other capabilities, it is a basic 
or fundamental right of the human being. Furthermore, the applica-
tion of the Aristotelian distinction between actuality and potentiality 
allows humans to allege rights as extralegal or extracultural moral 
standards for assessing the limitations of present social and political 
norms. For Sen, such criticism of the actual may stir reform toward 
the potential.9
Wollstonecraft and Mill applied the actual-potential distinction 
in their diagnoses of the moral problem of sex inequality, and their 
joint prescription of the universal human right to education as its 
political remedy. Males and females were unequal in society and 
politics not because of nature but rather because of their socializa-
tion within the patriarchal norms of the family. Almost eighty years 
apart, Wollstonecraft and Mill insisted that the potential of females 
to contribute to human society and progress would be unknown un-
til they were given a chance to develop without the fetters of patri-
archy. Wollstonecraft hypothesized that women “will change their 
character, and correct their vices and follies, when they are allowed 
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to be free in a physical, moral, and civil sense.” Concerning women’s 
“capabilities,” Mill empirically reasoned that “nobody knows” what 
they are or could be, “not even [women] themselves, because most of 
them have never been called out.”10
The fi rst step toward realizing the capabilities of girls and women 
would be the reform of education—in families, schools, and culture 
as a whole—such that it produced more egalitarian norms of charac-
ter development for the sexes. Wollstonecraft’s theory of education 
was twofold in its innovative treatment of the psychological develop-
ment of the girl child’s gender identity. First, Wollstonecraft diag-
nosed how bad educational practices led girls to adapt to conditions 
of patriarchal domination by playing the standard, limited gender 
roles assigned to them by society. Second, she prescribed a cure for 
this problem in the deep coeducational reform of public schools such 
that they would train girls and boys to see themselves and each other 
as equally entitled to the “birthright” of humankind: “such a degree 
of liberty, civil and religious, as is compatible with the liberty of  every 
other individual.” Less focused on the curricular details of educa-
tional reform at the primary or secondary level, Mill offered a prag-
matic model for criticizing the negative effects of patriarchal gender 
roles on human development in general. Both theorists envisioned 
how the state-level institutionalization of a basic human right to uni-
versal primary education (UPE) would establish national venues for 
systematic, virtuous reform of gender and other social roles.11
Because Wollstonecraft and Mill wished to convince govern-
ments to provide the fundamental human right to education, they 
were faced with a political predicament. On the one hand, their pri-
mary justifi cation for the human right to UPE was the intrinsic 
value of equal education for individual girls and boys. On the other 
hand, elite men in power had to be persuaded to extend this right 
to females. Responding to these unfavorable political circumstances, 
Wollstonecraft and Mill made consequentialist arguments that fore-
grounded the extrinsic benefi ts of reforming female education for 
society at large, including the men who ran it. However persuasive, 
such consequentialist arguments for women’s human rights had the 
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countervailing rhetorical effect of portraying girls and their educa-
tion as mere means to larger social and political ends. This chapter 
concludes by engaging the questions of whether and how women’s 
human rights advocates and educational reformers may avoid this 
moral contradiction between their deeper philosophical principles 
and their rhetorical practices.
Diagnosing Bad Education via the Sex-Gender Distinction
Wollstonecraft began her philosophy of education by assessing the 
bitter reality of social inequality in her time. Her “observations” on 
women’s “state of degradation” led her to argue that such degrada-
tion was predominantly caused by bad educational practices that sys-
tematically disadvantaged girls at the same time that they advantaged 
boys. The remedy to such bad, gender-specifi c educational practices 
was the institution of an equal human right to education, especially 
formal primary education. Wollstonecraft proceeded to propose the 
reform of educational institutions and practices such that they would 
guarantee this basic right and generate virtuous characters for indi-
viduals across the sexes and the species as a whole.12
Wollstonecraft’s treatment of gender— or the socially constructed 
aspect of human sex identities—was the most groundbreaking di-
mension of her observational and politically situated approach to 
defending the universal human right to education. While she and 
other eighteenth-century thinkers did not use the term “gender” in 
this way, she came remarkably close to articulating in her philoso-
phy the conceptual distinction between gender as a social construc-
tion and sex as a biological trait that has become fundamental to 
social science research since the 1940s. The Rights of Woman pre-
sented her most complete account of the social construction of gen-
der identities, masculine and feminine. Continuing a theme from 
the Rights of Men, the fi rst chapter reviewed how unnatural social 
hierarchies—such as slavery, the aristocratic class system, the Cath-
olic and Anglican Churches, monarchical government, and standing 
armies— provided the context in which people assigned limiting and 
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corrupting identities to one another. She then moved, in chapter 2, 
to discuss how the same process formed “the prevailing opinion of a 
sexual character.”13
What Wollstonecraft meant by “the prevailing opinion of a sexual 
character” was the way in which society prescribed unduly sexu-
alized identities for both women and men, but especially women. 
“Prevailing opinion” consisted of culturally shared, comparative, and 
competitive judgments and beliefs about one another. Such opinions 
were the mechanism that created stereotypical gender identities. 
The power of “prevailing opinion” to shape people’s beliefs meant 
that it could impose a set of sexual stereotypes upon people—such 
as the male rake, the dandy redcoat, the vain girl, and the despotic 
mistress—which they often unrefl ectively, even happily, accepted as 
their own social identities. These gender identities situated men and 
women in a sexualized hierarchy of roles and relationships; they also 
refl ected and intersected with the other artifi cial hierarchies that de-
fi ned society, including those infl ected by class and race.14
Wollstonecraft identifi ed education as the means by which cul-
ture reinforces both economic and legal constructions of patriarchal 
power. Through education, women come to be seen as “cyphers” 
in the eyes of themselves and others. Wollstonecraft pinpointed 
“education” as principally responsible for giving an “appearance of 
 weakness to females.” This appearance quickly became reality, as ed-
ucation trained girls to internalize this collective social judgment of 
their gender’s supposed physical or natural inferiority. The frivolous 
character of female education, with its focus on “novels, music, po-
etry, and gallantry,” tended to “make women creatures of sensation, 
and their character is thus formed in the mould of folly.” Such a poor 
education had “a more baneful effect on the female than the male 
character” because women were denied the economic and political 
opportunities that would at least give them a chance to break out of 
this culturally imposed mold.15
Likewise, Mill was morally troubled by the social construction of 
gender to support male power and female powerlessness. In com-
paring husbands to slave owners, he caustically asked: “Was there 
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ever any domination which did not appear natural to those who pos-
sessed it?” The fi rst chapter of his Subjection of Women thus opened 
with Mill’s engagement of this problem as if he were the lawyer for 
the defense of women’s equality with men. Similar to Wollstonecraft 
with her observational and politically situated approach, he pro-
ceeded from the realistic assumption that the “burthen of proof” lay 
on his side, because “the subjection of women to men being a uni-
versal custom, any departure from it quite naturally appears unnatu-
ral.” Despite the odds against him, Mill pitched his case for human 
equality in the hope that the jury of society would change its mind 
on the basis of his arguments about the arbitrary and artifi cial char-
acter of sex inequality. Because humans made gender, gender could 
be unmade and remade by them. Mill thus underscored the practical 
possibility of rethinking and reforming gender norms such that they 
unleashed both women’s and men’s full human capabilities.16
The beginnings of Mill’s relationship with Harriet Taylor, in 
the early 1830s, inspired some of his fi rst meditations on gender. 
In private correspondence in the fall of 1833, Mill challenged his 
friend Carlyle’s description of Madame Roland as “almost rather a 
man than a woman” by way of querying, “Is there any distinction 
between the highest masculine and the highest feminine character?” 
Over the next three decades, Mill developed a theory of gender as 
a social construct independent of biological sex—particularly in his 
private musings on marriage and women’s rights, and in his public 
engagement of the suffrage debate.17
In his unpublished essay “On Marriage,” exchanged with Taylor 
sometime around 1832–33, Mill began to theorize the role of “educa-
tion and custom” in the social formation of constricting gender roles 
for women. He used the example of a married woman’s “artifi cially 
desirable” condition in contrast to the lowly, yet comparatively freer, 
single woman of his time. Although the wife lacked “any superiority 
of legal rights” due to coverture, her position in life was still prefer-
able to the single woman. To unravel this paradox, Mill argued that 
“it is not law, but education and custom which make the difference” 
between the lower status of the single woman and the higher status of 
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the wife. He concluded that women were particularly subject to the 
ill effects of bad education. From girlhood, they “are educated to be 
married.” The perverse effect of this lifelong push toward marriage 
was to deny girls the chance to experience freedom, even “in the mere 
physical sense.” Instead, girls were “brought up” to depend upon men 
for their basic subsistence and security. This deep cultural inculcation 
of women’s dependency on men made it unlikely that they would seek 
“to subsist” independently or “to protect themselves.”18
An undated essay on women’s rights, cowriten with Taylor in the 
late 1850s, similarly argued that the difference between men’s and 
women’s social roles “is principally if not wholly the effect of differ-
ences in education and in social circumstances, or of physical char-
acteristics by no means peculiar to one or the other sex.” Here, Mill 
and Taylor perceptively disaggregated physical differences depen-
dent on sex from physical differences independent of sex, suggesting 
that the latter were actually more relevant to determining choices in 
occupation. Mill’s 1861 treatise Considerations on Representative Gov-
ernment cemented this distinction between “physical” and “social” 
differences between men and women. In his defense of “universal 
yet graduated suffrage,” he paid no attention to “sexual difference” 
because it was “entirely irrelevant to political rights, as difference in 
height, or in the colour of the hair.” By the early 1860s, Mill drew 
a bright line between sexual difference determined by biology and 
gender difference produced by socialization. Sexual differences were 
nowhere near as signifi cant for society as the gender roles produced 
by education and custom. Moreover, sexual differences were less rel-
evant to choice of occupation than species-wide physical differences 
like height, and as “irrelevant” to political issues as hair color.19
Mill’s 1843 Logic had used the term “gender” in the grammatical 
sense, in the context of his defi nition of universal propositions. Mill 
argued that the proposition “man is mortal” is universal, meaning, 
its subject’s referent logically denoted all “human beings,” not only 
“man” or male humans. In propositions in which the universality 
or particularity of terms such as “man” was not clear, there was no 
logical reason to “enumerate the doubtful gender.” The meaning of 
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the term “man”—whether it was intended to denote “humans” or 
“males”—could be construed from the context of the proposition.20
Beyond this point of grammar, Mill never used the term “gender” 
in the modern sense of the social construction of human sex identi-
ties. His involvement in the women’s rights cause, however, pushed 
him to more strongly consider the ethical implications of universal-
istic propositions about “man” that did not “enumerate” women as 
part of the general category of humanity. While there was not an 
abstractly logical reason to specify women or use a sex-neutral term, 
there were plenty of contextual moral and political reasons to foster a 
more inclusive discourse on humanity. Mill’s Subjection of Women and 
his other political arguments on behalf of women’s human rights ex-
plored the problematic ethical implications of making universalistic 
propositions about “man” without considering women’s education 
into conditions of arbitrary subordination.21
In May 1867, Mill’s speech before the House of Commons, “The 
Admission of Women to the Electoral Franchise,” put this gender-
sensitive ethic of universalistic argumentation to political use. Before 
the assembly of fellow male legislators, he proposed an amendment 
to the Reform Bill concerning the qualifi cations of voters in British 
counties. This amendment stated that the word “person” should be 
used instead of “man,” in order to legally denote women’s right to 
vote. Before applause, he argued against the current state of affairs, 
in which “neither birth, nor fortune, nor merit, nor exertion, nor 
intellect, nor even that great disposer of human affairs, accident, can 
ever enable any woman to have her voice counted in those national 
affairs which touch her and hers as nearly as any other person in the 
nation.” His gender-sensitive rhetoric specifi cally denoted woman in 
his universalistic moral argument for every person’s right to vote. Al-
though his motion lost, 196 to 73, Mill’s case for legal recognition of 
women’s status as “persons” had already been publicly recognized as 
an expression of his “logic,” in a recent issue of the satirical London 
magazine Punch (fi gure 1).22
From the earliest responses to their theories of the social con-
struction of gender roles, Wollstonecraft and Mill had been accused 
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Figure 1. “Mill’s Logic; or, Franchise for Females,” in 
Punch (London, 30 March 1867), 129. The subcaption is 
“Pray clear the way, there, for these-a-persons.”
of professing strange views on the expression or repression of sexual-
ity in human life. She was spoofed as a sexual wanton, while Freud 
mocked Mill’s Autobiography for its “prudish” ideas on the relation-
ship between men and women. Although they exaggerated some 
truths about Wollstonecraft’s revolutionary-era sexual radicalism 
and Mill’s Victorian reserve, the critics had their moments of in-
sight. Intriguingly, the press caricatured Wollstonecraft and Mill as 
manly women or as womanly men for their ideas on how women’s 
rights ought to transform gender roles in society. Indeed, seventy 
years apart, cartoonists presented them as cross-dressing philoso-
phers of women’s human rights (fi gures 2 and 3).23
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Figure 2. “Mary Wollstonecraft,” 1798 stipple engraving by 
John Chapman, in the National Portrait Gallery, London.
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Figure 3. “Miss Mill Joins the Ladies,” in Judy (London, 25 November 
1868), 46– 47, and the National Portrait Gallery, London.
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Wollstonecraft and Mill both shrugged off such crude satires of 
their radical views on the difference between bodily sex and gender 
norms. Wollstonecraft defl ated such criticisms by anticipating them: 
she exploded the notion of “manly virtues” in the opening pages of 
the Rights of Woman by invoking the universal human standard of 
moral virtue and depicting “masculine” activities such as hunting 
and shooting as vicious regardless of which sex performed them. 
Mill persisted in making his logical argument for the human right 
to be legally recognized as a person. His unsolicited 1867 letter to 
Kansas state senator Samuel N. Wood, later printed in Topeka and 
New York papers, praised the legislator for proposing a constitu-
tional amendment for universal suffrage that would abolish “the un-
just political privileges of sex at one and at the same stroke with the 
kindred privilege of color.”24
Contemporary scholarship has carried on the nineteenth-century 
tradition of supposing that Mill wished to impose asexual androgyny 
on others, and presuming that Wollstonecraft wanted women to 
be like men. These interpretations do not, however, make sense of 
why Wollstonecraft and Mill made human embodiment the starting 
point for their practical ethics. Their philosophical distinction be-
tween gender and sex relied upon their conceptions of the embodied, 
sentient, sexed human being.25
For Wollstonecraft and Mill, sex mattered because the body mat-
tered—physically and morally—as the vehicle for human life. Woll-
stonecraft argued that both children and adults should study sexual 
reproduction as part of natural science, beginning with botany. 
Sexuality had important public health ramifi cations, as she and Mill 
acknowledged in relation to prostitution and venereal disease, and so 
it needed to be treated as a vital issue in political discourse.26
Like most people of their times, Wollstonecraft and Mill some-
times predicated their arguments about sexual politics on moral pre-
sumptions about how the sexed body generates social preferences. 
As discussed in chapter 2, Wollstonecraft assumed that sexual re-
production gave reasons for monogamous marriage and male-female 
partnership in early childcare. In a highly contested statement in The 
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Subjection of Women, Mill assumed that most married women would 
(and perhaps even should) choose to focus upon family and mother-
hood, rather than careers outside the home, even once granted full 
legal and economic equality with men: “Like a man when he chooses 
a profession, so, when a woman marries, it may in general be under-
stood that she makes choice of the management of a household, and 
the bringing up of a family, as the fi rst call upon her exertions, during 
as many years of her life as may be required for the purpose; and that 
she renounces, not all other objects and occupations, but all which 
are not consistent with the requirements of this.” The meaning of 
this passage has been much debated by feminist scholars. Some, like 
Nadia Urbinati, have interpreted it as a rhetorical strategy to per-
suade men to enfranchise women at no risk to their current domestic 
situations. Others, like Susan Okin, have interrogated it to expose 
Mill’s inconsistency or limitations as a feminist, particularly on the 
sexual division of labor.27
In light of his moral concern with human embodiment, it is inter-
esting to note that Mill cited “the physical suffering of bearing chil-
dren” and the “bodily and mental exertion” of running a household 
as reasons why married women focused on work within the family 
during their reproductive years. Lending social scientifi c evidence 
to this hypothesis, political economists Torben Iversen and Frances 
Rosenbluth have recently explained why women are more likely to 
slow down in their work beyond the home when they are in their 
childbearing years, whether or not they have children. The embedded 
causes of this trend are found in politics, economics, and patriarchal 
family structures. In a patriarchal society that allows women at least 
some access to the marketplace, women face greater pressure than 
men to calculate the costs and benefi ts of reproduction and other 
caregiving roles to them. The possibility of pregnancy, childbirth, 
and elder care is a signifi cant determinant of action, including choice 
of work, from women’s perspectives as economic actors. Whether 
because of actual or anticipated caregiving burdens, women focus 
less on their careers outside the home during their fertility windows, 
which feeds back into patriarchal patterns of employment and salary 
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discrimination against women in general. As Mill contended long 
ago, female embodiment does matter, but so do patriarchal gender 
norms.28
The bulk of Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s arguments concerning the 
sexes clearly fell on the side of addressing the moral problem of the 
social construction of patriarchal gender norms. In response to this 
problem, Wollstonecraft called for a “revolution in female man-
ners” by which women could reform themselves as individuals, and 
in so doing, “reform the world.” Mill likewise envisioned the ho-
listic, egalitarian transformation of education so that it cultivated 
self- sovereign individuals who would reform gender and society 
along virtuous lines. As Urbinati has shown, Mill embraced the Brit-
ish  Romantic ideal of androgyny— or the positive blending of the 
“highest” feminine and masculine qualities in human psychology—
found in the writings of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Percy Bysshe 
Shelley. It is clear, however, that Mill understood this androgyne 
ideal to be a psychological or moral disposition that one could adopt 
to pursue a life of virtuous happiness, not an innate facet of the hu-
man mind or body.29
Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s theories of gender identity formation 
are strikingly similar to contemporary social scientifi c accounts of 
gender. When psychologists formally introduced the sex-gender dis-
tinction in the 1940s, they used it to distinguish between sex (male 
and female biological traits) and gender (socially constructed norms 
of masculinity and femininity). Wollstonecraft took note of male ho-
mosexual prostitutes, transvestites such as the French diplomat Ma-
dame d’Eon (who now might self-describe as transgendered), and 
other “equivocal beings” who broke down a strict gender binary be-
tween masculine and feminine plus the prevailing assumption of the 
biological basis of femininity. Although contemporary literary theo-
rists such as Claudia Johnson have criticized her hetero- normative 
perspective, Wollstonecraft acknowledged homosexuality and trans-
vestitism as practices in her time and seems to have tolerated them 
among adults except in cases of sexual promiscuity, infi delity, and 
prostitution (which she judged to be morally wrong in general). 
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By contrast, Mill’s general moral preference for the pursuit of the 
higher, mental pleasures may have led him to focus more on issues 
of gender than on issues of sexuality. Unlike his utilitarian mentor 
Jeremy Bentham, Mill did not boldly engage controversial sexual 
questions such as the morality of homosexual relations (then censo-
riously labeled as sodomy or pederasty). As we saw in chapter 2, even 
his consideration of Mormon polygamy in On Liberty hinged on the 
social and political question of whether such plural marital arrange-
ments ought to be tolerated from afar, rather than on close moral 
evaluation of their sexual practices. Although he and Harriet Taylor 
chose to practice a platonic, intellectual love together, free from the 
obsession with sex and reproduction that dominated most couples’ 
relationships, Mill never prescribed asexuality, chastity, or childless-
ness for people in general; in fact, he devoted a large portion of his 
life to advocacy for people’s access to and education regarding birth 
control and family planning, especially for the working classes, who 
sadly lacked the means to support the many children they currently 
brought into the world.30
What distinguishes Wollstonecraft and Mill from many postmod-
ern invocations of gender is their consistent use of a philosophi-
cal distinction between sex, understood as biological, and gender, 
understood as a social construction. In the late twentieth century, 
the rise of postmodern theories of gender as a kind of social per-
formance had the effect, in academic and even more in popular dis-
course, of treating gender as a general category under which cognate 
yet distinct identity traits, such as sex and sexuality, are subsumed. 
Especially in current popular discourse, gender serves as a nebulous 
umbrella concept that covers all dimensions of sex and sexual identi-
ties, rather than as a specifi c concept that distinguishes between what 
is biological and what is socialized in these aspects of human identi-
ties. The distinction between biological sex and socially constructed 
gender, as applied in contemporary social sciences such as anthro-
pology and sociology, better promotes such rigorous analysis of gen-
der, sex, and sexuality. Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s philosophies have 
more in common with this social scientifi c approach to understand-
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ing the differences between gender and sex than with the popular, 
postmodern usage of the term “gender” to diffusely describe any and 
all aspects of sex and sexual identities.31
Within their critical theories of gender socialization, Wollstone-
craft and Mill typically distinguished between the sexed body and the 
social roles that had become culturally and legally associated with 
sex. This distinction served as a point of departure for their common 
judgment of patriarchal gender roles as arbitrary, artifi cial, and dam-
aging to all humans. Their use of the sex-gender distinction grew out 
of their perfectionistic ethics. The reference point of biological sex 
aided the critical analysis of patriarchal gender roles as vicious yet 
culturally contingent, and therefore transformable. According to the 
highest standard of moral virtue, gender could be reconceived along 
egalitarian lines so that it promoted, rather than inhibited, the free 
and full self-development of embodied, sexed human beings.
Vicious Cycles of Bad Education: Women’s 
Adaptation to Patriarchal Gender Norms
Wollstonecraft and Mill identifi ed education as the vicious means 
of women’s subjection but also, once holistically reformed, as the 
primary means of their exit from patriarchal domination. Mill elo-
quently conveyed the distinction between good and bad education, 
as well as their dialectical relationship, in his 1867 inaugural ad-
dress at the University of St. Andrews: “Whatever helps to shape 
the human being; to make the individual what he is, or hinder him 
from being what he is not—is part of his education. And a very bad 
education it often is, requiring all that can be done by cultivated 
intelligence and will to counteract its tendencies.” A good educa-
tion—which promoted the “virtue” and “self-culture” of the human 
being—was the outcome of the “always slow” process of reforming 
“bad education.”32
The most perplexing problem with the patriarchal system of bad 
education was that women did not want to graduate from it. As a 
highly observant woman, Wollstonecraft was struck by her sex’s 
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complacent enjoyment and even willing, malicious perpetuation of 
patriarchy: “Women are told from their infancy, and taught by the 
example of their mothers, that a little knowledge of human weak-
ness, justly termed cunning, softness of temper, outward obedience, 
and a scrupulous attention to a puerile kind of propriety, will obtain 
for them the protection of man; and should they be beautiful, every 
thing else is needless, for, at least, twenty years of their lives.” Mill 
also recognized most women’s contented acceptance of their subor-
dination. As an extremely conscientious man, Mill blamed his sex for 
using “the whole force of education” to make woman “not a forced 
slave, but a willing one.” Despite different emphases in critiquing 
his or her own gender, he and Wollstonecraft agreed that it was the 
overarching patriarchal structure of family, society, and the state that 
occasioned such vicious choices, concessions, and strategies, and 
worst, ignorant acceptance, among human agents.33
Sen and Nussbaum’s theories of human development have de-
scribed such responses to suboptimal circumstances as adaptive 
preferences. Wollstonecraft and Mill understood the phenomenon 
of women’s adaptation to patriarchy as vicious in three senses. First, 
it was morally bad, as in contrary to the realization of the individual’s 
potential for happy, virtuous self-governance. Second, it was self-
perpetuating, as it spread vice throughout society via the repetitive 
processes of socialization within marriage and the family. Third, and 
worst of all, it was a mind-set deeply rooted in the agent’s subjective 
sense of self.34
Building on her personal experiences and observations as a girl, a 
woman, a mother, and a teacher of girls, Wollstonecraft made an im-
portant contribution to understanding the subjective psychological 
experience of women’s adaptation. Wollstonecraft used fi rst-person 
narration in her 1798 novel Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman—most 
vividly with the destitute character of Jemima—to reveal the bleak 
interior psychology of patriarchal oppression. Jemima recounted to 
Maria her sad experience as a street prostitute: “Fate dragged me 
through the very kennels of society; I was still a slave, a bastard, 
a common property. . . .  I picked the very pockets of the drunk-
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ards who abused me; and proved by my conduct, I deserved the epi-
thets, with which they loaded me at moments when distrust ought 
to cease.” Her desperate situation drove Jemima to steal from the 
“drunkards” who “abused” her; her shame for this crime, even in 
light of the sexual abuse she suffered, poignantly showed how female 
victims of patriarchal oppression internalize society’s estimation of 
their worthlessness.35
Mill, as a conscientious man, assessed the problem from the out-
side; his perspective yielded far-reaching insights into the political 
psychology of not only women’s adaptation to patriarchy but also 
their capability to resist it. While he acknowledged the thesis that 
women’s subjection “is accepted voluntarily; women make no com-
plaint, and are consenting parties to it,” he challenged its power to 
explain all women’s attitudes toward patriarchy. He pointed out that 
“a great number of women do not accept it.” Women had long used 
the pen, and more recently other forms of activism, to record their 
“protests against their present social condition.” On the other hand, 
Mill conceded, “All causes, social and natural, combine to make it 
unlikely that women should be collectively rebellious to the power 
of men.” Because women had been raised to “make complete abne-
gation of themselves,” they were unlikely to do more than indepen-
dently complain about bad treatment at the hands of their husbands. 
But it was a “political law of nature” that people “under power of 
ancient origin”—such as slaves or women—would only gradually 
move from complaint of the power’s “excessive exercise” to com-
plaint of “the power itself.”36
Wollstonecraft’s subjective psychological account of adaptation 
explained girls’ early adherence to socially prescribed gender roles 
alongside adult women’s rationalization of their limited options. 
For example, Wollstonecraft often criticized aristocratic women’s 
sour designation of early infant care as beneath them so they could 
focus on frivolous pastimes. But she was equally, if not more, con-
cerned with how their frivolous lifestyles set up a dangerous model 
for their daughters. Raised to play with dolls and admire themselves 
in the mirror, these girls were surrounded with an array of gender 
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 “stereotype threats” in their upbringing. As social scientists discuss 
today, a “stereotype threat” is the use of powerful stereotype (such as 
girls play with dolls) to compel a group to behave in a way that con-
forms to social expectations (such as being conventionally feminine) 
and thereby reduces their ability to successfully perform in other 
areas (such as doing well in math). Indeed, it has been shown that 
if girls are asked to play with pictures of dolls before taking a math 
test, they will signifi cantly underperform on the test as a result of 
confronting this gender stereotype threat.37
In challenging the Rousseauian assumption that girls by nature en-
joy so-called feminine pastimes, Wollstonecraft diagnosed the deeper 
educational problem of the “stunting” of the girl child’s preferences 
and behavior from the time of her infancy through exposure to vari-
ous gender stereotype threats. She thus isolated the effi cient cause 
of adaptation as women’s lack of knowledge of any other way to live. 
Since bad education was the origin of women’s stunted development, 
deep reform of education could open their psychological horizons 
in a way that would at least allow women to choose their lots rather 
than simply accept them or unrefl ectively impose them upon the next 
generation. Her response to the problem of women’s adaptation to 
pernicious gender norms and stereotype threats spurred Wollstone-
craft to conceptualize how education ought to be reformed to ad-
vance women’s human rights despite women’s ingrained preferences 
for oppression. Although she has sometimes been unfairly charged 
with misogyny, her sharp criticism of women’s vicious behavior in 
her time was not antiwoman but rather antipatriarchy and therefore 
against women’s adaptation to it.38
Mill’s theory of adaptation was just as subtle, and thus prone to 
misinterpretation as well. Mill has been mistaken for a conspiracy 
theorist of why women adapt to subjection. On this reading of The 
Subjection of Women, men supposedly gang together to get women to 
prefer things the patriarchal way. This view of Mill’s theory of adap-
tation fails to account for his broader social scientifi c explanation for 
global patriarchal institutions such as the family. The fi rst chapter 
of The Subjection of Women dispensed with the traditional explana-
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tion for “patriarchal” power, the natural dominance of fathers, as a 
 posthoc justifi cation of male authority. Men had power neither be-
cause it was natural nor because they schemed together to get it but 
rather because they arbitrarily acquired it through use of “force.”39
Mill empirically reasoned that patriarchal institutions grew and 
persisted because individual men in power perceived them as eco-
nomically and politically advantageous to them, and protected their 
self-interest accordingly. According to chapter 1 of The Subjection of 
Women, these patriarchal institutions emerged from the older, feu-
dal social order, so they could not be interpreted in isolation from 
broader patterns in political and economic development. In addition, 
Mill argued that women have adapted to the social expectation that 
“being attractive to men” should be their “polar star,” and thus have 
contributed to their own subjection. With a sympathetic regard for 
women’s predicament, he noted it would have been a “miracle” if 
they hadn’t taken up this “yoke.” For Mill as for many social sci-
entists since, patriarchy is not a collective conspiracy among men 
against women but rather a long, cumulative feedback loop through 
which all members of society gradually reinforce institutions of male 
dominance.40
Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s profound accounts of the moral and 
political psychology of patriarchal oppression led them to posit a 
correspondingly deep form of education as its remedy. This model 
of education is a kind of realistic perfectionism, as it aims to take 
“women as they are” (oppressed, and largely adapted to such op-
pression) to what they could and should be (individuals empowered 
to choose, if they so wish, a life of virtuous self-governance). Using 
the capabilities approach as a framework, Mozaffar Qizilbash has in-
sightfully argued that Mill’s rich conception of human fl ourishing is 
meant to be a realistic standard and goal for reforming society and 
politics. On this reading, Mill’s liberal virtue ethics is thus akin to 
Sen’s capabilities approach in upholding a holistic, liberty-centered, 
individual-empowering moral education as one such realistic policy. 
In what follows, I argue that this model of eudaimonic education 
supported both Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s visionary defenses of 
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UPE as a basic human right that, if institutionalized, could success-
fully undercut the vicious cycle of patriarchal domination.41
Perfectionism Meets Egalitarianism: Wollstonecraft and Mill 
on the Human Right to Universal Primary Education
In her Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft was the fi rst philosopher 
to publicly propose and systematically defend a national system of 
government-supported primary schools, free for boys and girls of 
any social status to attend during the day in their localities. In a chal-
lenge to the “enlightened nation” of France and Charles Maurice de 
Talleyrand-Périgord’s recent report on public education there, she 
argued that they should try an “experiment” in permitting women 
“to share the advantages of education and government with man.” 
Anticipating patriarchal criticism in the guise of masculine chivalry, 
she satirically remarked that women “cannot be injured by the ex-
periment; for it is not in the power of man to render them more 
insignifi cant than they are at present.” She outlined the experiment 
as follows: “Day schools, for particular ages, should be established by 
the government, in which boys and girls might be educated together. 
The school for the younger children, from fi ve to nine years of age, 
ought to be absolutely free and open to all classes.” This overlaps 
with the twenty-fi rst-century defi nition of UPE used by the United 
Nations in its second and third Millennium Development Goals: 
enabling all children, boys and girls, to complete education from 
grade 1 through grade 5.42
Wollstonecraft systematically argued for a right to UPE when 
the concept had only recently and partially emerged in Western 
educational thought and practice. In the context of the eighteenth-
century expansion of primary-level parish and charity schools in his 
native Scotland, Adam Smith had defended government-sponsored 
primary education for working-class boys in book 5 of The Wealth of 
Nations (1776). This schooling was intended to serve as a psychologi-
cal corrective to the narrow, mechanical lines of work that they faced 
in the capitalistic division of labor. Smith did not apply this argu-
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ment to girls, despite the fact that they dealt with similarly narrow 
lines of work in the domestic realm. Given that girls were already 
being trained to read and to spin in Scottish charity schools in the 
1770s, Smith’s patriarchal bias is all the more evident.43
With a similar slant toward the rights of men, Talleyrand- Périgord’s 
Rapport sur l’instruction publique (1791) proposed that  orphan girls 
ought to receive government-sponsored primary education in the 
new French republic, but it defended full access to public education 
only for boys. Talleyrand-Périgord’s partial inclusion of females had 
the instrumental goal of saving these orphans from a projected life of 
prostitution, not the empowerment of women in general. Likewise, 
the turn-of-the-century Swiss educator Johann Pestalozzi inspired a 
progressive, “child-centered” movement in primary education, but 
his reliance on Rousseauian ideals of womanhood oriented his fol-
lowers more toward educating girls to be better mothers than toward 
equalizing the options of the sexes.44
Across the Atlantic, Boston’s tax-supported primary schools had 
been coeducational since 1789 and fl ourished alongside several pri-
vate female academies. Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman resonated 
deeply with Boston’s feminist educators at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, including Hannah Mather Crocker and Susanna Rowson. 
In his 1798 political tract The Key of Liberty, the rural Massachusetts 
farmer William Manning argued that mandatory, free, public co-
education was foundational to democracy.45
Six years earlier, the Rights of Woman had culminated with a com-
prehensive moral argument for UPE as a public policy solution to 
the vicious cycle of bad, patriarchal education. UPE would provide 
a public space in which governments could apply Wollstonecraft’s 
perfectionistic theory of women’s capability to realize moral and po-
litical equality alongside men: “By allowing them to share the advan-
tages of education and government with man, see whether they will 
become better, as they grow wiser and become free.” UPE ought 
to be a “grand national concern” because “private education” in the 
family could not be relied upon alone to bring about the “good ef-
fects” of moral and political virtue among all.46
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In Wollstonecraft’s theory of UPE, her perfectionism met her 
egalitarianism: “My observations on national education are obviously 
hints; but I principally wish to enforce the necessity of  educating the 
sexes together to perfect both.”47 Wollstonecraft envisioned UPE 
as operating according to three core moral principles that would 
together undermine harmful social norms by instilling an egalitar-
ian ethic of mutual respect among children: (1) holistic universalism 
(general education of body, mind, and character for all); (2) duty-
based individualism (teaching children that their fi rst duty is to gov-
ern themselves); and (3) psychological optimism (educating children 
to believe in their human capabilities to develop). Applied in concert 
in a primary school, these principles would guide children to avoid 
playing out the damaging gender roles that their culture had foisted 
on them.
Universalism in primary education, for Wollstonecraft, meant ho-
lism and fairness. Holism entailed the education of the whole per-
son, and fairness required equality of opportunity for such a holistic 
education. Fairness arose from national standards for UPE and local 
schools’ implementation of the government policy of holistic edu-
cation for all. The national standards of equity that Wollstonecraft 
imagined were “absolutely free” primary education for “boys and 
girls, rich and poor”; uniformity in schoolchildren’s clothing, disci-
pline, and curriculum; and a local parish school committee system to 
which teachers could be held accountable by parents.48
Holism meant an education that developed, rather than “stunted,” 
the potential of the “body, heart, and understanding.” By playing to-
gether during hourly recess in the grounds surrounding the school, 
girls and boys would learn to see and treat each other as embodied 
human equals. Differences in body or sex did not translate into dif-
ferences in moral status or rules. The only rule specifi ed for their co-
educational outdoor play ought to be “national” in scope: the general 
prohibition of brutality toward animals. By learning to treat animals 
benevolently in their games, children would discern the Rousseauian 
idea that all embodied, sentient creatures (including humans) had 
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natural rights to respect of their bodily integrity. Finally, holism 
demanded day schools because children needed their families for a 
complete moral education: it is by “making children sleep at home 
that they may learn to love home.”49
Individualism was about inculcating a sense not of social isolation 
but rather of moral responsibility to oneself and others. Children 
ought to be treated as moral equals by their teachers. Girls and boys 
would learn to see themselves as capable of the same self-respect 
if they governed themselves according to the same rules of moral-
ity. Raised to think themselves worthy of equal respect, children 
could better resist the threat of external gender stereotypes: “Were 
boys and girls permitted to pursue the same studies together, those 
graceful decencies might early be inculcated which produce mod-
esty without those sexual distinctions that taint the mind.” Integrat-
ing boys and girls of different class backgrounds was the key to the 
deeper psychological transformation of their images of themselves 
and each other: “They should be sent to school to mix with a number 
of equals, for only by the jostlings of equality can be formed a just 
opinion of ourselves.” Such “jostlings of equality” on the playground 
and in the classroom would lead to a general ethic of respect for hu-
man potential, regardless of ascribed social roles.50
Optimism, or a belief in one’s capability for positive development, 
would be inculcated through a standard yet stimulating curriculum. 
Girls and boys would be similarly encouraged to believe in their hu-
man capabilities to better themselves in body, mind, and character. 
They would be taught botany, mechanics, astronomy, reading, writ-
ing, arithmetic, natural history, and simple experiments in natural 
science, but such intellectual training would “never encroach on 
gymnastic plays in the open air.” In Socratic conversation with their 
teachers, they would learn elements of religion, history, anthropol-
ogy, and politics. In this way, optimistic teaching methods and goals 
reinforced the holistic dimension of UPE. Religion and morality were 
not dissociated from other elements of instruction in the govern-
ment school system Wollstonecraft desired. Britain’s long  tradition 
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of royal-chartered, Anglican, charitable day schools for poor boys 
and girls—such as Christ’s Hospital, founded in 1552—gave her a 
cultural framework for thinking these elements compatible.51
Mill likewise defended UPE, which had become a mainstream po-
litical issue in his time. It was on the legislative agenda in Britain dur-
ing his service as a member of Parliament from 1865 to 1868. Soon 
after his single term in offi ce, the Education Act of 1870 established 
the rudiments of modern UPE in England and Wales but also per-
mitted Anglican religious instruction in the government-sponsored 
schools. Since the early 1830s, Mill had been in favor of “the compul-
sory principle in education” for children in the primary school years, 
but against the use of public funds for the support of religious instruc-
tion. Before the National Education League Meeting in London, he 
gave a speech against the passage of the 1870 Education Act. If he 
had still been an MP, he would have voted against it on the grounds 
that it did not separate religious and public instruction. For Mill, the 
general division of religious and governmental institutions was nec-
essary to prevent the trampling of the individual conscience.52
Although Mill consistently valued UPE’s power to promote vir-
tuous and happy outcomes in human self-development, he differed 
from Wollstonecraft in the emphases he placed on the three core 
moral principles that drove the policy. The guiding roles of the prin-
ciple of individuality and the harm principle in his practical eth-
ics meant that Mill prioritized duty-based individualism over uni-
versalism and optimism. A case in point was his desire to prevent 
harm to the private conscience by excluding religious instruction 
from government schools. In contrast, Wollstonecraft’s curricular 
holism imagined a seamless integration of religion with other ele-
ments of rational, moral learning. From Mill’s secular liberal utilitar-
ian perspective, any government control over religious education of 
children seriously hampered the freedom and diversity of individual 
thought and conscience.
Mill also privileged duty-based individualism above universalism 
in upholding the moral responsibility of parents for the education 
of their children. While Wollstonecraft made a universalistic case 
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for “absolutely free” UPE for all children, Mill deployed the prin-
ciple of individualism to defend a scalar fee structure for UPE, based 
on parental income, with the poorest families receiving “state aid” 
for their children’s educations. Even more crucially, Mill considered 
“the home, the family” to be the appropriate place for “moral and 
religious education,” which “consist in training the feelings and the 
daily habits.” Because “these are, in the main, beyond the sphere and 
inaccessible to the control of public education,” it was the primary 
responsibility of parents to inculcate morals and, if they chose, faith 
in their children.53
Although he supported a national mandate for UPE and the sepa-
ration of religion from government schools, Mill entertained “the 
strongest objections to any plan which would give a practical mo-
nopoly to schools under government control.” He instead defi ned 
compulsory education as requiring parents “to have their children 
taught certain things” while being “left free to select the teachers.” 
Despite his own wariness about faith-based education, Mill’s broader 
commitment to duty-based individualism supported diverse school-
ing options—secular and religious—for parents to choose within 
the national mandate for UPE. He also argued for local autonomy in 
school committees’ oversight of the government’s primary schools, 
and for a range of women and working-class people to serve on such 
boards to represent the wider public opinion.54
On Liberty’s principle of individuality fl eshed out how duty-based 
individualism was to work within Mill’s vision of UPE. In chapter 3, 
Mill dramatically situated the free yet responsible cultivation of hu-
man individuality as standing in tension with the potentially crush-
ing infl uence of cultural uniformity. If facilitated through education, 
the diverse and spontaneous development of human beings would 
fi rst enrich the well-being of individuals and subsequently the sen-
tient creation as a whole: “In proportion to the development of his 
individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is 
therefore capable of being more valuable to others.” Children’s edu-
cation aimed toward the lofty moral goal of individuality but never-
theless relied upon a certain amount of curricular standardization en 
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route: “Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained 
in youth, as to know and benefi t by the ascertained results of hu-
man experience. But it is the privilege and proper condition of a 
human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and in-
terpret experience in his own way.” Standardization of primary edu-
cation could and should be done in a way that fostered, not stultifi ed, 
individuality.55
In his 1867 inaugural address at St. Andrews, Mill supported a 
broad-ranging curriculum for primary education in “the islands” 
of Great Britain, focused on the acquisition of general knowledge, 
yet adapted to the needs of particular populations. While classical 
schools for university-bound children ought to continue teaching 
Greek and Latin, “history and geography” should be taught “in el-
ementary schools for the children of the laboring classes, whose sub-
sequent access to books is limited.” Mill offset the class-based biases 
of such curricular differentiation with his commitment to guarantee-
ing the right to a quality “general education” for all children, regard-
less of economic status. This general education inculcated virtue as a 
consequence of imparting a broad knowledge of a variety of subjects, 
from math to literature: “Education makes a man a more intelligent 
shoemaker, if that be his occupation, not by teaching him how to 
make shoes; it does so by the mental exercise it gives, and the habits 
it impresses.” Mill thus envisioned UPE as a programmatic yet fl exi-
ble public policy for cultivating a variety of virtuous individuals, con-
fi dent in their abilities to insightfully interpret and ethically interact 
with the world around them. Indeed, he saw primary education as 
part of a holistic and continuous process of personal growth: “Where 
does elementary instruction end, and the higher studies begin?”56
Although Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) was a major inspi-
ration for On Liberty’s theory of individuality, Mill differed from the 
Prussian philosopher in defi ning free and full self-development in a 
virtue-oriented direction. Rather than being an open-ended process, 
as Humboldt allowed, free and full self-development ought to pro-
duce an active, creative, and virtuously self-governing individual. In 
his Utilitarianism, Mill’s distinction between the higher and lower 
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pleasures led to his moral demarcation of virtuous versus vicious pur-
suits. In On Liberty, he equated the “the most passionate love of vir-
tue” with “the sternest self-control.” He mourned that “the majority 
of young persons” lose their taste for “keeping that higher capacity” 
for virtue “in exercise,” if their educations and occupations do not 
encourage them to do so.57
Mill’s moral egalitarianism generated his pedagogical anxieties 
about steering all young persons to appreciate virtue and the other 
higher pleasures in life. He acknowledged that “virtue, according to 
the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the 
end, but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it dis-
interestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a 
means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness.” Mill insisted 
that virtues were “besides being means . . . part of the end” of utility. 
Young people had to be taught to love virtue in a disinterested way, 
so that they loved it for its own sake. Once people loved virtue in 
itself, they could experience virtue as integral to their happiness, not 
simply an instrument to it. In an 1829 speech, Mill upheld Words-
worth’s poem “The Character of the Happy Warrior” as illustrating 
“the most important features of the happiest and most virtuous char-
acter.” Wordsworth’s warrior was happy not because he was pleased 
by war but because he had come to cherish above all else the intrinsic 
value of a life characterized by personal excellence and self-control. 
It was incomparably happier for the warrior to be virtuous though 
displeased by his circumstances, like Socrates, than vicious and 
pleased, like a pig. Despite its apparently elitist distinction between 
higher (especially intellectual and moral) pleasures and lower (espe-
cially physical) pleasures, Mill’s conception of happiness sought to 
promote democratic political ends. In Considerations on Representative 
Government, Mill argued for plural voting as a reward for educational 
attainment in order to urge the poor to pursue higher schooling as 
well as experience greater powers of personal and democratic self-
governance.58
His substantive account of virtuous yet diverse self-development 
led Mill to support a universalistic national policy that mandated, 
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at minimum, primary education for all children regardless of sex or 
class. Neither he nor Wollstonecraft specifi ed the inclusion of all 
races in UPE, but this ethical implication could be logically derived 
from their strong antislavery politics and general critique of arbi-
trary, artifi cial inequalities. In his Political Economy (1848), Mill codi-
fi ed the educational policy that he and Harriet Taylor had discussed 
since the 1830s. He approved “universal education” for the complex 
consequence of empowering the laboring classes to control their fer-
tility and improve their chances at realizing the higher pleasures in 
life for themselves and their children.59
According to Ryan’s study of his educational philosophy, Mill 
spoke more of the cultivation of the individual in the “wider,” or 
 character-forming, sense than in the “narrower,” or curricular, 
sense. As a political economist, not a teacher, Mill did not approach 
UPE from the grassroots perspective of Wollstonecraft. His very 
consistent views on UPE largely overlapped with Wollstonecraft’s 
comparatively more detailed proposal, however. Fundamentally, 
both Mill and Wollstonecraft envisioned children’s holistic education 
of body, mind, and character. As Mill claimed in his Autobiography, 
children of average abilities could handle the broad-ranging educa-
tion of his childhood. With his university audience at St. Andrews, 
Mill shared his amazement “at the limited conception which many 
educational reformers have formed to themselves of a human be-
ing’s power of acquisition.” For this reason, he might have endorsed 
Wollstonecraft’s ambitious liberal arts curriculum for her ideal day 
school. In a striking parallel to the Rights of Woman, The Subjection 
of Women observed that girls benefi ted from sharing the “healthful 
physical education and bodily freedom of their brothers.” The physi-
cal education of girls was another core, practical component of Mill’s 
and Wollstonecraft’s theories of UPE.60
For both philosophers, a long-range goal of such a holistic pri-
mary education was to improve the life chances of girls and other 
historically disadvantaged groups. While Wollstonecraft’s univer-
salism directed her to focus on the value of a national educational 
system, Mill’s liberal utilitarianism—especially the primacy of in-
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dividuality within it—guided him to support a variety of public and 
private schools within UPE. Mill’s distrust of uniformity also made 
him wary of centralization, bureaucratic ineffi ciency, and the loss 
of parental rights and responsibilities in any national educational 
system.
Mill shared Wollstonecraft’s optimistic belief in the human capa-
bility for self-development toward virtue. But as a political economist 
and a liberal politician, he tended to be optimistic more about the 
long-term effects of educational policy than about particular teaching 
methods or learning experiences. Mill’s theory of progress was hopeful 
about the power of free yet responsible choice to eventually produce 
benefi cial social outcomes. On this account of progress, proponents 
of UPE and other optimistic social policies should generally seek to 
reinforce individual responsibility for personal choices, and expect a 
process of slow, not necessarily linear, but effective reform.61
Effective yet Ethical Argumentation for 
Women’s Human Right to Education
Despite their differences at the policy level, Wollstonecraft and 
Mill judged the goodness of UPE in terms of its benefi cial conse-
quences: (1) enabling duty-based individualism and (2) encouraging 
other positive outcomes for human society as a whole. Unlike Mill’s 
liberal utilitarianism, Wollstonecraft’s rational theology required her 
to address the question of goodness separately from the question of 
rightness. While goodness could be defi ned as relative to benefi cial 
outcomes, rightness was absolutely based on the rational demands of 
God’s moral law. In contrast, Mill posited utility as the standard by 
which all normative measures—including goodness and rightness—
were made.62
Supplementing her foundational duty-based argument for the hu-
man right to education, Wollstonecraft argued that UPE would yield 
better citizens, spouses, and parents. Like any effective rhetorician, 
she knew her political audience. Men in power, such as Talleyrand-
Périgord, had to be persuaded of the benefi ts of extending equal civil 
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and political rights to women. She thus presented an additional se-
ries of consequentialist arguments that focused specifi cally on the 
benefi ts of women’s education for men and children: “I entreat them 
to assist to emancipate their companion, to make her a help meet for 
them! Would men but generously snap our chains, and be content 
with rational fellowship instead of slavish obedience, they would fi nd 
us more observant daughters, more affectionate sisters, more faith-
ful wives, more reasonable mothers—in a word, better citizens. We 
should then love them with true affection, because we should learn 
to respect ourselves; and the peace of mind of a worthy man would 
not be interrupted by the idle vanity of his wife, nor the babes sent to 
nestle in a strange bosom, having never found a home in their moth-
er’s.” On a moral level, these consequentialist arguments served as 
supplements to Wollstonecraft’s core deontological justifi cation for 
women’s human rights. Human rights derived from human duties, 
and such duties were expressions of a rational standard of moral “vir-
tue” that had “no sex” but rather applied universally to all people. On 
a metaphysical level, both forms of moral argumentation for women’s 
human rights—deontological and consequentialist—fi tted, rank-
ordered, within Wollstonecraft’s belief in the benevolence of God’s 
overarching plan for humanity. These consequentialist arguments, 
however, stressed the extrinsic value of women’s human rights for men 
and children. Wollstonecraft’s direct entreaty to the opposite sex, her 
pleading tone, combined with her suggestion that liberated women 
would more dutifully care for their fathers, husbands, brothers, and 
sons, produced a real tension between her philosophical justifi cation 
of women’s human rights and her rhetorical presentation of it.63
After her sustained argument for national education in chapter 
twelve of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft repeated that UPE 
would produce better mothers: “Besides, by the exercise of their 
bodies and minds women would acquire that mental activity so nec-
essary in the maternal character.” A few lines later, however, she 
reminded her readers that this reasoning actually applied to both 
sexes. UPE would in fact cultivate good parents and spouses, not 
just good mothers and wives. She also indicated that these benefi cial 
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consequences for family life would arise from the sexes’ reciprocal 
enactment of the duty to show mutual respect to one another: “Make 
women rational creatures, and free citizens, and they will quickly 
become good wives, and mothers; that is,—if men do not neglect 
the duties of husbands and fathers.” Like Mill, she did not set edu-
cation as a legal prerequisite for citizenship but rather considered 
it a comprehensive basis for the virtuous character development of 
future citizens, male and female. If educated together as equals, then 
men and women would practice, rather than neglect, the moral and 
civic “duties” from which their basic human rights were derived. In 
her prioritizing of the right before the good, Wollstonecraft was 
more like Kant in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace” than like Mill in 
On Liberty. Kant envisioned the ultimate benefi cial political conse-
quence (world peace) as a by-product of all nations doing the right 
thing (following requirements for establishing a pacifi c international 
league of republics). Similarly, Wollstonecraft’s supplemental conse-
quentialist arguments predicted that the pursuit of the right path in 
politics (for example, human rights to education and political par-
ticipation) would have long-term public benefi ts (for example, virtu-
ous citizenship and social justice), without establishing utility as the 
basis of her ethical system.64
On Mill’s side, consequentialist arguments for the personal and 
public benefi ts of rights were basic to his liberal utilitarian enter-
prise. With regard to UPE’s public benefi ts, he argued that it would 
decrease the fertility of the working classes, liberate women from the 
burden of excessive childbearing, reduce poverty, and thus advance 
the development of society as a whole. In the Autobiography, Mill 
confi ded that he and Harriet “only hoped that by universal education, 
leading to voluntary restraint on population, the portion of the poor 
might be made more tolerable.” Most important, UPE would give 
women literacy, and the corresponding opportunity for a broader 
range of work inside and outside the home. As individuals and as a 
sex, women would fi nally activate their unknown human potential. 
In the process of virtuous self-development, girls would undercut the 
vicious cycle of socialization into patriarchal gender norms. Finally, 
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they would gain a better basis of knowledge for voting and other 
forms of political participation.65
Mill’s liberal approach to utilitarianism generated many power-
ful arguments for women’s rights, including the human right to 
ed ucation, because it emphasized both the public and the personal 
utility of such rights. Yet the idea of public utility yielded instru-
mental arguments for women’s rights that could rhetorically portray 
women’s social, economic, and political opportunities as tools for 
other development goals, rather than as good outcomes for individ-
ual women. Chapter 4 of The Subjection of Women contained several 
examples of instrumental arguments for women’s rights: equality of 
rights will make men less selfi sh and more intellectually stimulated 
by marriage, plus double “the mass of mental faculties available for 
the higher service of humanity.” While such instrumental arguments 
might be, prima facie, persuasive, they also give the appearance that 
the standard utilitarian justifi cation for rights is not suffi cient in the 
case of women.66
In isolation, Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s arguments for the extrin-
sic benefi ts of women’s right to education have the rhetorical effect 
of portraying female education as a tool for other, superior develop-
ment outcomes, such as happier families, universal suffrage, democ-
racy, and population control. This rhetorical practice threatened to 
derail the orientation of their moral theories away from the end goal 
of human life, the virtuous happiness of the individual. By under-
scoring how the education of girls would make men and society hap-
pier and better developed, Wollstonecraft and Mill ran the risk of 
perpetuating the dangerous gender stereotype of women as instru-
ments for male pleasure and power. An undesired (yet likely fore-
seen) by-product of pitching their arguments to men in power was 
to rhetorically reinforce the gender biases that they originally sought 
to uproot with their egalitarian theories of education.
Their predicament can be captured in a question: How can one 
defend universal human rights to the very people whose power de-
pends on the current system of inequality? The reformer appears to 
face a trade-off between maintaining her principles (by arguing that 
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women deserve rights simply by virtue of their humanity) and being 
effective in practice (by persuading male leaders of the personal and 
public benefi ts of granting rights to women). Because philosophical 
argumentation often sounds like futile rationalization when used in 
actual politics, the trade-off between holding principles and having 
practical effectiveness has been one contemplated by every modern 
political theorist seriously concerned with reform, from Wollstone-
craft and Mill, to Marx and Rawls, to Nussbaum and Sen. This di-
lemma is also still a real one for women’s human rights advocates 
working on a variety of issues, such as domestic violence, sexual dis-
crimination, and family law. Yet the dilemma is perhaps most widely 
faced with regard to the issue of state provision of the universal hu-
man right to education, because UPE is a right that literally applies 
to all children, and therefore to all humanity, at the most vulnerable 
stage in their lives.
In our time, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) have 
drawn attention to the problem of gender inequality in primary edu-
cation by arguing that the education of girls is essential for the reduc-
tion of extreme poverty worldwide. Since the adoption of the MDG 
by the United Nations in 2000, there has been signifi cant progress 
in achieving some overlapping aims of goals 2 and 3: universal pri-
mary education and gender equity in education. In 2013, the United 
Nations documented that the gender gap in literacy is narrowing 
in developing countries, especially in Southeast Asia and northern 
Africa, where general literacy rates have grown to 80 to 90 percent of 
the population. From 2000 to 2011, there was a remarkable drop in 
the number of children out of school worldwide—from 102 million 
to 57 million. U.N. Women, the agency devoted to gender equity in 
global justice, has nuanced this data by tracking the enduring gender 
disparities in primary education and literacy rates. It is a sobering 
fact that twelve years after the espousal of the MDG, “ten million 
more girls than boys” remained out of primary school and “nearly 
two-thirds of the world’s 780 million people who cannot read are 
women.” Given these dramatic gender inequalities, women’s human 
rights advocates face a dilemma similar to that facing Wollstonecraft 
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and Mill. While it is morally necessary and philosophically consis-
tent to defend the equal right of girls and boys to UPE, it may be 
ineffective or even counterproductive for correcting the actual gap 
in their access to education.67
Wollstonecraft and Mill modeled some ways to navigate past this 
dilemma. As we have seen, Wollstonecraft reminded her readers that 
women deserved rights because of their human capability for virtue, 
not because men would benefi t from their more virtuous behavior. 
Following her example, reformers might balance any economic or 
political arguments for the extrinsic value of UPE with repeated and 
clear public appeals to its intrinsic value for children. Near the end of 
his career, Mill modeled a morally stronger yet politically riskier rhe-
torical tactic: stressing the intrinsic value of education for all people 
over and against its extrinsic advantages for society. In his rector’s 
address to the students of St. Andrews in 1867, he explained that the 
ultimate reward of education “is not a consequence, but is inherent in 
the very fact of deserving it.” Intrinsic to education was “the deeper 
and more varied interest you will feel in life: which will give it ten-
fold its value, and a value which will last to the end.” Education was 
inherently meaningful in the sense that it inculcated the virtues nec-
essary for a human being to see, and deeply feel, just how interesting 
life was to live for its own sake. Given its strong moral and spiritual 
appeal, Mill’s argument for the intrinsic good of education—and a 
happy life—was both ethical and effective in its rhetorical formula-
tion. Although such arguments might not independently persuade 
men in power to promote gender parity in schools, they might at 
least counteract the cruder patriarchal connotations of arguments 
for the extrinsic value of female education for men. Learning from 
the examples of Wollstonecraft and Mill, feminist theorists and re-
formers should strive to avoid rhetorical constructions of women’s 
human rights that overstress their benefi ts to families, males, societ-
ies, governments, religions, or (often implicitly Western) models of 
development. Chapter 4 turns fully to the latter issue: particularly, 
the problematic place of Western European cultural biases in Woll-
stonecraft’s and Mill’s theories of women’s progress.68
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THE PROBLEM OF CULTURAL BIAS
WOLLSTONECRAFT, MILL, AND WESTERN 
NARRATIVES OF WOMEN’S PROGRESS
Confronting Cultural Bias
Although Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart Mill aspired 
to transcend time, place, and personal bias in the development of 
universalistic arguments for women’s human rights, they fell short 
of this noble moral goal. As Michel Foucault, Carol Gilligan, and 
Charles Taylor have diversely argued, it is improbable that any hu-
man mind could move wholly beyond the epistemological frames set 
by epoch, gender, culture, religion, nation, and politics. But does the 
psychological fact of mental rootedness absolutely prevent a person 
from thinking more globally than locally?1
This is a particularly important question of practical philosophy 
for human rights advocates. Human rights advocacy in the wake of 
the 1948 Universal Declaration relies on the universalistic status 
of human rights in international law and policy. Human rights are 
meant to apply across nations and cultures to each and every hu-
man being—for the grave reason that we wish to prevent atroci-
ties like those of the two world wars. For philosophers from Jürgen 
Habermas to John Rawls, the terrifying fact of the mass genocide of 
minorities as in the case of the Holocaust has spurred a return to po-
litical conceptions of human rights as a defense against such deadly 
treatment of humans as objects and instruments for the cruel ends 
of others. Human rights advocates, especially those who cautiously 
seek to reform aspects of other people’s cultures, are thus faced with 
a moral quandary. May one advocate a global standard of human 
rights without an imperial mind-set that imposes one’s own cultural 
values and biases upon others?2
Given their legacies for the idea of universal human rights, Woll-
stonecraft, Mill, and their philosophical followers are crucial histori-
cal cases to study with regard to this fundamental ethical problem 
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within global politics. Despite the nearly ethereal perspective of her 
metaphysics, Wollstonecraft failed to extend her rational theological 
arguments for women’s human rights in a perfectly universal way 
in rhetorical practice. Although she boldly strove to overcome the 
patriarchal biases of Enlightenment political philosophy in defend-
ing women’s human rights, she did not rise above this intellectual 
tradition’s cultural prejudices concerning non–Western European 
peoples and religions, especially Turkish Muslims. Similarly, Mill 
moved well beyond the cruder cultural biases of his father, James 
Mill, and other employees of the East India Company, particularly in 
rejecting the imperial supposition of India’s incapacity for self-rule. 
He nonetheless incorporated negative stereotypes of non–Western 
European peoples and religions, especially Muslims and Hindus, 
into his liberal utilitarian arguments for human development, lib-
erty, and rights.3
One explanation for these persistent cultural and religious bi-
ases is found in Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s joint intellectual debt 
to  eighteenth-century philosophies of history. Enlightenment-era 
theories of the history of human progress, exemplifi ed by Scot-
tish economist Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776), were typi-
cally conjectural and stadial, imagining the growth of human society 
from its origins in terms of economic stages of hunting, shepherding, 
agriculture, and commercial trade. These philosophical narratives 
usually (at least implicitly) assumed a Western European model of 
commercial civilization at the pinnacle of the development process. 
Worse, they coded modern Western Europe as the antithesis of the 
“barbarian” or “savage” peoples beyond it. According to Charles W. 
Mills, this opposition contributed to the racist idea that white set-
tlers and colonizers had a right to dominate nonwhites under their 
supposedly more “civilized” systems of republican government.4
Even Jean-Jacques Rousseau—whose 1749 Discourse on the Sciences 
and the Arts sought to overturn the prevailing consensus that more 
civilization, education, and commercial growth was better than 
less—still employed prejudicial assumptions about non–Western 
European cultures in his construction of an alternative conception 
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of human development. With irony that exploited and perpetu-
ated Orientalist stereotypes, he cited the “stupid Muslim” (with his 
barbaric tendency toward violent conquest, and accidental push of 
classical philosophy into medieval Spain) and the ancient Egyptians 
(with their superstitious and primitive science) as the progenitors of 
the indolent and slavish modern civilization he hated. More obvi-
ously Eurocentric in his relative lack of irony, he specifi ed the island 
of Corsica or the mountain villages of the Swiss Valais as the ideal 
locations for a truly free society.5
Continuing in this Enlightenment-era tradition of thinking in Eu-
rocentric terms about human development, Wollstonecraft and Mill 
upheld Western European women’s social status as a cross-cultural 
standard for economic, political, and cultural progress. Wollstone-
craft was deeply read in the tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment 
that put modern European women on such a pedestal. For example, 
she defi ned her monistic view of the human species as a single group 
with diverse potentialities against Scottish philosopher Lord Kames’s 
essentialist view that the species originated with plural racial groups. 
Rejecting Kames’s scientifi c racism, Wollstonecraft nonetheless took 
up his Occidental slant on sex and gender. Kames contrasted “matri-
mony among savages, having no object but propagation and slavery,” 
with “European education,” which enabled women to be raised as 
the “virtuous and refi ned” wives of monogamous men. As we saw in 
chapter 2, Wollstonecraft eerily mirrored this Kamesian language in 
her ethical objection to polygamy. While such arguments in the ab-
stract were morally universalistic (for example, polygamy is bad for 
women), they were rhetorically rooted in symbolic binaries between 
the West and the rest of the world.6
Mill, too, was heavily infl uenced by the Scottish Enlightenment, 
for his father’s philosophy of history—found in The History of British 
India (1817)—was part of the utilitarian tradition of applying prin-
ciples of classical liberal political economy to determine the happiest 
direction for humanity. John Stuart Mill’s theory of human develop-
ment, with its optimistic orientation toward the realization of in-
dividuality and diversity, was more speculative and forward-looking 
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than his father’s rigid, linear, historically grounded model of stadial 
progress.
The cultural bias and epistemological blinders of James Mill’s 
approach were apparent in the preface to The History of British In-
dia. Defending his historical method, James Mill brazenly claimed 
that “use of his eyes and his ears in India” was unnecessary to jus-
tify his philosophical prescription of imperial domination for it. He 
could learn more about India during a year of study in “his closet in 
England” than by traveling there or acquiring the languages. From 
this standpoint of cultural isolation, he could cherry-pick historical 
examples of Indian incompetence at self-government to legitimate 
British rule via his employer, the East India Company.7
Given James’s intensive private education of John Stuart, perhaps 
it is to be expected, though not excused, that there was some spill-
over of his disturbing biases in his son’s mature political philosophy. 
As with other historians of nineteenth-century liberalism, such as 
Jennifer Pitts and Karuna Mantena, I am interested in the problem-
atic intersection of liberal and imperial ideas in John Stuart Mill’s 
political thought, particularly in relation to India. Mill had worked 
for thirty-fi ve years at the London offi ce of the East India Company 
before publishing his major political works. He troublingly deployed 
many imperial ideas in arguing for a fundamental human right to 
self-development in works such as On Liberty and The Subjection of 
Women. These liberal imperial ideas included: (1) the conception of 
the relative cultural superiority of Western Europe to developing 
and colonized nations, (2) the use of Orientalist imagery, or sym-
bolic caricatures of the East in opposition to the West, to support 
liberal reforms, (3) a tendency to contrast civilized peoples with so-
called barbaric ones, (4) the assumption of the need for temporary 
and nontyrannical despotic government of such barbaric nations in 
order for them to ultimately realize republican self-government, and 
(5) condescension toward supposedly primitive religions beyond 
modern “Christian Europe.”8
Scholars have explored how this constellation of ideas aided com-
plex defenses of colonialism and empire in Mill’s writings. Oddly, his 
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Subjection of Women has been left relatively untouched by such criti-
cism. On the other hand, literary and historical scholarship has long 
situated Wollstonecraft’s feminism in the context of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century European imperialism. Further merging the 
literatures on feminism, liberalism, and imperialism, this chapter 
provides the fi rst extended comparative analysis of the ethics of 
Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s Eurocentric rhetoric for women’s human 
rights.9
Although they criticized the bad educations, oppressive marital 
arrangements, poor economic opportunities, and political disen-
franchisement of women in general, Wollstonecraft and Mill typi-
cally contrasted the higher status of women in Western Europe and 
the United States with the lower status of women in non–Western 
 European cultures, such as India and Turkey. Although they both 
deployed images of Eastern women’s oppression to undermine the 
perceived legitimacy of patriarchy at home and abroad, such rhetori-
cal moves were predicated on, and thus perpetuated, a slanted cultural 
perspective from which the Occident condescendingly looked down 
upon the Orient. The most pressing problem with these Eurocentric 
and liberal imperial ideas was their cumulative effect: the creation 
of a Western-biased rhetorical model for women’s human rights ar-
gumentation. Wollstonecraft’s Eurocentric arguments for women’s 
progress through the advancement of their human rights, coupled 
with her growing iconic status as the founding philosopher of this 
school of thought, enhanced the salience of Orientalist prejudices 
within the emergent feminist cause. Published in twenty-six non-
English editions, seventeen countries, twelve European languages, 
and three non-European languages between 1869 and 1928, Mill’s 
Subjection of Women was stunningly popular on a global scale. Its in-
ternational reach made it more infl uential than the Rights of Woman 
among both non-Western and Western fi rst-wave feminists.10
Building on the work of Edward Said, Chandra Mohanty, Joyce 
Zonana, Inderpal Grewal, and other postcolonial theorists, I expose 
the power of Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s Eurocentric idiom to in-
sidiously shape prejudicial political rhetoric toward non-Western, 
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 colonized, and developing peoples. To this end, I trace the origins 
of an Orientalist rhetoric for women’s human rights in Wollstone-
craft’s Rights of Woman and the writings of several of its most promi-
nent early American readers: Abigail Adams (1795), Hannah Mather 
Crocker (1818), and Sarah Grimké (1838). I assess The Subjection of 
Women alongside the forewords to four of its earliest non–Western 
European editions—by Grigory Blagosvetlov and Maria Tsebrikova 
in Russia (1869–70), Martina Barros Borgoño in Chile (1872), and 
Govind Vasudev Kanitkar in colonial India (1902)—to reveal its syn-
ergies and tensions with other cultures on the woman question. Two 
of Wollstonecraft’s non–Western European interlocutors,  Olive 
Schreiner of South Africa (1889) and Elvira López of Argentina 
(1901), respectively show the struggle with cultural bias in feminist 
thought and the successful crafting of an international and intercul-
tural feminist narrative.11
This exercise in comparative political thought makes clear how 
Wollstonecraft and Mill established problematic rhetorical models 
for women’s human rights arguments that would incline toward rep-
resenting non–Western European women and cultures in belittling 
and instrumental terms. The internalization and replication of some 
of these biases by Blagosvetlov, Schreiner, and Kanitkar show the 
insidious power of this rhetoric in colonized and developing coun-
tries. By comparing Wollstonecraft and Mill and their historic non–
Western European interlocutors, I enable a cross-cultural dialogue 
on women’s rights that underscores the importance of thinking criti-
cally about Western-biased and instrumental arguments for ending 
women’s subjection around the globe.
This comparative reception history additionally reveals that the 
Rights of Woman and The Subjection of Women were used and pre-
sented as resources for thinking through problems of Westernization 
and women’s human rights by non–Western European  intellectuals. 
Although their particular views of Westernization varied from time, 
place, and ideological perspective, these non–Western European 
respondents to Wollstonecraft and Mill help to show how a gen-
eral conception of Westernization emerged in the late nineteenth 
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and early twentieth centuries. Whether they interpreted it as good, 
bad, or mixed in effects for their societies, they saw Westernization 
as a process of exporting or importing Western models of devel-
opment (grounded in the liberal, utilitarian, and capitalist ideas of 
the European Enlightenment) beyond the developed nations of the 
North Atlantic. Non-Westerners adapt and innovate in the face of 
 Westernization, but the process is nonetheless predicated on their 
dependence on the Occident.12
Although they sometimes perpetuated prejudice, often unrefl ec-
tively, these international dialogues on the Rights of Woman and 
The Subjection of Women also spurred some profound critical refl ec-
tion on the problem of cultural bias for feminism. Organized femi-
nism became a global trend, with national and transnational social 
movements, from the early 1870s through the 1910s. Several of 
the earliest non–Western European interpreters of Wollstonecraft 
and Mill—Tsebrikova of Russia, Borgoño of Chile, and López of 
 Argentina—show us why and how we should avoid the moral traps 
set by Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s discriminatory language. This 
chapter concludes with a hopeful assessment of these non–Western 
European feminist thinkers’ achievement of a partial yet suffi ciently 
ethical transcendence of cultural bias, through the self-refl ective 
adoption of “rooted,” or culturally attuned, cosmopolitan perspec-
tives in crafting universalistic, or globally applicable, arguments for 
women’s human rights. By looking back to their examples, we may 
look forward to a contemporary reformulation of feminist liberalism 
in light of its historic concern with making culturally sensitive claims 
for the rights of women worldwide.13
The Problem of Western Prejudice in 
Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman
Wollstonecraft opened the Rights of Woman with a trenchant cri-
tique of the irrational prejudices of European civilization. “Men, in 
general,” she dryly noted, “seem to employ their reason to justify 
prejudices.” This attempt at reasoned justifi cation was more  apparent 
Y6872.indb   161 1/6/16   10:38:06 AM
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  C U L T U R A L  B I A S
162
than real. As she scoffed, “They can scarcely trace” how they “im-
bibed” these biases, let alone use reason to “root them out.” She later 
defi ned prejudice as any belief held without a reason to support it: “A 
prejudice is a fond obstinate persuasion for which we can give no rea-
son; for the moment a reason can be given for an opinion, it ceases to 
be a prejudice, though it may be an error in judgment.” Prejudices, 
or unjustifi ed opinions, were prevalent and persistent because of a 
human tendency to think emotionally and circularly about their be-
liefs. People typically assumed the truth of their beliefs “because they 
love[d], or believe[d] them.”14
Like Gilligan’s recent rejection of the patriarchal biases behind the 
idea of girls’ inferior moral reasoning skills, Wollstonecraft insight-
fully critiqued how this “mode of arguing” was “vulgarly termed a 
woman’s reason.” From Wollstonecraft’s metaphysical standpoint, 
even the epistemological process by which prejudice was widely 
mistaken for true and justifi ed belief was in itself an example of the 
formation of patriarchal bias. Given her universalistic view of the hu-
man mind’s capabilities, there was nothing essentially female about 
an emotivist claim such as “it is true because I believe it, and I believe 
it because I love it.” Rather, women were particularly susceptible to 
holding such prejudicial beliefs because of early gender socialization. 
Girls were not educated to use reason to see through the irrationality 
of the opinions inculcated in them by their patriarchal culture.15
Wollstonecraft’s analysis of prejudice grew out of her reinterpreta-
tion of John Locke’s and David Hume’s empirical epistemologies. 
She entitled chapter 6 of the Rights of Woman “The Effect which an 
Early Association of Ideas Has upon the Character.” Here she built 
on Locke and Hume to argue that the mind’s “fi rst impressions” were 
sense-based refl ections of the empirical world. These impressions 
bombard our minds and together forge an “association of ideas.”16
Whereas Hume’s “laws of the association of ideas” were simply 
his surmise as to the laws of his science of the mind, Wollstonecraft 
thought humans could and should use reason to challenge the preju-
dicial associations of ideas that form in their minds. Hume’s “laws” 
explained the mental formation of prejudice and nonprejudice alike. 
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In contrast, Wollstonecraft thought of the “association of ideas” as 
a process we must analytically challenge in the case of prejudice. In 
her hands, the epistemological concept of the “association of ideas” 
became a tool for critical social theory.17
While Hume had a more benevolent view of the ethical impli-
cations of the association of ideas, Wollstonecraft saw its insidious 
potential for women. Sensory impressions quickly developed into a 
chain of “associations that do violence to reason” if children were not 
given a good education. A good education would teach them how 
to use reason to think through the difference between rational and 
irrational beliefs, rather than simply imbibe the prejudices pushed 
upon them.18
Because of their bad educations, girls were more victims of this 
problem than boys were. Setting forth a feminist theory of subject 
formation, Wollstonecraft argued that girls were shaped from the 
crib by a “cruel association of ideas”: “Every thing that they see or 
hear serves to fi x impressions, call forth emotions, and associate ideas, 
that give a sexual character to the mind.” Anticipating feminist read-
ings of Foucault, Wollstonecraft interpreted the embodied psyche 
as a prison for girls and women under patriarchy. Patriarchal power 
structures set the bounds of women’s meager senses of self, agency, 
rationality, and knowledge: “Taught from their infancy that beauty 
is woman’s sceptre, the mind shapes itself to the body, and, roaming 
round its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn its prison.” Because women 
were educated only to be attractive mates for men, their mental con-
tents were confl ated with the rudimentary sensory experiences of 
their bodies. Exacerbating the problem, society valued women’s bod-
ies primarily in terms of their sexual functions. Exercising their rea-
son within the constraints set by patriarchy, women perceived their 
only route to power as manipulation of men through their sexuality 
and fertility.19
Although Wollstonecraft posited a rational education as the solu-
tion to the problem of prejudice, her own education did not prevent 
her from slipping into cultural bias— over and over again. Perhaps 
it was the haphazard quality of her early education, similar to that 
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of other girls of her time, that made her less than systematic in how 
she identifi ed and eradicated prejudice in her own worldview. On the 
other hand, her education did not prevent her from analyzing the 
problem of patriarchal prejudice toward and for women in general. 
Proceeding as though she were the exception to the rule, she at least 
recognized that it would be diffi cult for other women to overcome 
the tendency to think in prejudicial terms: “Still I know that it will 
require a considerable length of time to eradicate the fi rmly rooted 
prejudices which sensualists have planted; it will also require some 
time to convince women that they act contrary to their real interest 
on an enlarged scale.” Yet her enlightened awareness of the problem 
of prejudice, especially for women, did not fully extend to her own 
case. As she strove to take what Thomas Nagel has called the “view 
from nowhere,” she was able to see through the problem of prejudice 
in others, but was largely blinded to it in herself.20
One likely culprit was the abstraction of her metaphysical frame-
work. The attempt to adopt a universalistic perspective on morality 
may mask the fact that the perspective is ineluctably rooted in a par-
ticular historical, cultural, and personal context. As Taylor has noted 
in his analysis of Foucault, this tendency to generalize from one’s own 
perspective colors even the deepest critiques of our psychological 
bounds. For example, feminists have widely criticized Foucault for as-
suming a male perspective in his History of Sexuality (1976), even as 
they praise him for including the male homosexual point of view. The-
orizing general patterns in human consciousness and behavior often 
leads us to overlook some prejudices in favor of overturning others.21
Immanuel Kant, like Wollstonecraft, had employed an abstract 
approach to defending rights for humans in the wake of the French 
Revolution. Despite his moral universalism on an abstract level, he 
denied political rights to women in modern republics because he 
prejudicially judged them incapable of rational self-governance. 
Wollstonecraft fell prey to the obverse problem: exposing the preju-
dices that harmed women in general but failing to critically assess 
a range of cultural biases that compromised the universalism of her 
feminist argumentation.
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Another culprit for Wollstonecraft’s cultural biases was her reli-
gious standpoint. Given the dissenting Christian theological founda-
tion for her ethics, Wollstonecraft had “imbibed” many Protestant 
biases toward non–Western European religions, especially Islam 
and Russian Orthodoxy. Wollstonecraft also followed French and 
Scottish Enlightenment philosophers such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, 
and Smith in casting the Roman Catholic countries of southern Eu-
rope as nests of indolence and other forms of cultural backwardness. 
She followed her theological mentor Richard Price in designating 
the “blind” slavery of “a Spaniard, a Russian, or a Turk” as the an-
tithesis of free and responsible Western Protestants—particularly 
those noble Christians in the abolition movement. What these three 
non-Protestant religions—Roman Catholicism, Russian Orthodoxy, 
and Islam—had in common were origins and institutional centers 
beyond Western Europe.22
Although Wollstonecraft found the “civilization of the bulk of the 
people of Europe” to be “very partial” toward men in power, she was 
certain it was worse elsewhere for her sex—particularly in the Mus-
lim cultural outpost of Turkey. She was well traveled within Europe, 
trekking to Portugal, Ireland, France, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
and northern Germany. Yet her journeys seemed only to reinforce 
her haughty cultural preferences for Paris and London. Despite what 
she judged as her culture’s condescending view of women’s capa-
bilities, Wollstonecraft consistently judged Western Europe and its 
North American colonies as superior to virtually every other culture 
in the world. “Scarcely human” and “sluggish” peasants of rural Scan-
dinavia, wife-abusing Russians, Chinese foot binders, lazy southern 
Europeans, Roman Catholic “vermin,” tyrannical Egyptians, over-
sexed Tahitians, and voluptuous Turkish Muslims were all symbolic 
targets of her culturally biased arguments in favor of women’s human 
rights. Ironically, all this disdain came from an endlessly indebted, 
middle-class, Anglo-Irish woman from a broken home.23
Wollstonecraft drew her negative caricatures of non-Western cul-
tures, especially the Muslim peoples of Turkey and North Africa, 
from books by European explorers. Like the elder Mill, she followed 
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the Enlightenment-era approach of studying Eastern cultures in her 
“closet.” Wollstonecraft’s frequent resort to anti–Turkish Muslim 
rhetoric probably arose from the politics of the time. Turkey was at 
war with both Russia and Austria from 1787 until 1791, the year she 
wrote the Rights of Woman. Earlier in the eighteenth century, Lady 
Mary Wortley Montagu had written home to Britain with relatively 
kind words about her experiences within Turkish culture, includ-
ing the secret female world of the seraglios. By the late eighteenth 
century, however, the Ottomans were generally misrepresented to 
the Western European public as “barbarians” who viewed women 
as soulless creatures, unworthy of the same afterlife as men. In fact, 
it was a Western-made myth that Muslims believed women had no 
souls and thus no access to paradise.24
The rhetorical power of such Orientalist prejudices was not lost 
on Wollstonecraft. She literally began and ended the Rights of Woman 
with images of women’s servitude in Eastern cultures. In the open-
ing lines of the introduction, she inveighed against “men of genius” 
who “in the true style of Mahometanism” conceptualized women 
as “subordinate beings,” not as “part of the human species.” A few 
paragraphs later, she bewailed that women were raised to be “weak 
beings . . . only fi t for a seraglio!” In the fi nal sentence of the book, 
she rebuked European men for being “Egyptian task-masters” to un-
derscore the injustice of their enslavement of women even in the age 
of “reason” and “rights.”25
As Marilyn Butler and Janet Todd argued in their annotations to 
the Rights of Woman, each of these symbolic references to the Orient 
was likely rooted in contemporary British prejudices toward Turkey. 
As early as 1717, Lady Montagu had challenged the British miscon-
ception that the Turkish Muslims were barbaric because they did 
not believe women had souls. The Turkish seraglio, or the private 
living quarters of the wives and concubines in a Muslim household 
in the Ottoman Empire, likewise fascinated the European public. 
Such polygamous Muslim households often served as symbols of 
Oriental sexual perversity, which buffed the veneer of Occidental 
sexual restraint. Since the Ottoman Empire occupied Egypt for most 
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of the eighteenth century, Wollstonecraft’s “Egyptian task-master” 
metaphor obliquely jabbed the Turkish even as it rallied Protestants 
around a familiar biblical and abolitionist trope.26
There is a likely unintended irony in Wollstonecraft’s use of anti-
Turkish rhetoric to shore up her feminist critique of the master-slave 
dynamic. Wollstonecraft denounced the vicious cycle of patriarchal 
oppression—with its arbitrary husbands, manipulative wives, des-
potic mothers, and tyrannized children—in morally universal terms. 
She nonetheless exploited the view of Turkish Muslims as partic-
ularly prone to the moral vices that civilized Europeans ought to 
avoid. Revealing her superfi cial understanding of Ottoman culture, 
she compared European wives to “Turkish bashaws” (sic). Techni-
cally, these pashaws were high-ranking Turkish military offi cers, but 
Wollstonecraft reduced them to an instrumental stereotype. She de-
ployed the “bashaws” as symbols of the master-slave dynamic that 
she sought to expose in male-female relations. Women, she wrote, 
like the Turkish offi cers, “cunningly obtain power by playing on the 
weakness” of their male superiors but sacrifi ce “virtue” and “respect-
ability” to the “temporary gratifi cations” of such “illicit sway.”27
Moving beyond metaphor into a kind of Montesquieuian sociol-
ogy, Wollstonecraft claimed that this type of “despotism that kills 
virtue and genius in the bud” may “hover over Europe,” but it “deso-
lates Turkey.” The sexual subtext of her argument surfaced along-
side her Orientalist prejudices: Turkish despotism, especially in the 
seraglios, had caused the spread of venereal disease, making “men, 
as well as the soil, unfruitful.” Her account of Turkey as desolated 
by male infertility functioned as a veiled threat to European men 
(perhaps especially those who frequented the Turkish baths in Lon-
don) and especially their wives. After all, the women faced the dire 
consequences of their husbands’ extramarital sexual traffi c: venereal 
disease was a major contributor to eighteenth-century mothers’ and 
children’s ill health and early deaths.28
Wollstonecraft proposed a solution, which was predicated on a 
culturally biased binary: either Western women could ignore the 
cyclical problem of despotism and be “shut up” in their homes like 
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“eastern princes,” or they could be “educated in such a manner as 
to be able to think and act for themselves.” Both routes negated the 
worth of the Muslim wife by transforming the Western wife into 
either an “eastern prince” or a bearer of equal rights. This binary, in 
turn, presumed that Eastern governments were despotic and there-
fore inferior to emergent Western conceptions of rights-based re-
publicanism as nondomination.29
By framing and interweaving the fi rst major philosophical treatise 
on women’s human rights with such Orientalist metaphors, Woll-
stonecraft was the author of a double-edged tradition: a feminist 
 liberalism with both humanist and imperialist sides. Contra the pa-
triarchal apologists, such as Edmund Burke and Rousseau, she upheld 
the feminist humanist idea of women as part of the human species 
and therefore entitled to the same rights as men. Yet she relied on 
demeaning images of Eastern, especially Turkish Muslim, peoples to 
signal the moral importance of the liberation of women in general. 
She thus implied that Eastern women and men must be Western-
ized in order to be free. The obverse implication was that Western 
women and men must resist a “return” to the passions of Eastern 
“barbarism” in order to fully realize the rational freedom of their 
superior culture. These two sides—humanist and imperial— of the 
feminist liberalism born of Wollstonecraft are not necessarily tied 
together, for we shall see in the remainder of this chapter how later 
feminist liberals have achieved partial yet suffi ciently ethical tran-
scendence of such Western imperial biases. Rather, the prejudices 
of Wollstonecraft and some of her followers ought to be understood 
as historically situated products of a Western European culture that 
was, according to Pitts, in the midst of a “turn to empire.”30
Wollstonecraft’s reproduction of the symbolic binary between 
Eastern seraglios and Western morality may be read as an early itera-
tion of a trend in British imperial feminism. According to  Grewal’s 
study of late nineteenth-century British feminist activism concern-
ing India, “the discourse of the woman ‘caged’ in the harem, in 
purdah, becomes the necessary Other for the construction of the 
Englishwoman presumably free and happy in the home.” Wollstone-
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craft offered an Enlightenment variation on this theme: the women 
in the seraglios of Turkey served as the “necessary Other” to con-
struct the greater possibility of women’s freedom in Europe, and the 
rest of the world’s hopeful emulation of it. As Zonana cogently ob-
served, the “feminist orientalist” rhetorical strategy of the Rights of 
Woman was to demand that “the West rid itself of its oriental ways, 
becoming as a consequence more Western—that is, more rational, 
enlightened, reasonable.” While Wollstonecraft’s primary goal was 
to make Western Europe “more Western,” she also reinforced the 
notion of the subordinate position of the East in relation to Western 
advancement.31
In the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft exposed the hypocrisy of 
Rousseau’s unduly sexualized prescriptions for female education by 
insinuating their affi nities with the luxury and decadence of Turkish 
Muslim polygamy: “In a seraglio, I grant, that all these arts are nec-
essary; the epicure must have his palate tickled, or he will sink into 
apathy; but have women so little ambition as to be satisfi ed with such 
a condition?” When Wollstonecraft summoned “women” in this 
highly rhetorical question, she connoted that European wives ought 
to have more “ambition” than their counterparts in the seraglio. The 
rhetorical dimension of this question, however, does not rebuff its 
prejudice. Although she took an ironic, or unexpected, position by 
granting the “necessity” of women’s sexual “arts” in the seraglio, she 
clearly demarcated such Eastern homes as ruled by “necessity” and 
thus inhospitable to Western ideas of freedom.32
Wollstonecraft’s Orientalist women’s human rights discourse 
represented a kind of global feminist imperialism. From her late 
eighteenth-century standpoint, she presumed women’s current op-
pression not only in the East but worldwide. Yet she situated patriar-
chal oppression on a slope—with non–Western European cultures 
at the bottom, and Western Europe and its North Atlantic colonies 
at the top. As Samara Cahill has shown, there was nothing absolute 
or “essential” about this slope: Wollstonecraft thought that Eastern 
peoples could, and should, close the gap between themselves and 
the West. Like Mill after her, she did not assume that non–Western 
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European peoples were absolutely incapable of progress, because of 
some essential fl aw in their natures or cultures. Her rhetoric, how-
ever, publicly bolstered the idea of Western supremacy in a way that 
stood in confl ict with her universalistic ethics.33
For Wollstonecraft, Western culture was almost as culpable for 
women’s oppression as the non-Western cultures it had partly sur-
passed. Western European culture, through reverence for its “men 
of genius,” continued to profess unenlightened ideas about women. 
Even John Milton, the author of the greatest English Protestant epic 
poem, wrote in the “true Mahometan strain” with regard to Eve be-
ing “made to please” Adam. Burke likewise had not “steered clear 
of the mussulman’s creed” when he endorsed women’s seclusion in 
home and family. Wollstonecraft accused Rousseau of the sensual-
ity of a Turkish sultan for professing that “a girl should be educated 
for her husband with the same care as for an eastern haram [sic].” 
By mocking these Western “men of genius” with her caricatures of 
Islam, Wollstonecraft suggested that Western culture had advanced 
to a point where it could and should cast off patriarchal hierarchies 
and other “vestiges of barbarism.”34
Given the international success of the Rights of Woman, Wollstone-
craft established a morally problematic yet politically infl uential rhe-
torical model for making women’s human rights arguments. Histo-
rians of feminism and imperialism have traced the lingering impact 
of this Orientalist idiom on nineteenth-century feminist authors and 
activists from Britain—such as Mary Robinson, Emily Brontë, Har-
riet Martineau, and Millicent Fawcett. Grewal has inventively shown 
the ideological drift of this discourse among late nineteenth-century 
colonized Indian women, who reversed many Western stereotypes 
of their “harems” to expose the moral problems with British imperial 
ideas of womanhood and family. According to Grewal, such sym-
bolic reversals challenged imperial domination yet reproduced the 
binaries between East and West on a different bias.35
Both the humanist and the imperialist sides of Wollstonecraft’s 
feminist liberalism found a welcoming home in the United States. 
It was a confl icted young liberal democracy, which had recently 
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rewritten its constitution. Between 1787 and 1791, the Americans 
had reinforced the legitimacy of chattel slavery at the same time as 
they pushed forward a bill of individual rights for white male citi-
zens. In postrevolutionary America, we fi nd further evidence for 
Zonana’s provocative thesis that “the feminist orientalist strategy 
introduced by Wollstonecraft came to pervade nineteenth-century 
feminist discourse,” whether “through direct infl uence or simply be-
cause the ideas on which she drew were circulating freely within the 
culture.”36
From its publication in Boston and Philadelphia in 1792, the 
Rights of Woman attracted an enthusiastic audience among American 
Protestant women who advocated education reform, abolition, pub-
lic benevolence, temperance, and suffrage. In this book they found 
a rhetorical style that resonated with their own modes of argument 
for women’s human rights. In 1795, soon after reading the Rights of 
Woman with Vice President John Adams, First Lady Abigail Adams 
complained to her husband about the “more than Egyptian Bondage, 
to which the Female Sex, have been subjugated, from the earliest 
ages.” The Rights of Woman had argued that women were “educated 
in worse than Egyptian bondage.”37
The “Egyptian bondage” metaphor had multiple meanings in 
Wollstonecraft and the Adamses’ shared Anglo dissenting Christian 
context. When John Adams was an ambassador in London in the 
1780s, he and his wife had frequented Price’s church at Newington 
Green at the same time as Wollstonecraft. Although it is not known 
if they met, they certainly heard similar sermons, fraught with al-
lusions to the “darkness and superstition” of the “Mahometans and 
Papists.” On both sides of the Atlantic, the allegory of the libera-
tion of Moses and the Jews from Egypt was a common framework 
for late eighteenth-century Christian abolitionist narratives of 
 progress—such as by the freed African slave and poet Phillis Wheat-
ley of Boston.38
Like Wollstonecraft, Abigail Adams exploited the salience of these 
symbols and their multiple meanings for different audiences. Per-
haps to assuage her conservative husband, she made her critique of 
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patriarchy less universal by claiming that the “attention paid to the 
Education of Females in America” had raised their nation above the 
rest of the world just “within these last 15 years.” Framed within this 
rising imperial feminist idiom of the North Atlantic, Eastern despo-
tisms appeared more prone to subjecting women to “Egyptian bond-
age” than Western rights-based republics such as the United States 
and France. This was certainly an ironic contrast given the consti-
tutional legitimacy of the evil of slavery and the formal exclusion 
of women from citizenship in the United States, and the systematic 
retrenchment of women’s rights in France during the radical stage of 
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era.39
In the early nineteenth century, the two most signifi cant Ameri-
can philosophers of women’s human rights were Crocker and 
Grimké. Crocker’s Observations on the Real Rights of Women (1818) 
and Grimké’s Letters on the Equality of the Sexes (1838) were both 
published in Boston. These book-length treatises refl ected the city’s 
long-standing openness toward issues of abolition, female education 
reform, and women’s public activism. Crocker and Grimké’s books 
also contributed to the feminist imperial discourse that the reception 
of Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman had helped to transport around 
the Atlantic world.
Crocker favorably cited Wollstonecraft several times in the Obser-
vations and continued her philosophical forerunner’s assault on “the 
idea of the inferiority of female nature.” A liberal Congregational-
ist theologian, Crocker followed Wollstonecraft in her concern with 
refuting the religious notion that women have inferior souls to men, 
or no souls at all, leaving them incapable of the same (or perhaps 
any) salvation. Building on a widespread Western misconception 
of Islam at the turn of the nineteenth century, they both associated 
this “general view” of a metaphysical sex inequality with the “ma-
hometans both of Asia and Europe.” Crocker cited Lady Montagu’s 
rejection of the Western presumption that Turkish Muslims did not 
believe women have souls. But Crocker held on to the view that “ma-
hometans” believed in the natural inferiority of the female soul. She 
represented this patriarchal idea as backward and Islamic, and point-
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edly contrasted it with the egalitarian views of “our God,” found in 
the “religion of the gospel.”40
This (often implicit) contrast between our God and your Islamic 
barbarism also animated Grimké’s attempt to craft a transnational 
feminist abolitionism in her Letters. In an extended section of the 
book in which she examined the lowly status of women across the 
world’s cultures, Grimké reported that “pigs, dogs, women, and 
other impure animals” are treated as equivalents under the “Mo-
hammedan law.” A Quaker preacher who began life on a Southern 
plantation, Grimké presented her comparative refl ections—drawn 
from books and personal witness—as sociological fact. Capitalizing 
on the stereotype of Muslim women’s severe oppression, she noted 
the “resemblance between the situation of women in heathen and 
Mohammedan countries, and our brethren and sisters of color in 
this Christian land.” Her use of impersonal language imparted an 
emotional distance to her description of the condition of Muslim 
women, while her invocation of the “our” sought to foster a sense 
of deep sympathy in her American abolitionist audience for their 
“sisters of color” in the South. Such rhetorical moves illustrated 
what Grewal has identifi ed as the (often latent) imperial and cultural 
biases of transnational feminist narratives. Next, we shall see how 
Mill’s Subjection of Women also fell into this pattern of presenting a 
North Atlantic standard for women’s (and civilizational) progress, in 
a time when British imperialism had reached peak power.41
The Ethics of Instrumental and Eurocentric 
Rhetoric in Mill’s Subjection of Women
Mill’s liberal utilitarianism was his philosophical attempt to cor-
rect classical utilitarianism’s neglect of individual rights in favor of 
promoting the greatest good for the greatest number. His answer 
to his father and Jeremy Bentham was to defi ne individual self-
 development, in all its rich eccentricity, as the indirect path to the 
greatest good, or utility, of the human species. His liberal utilitar-
ian emphasis on both the public and the personal utility of human 
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rights made his school of thought a rich philosophical and political 
resource for feminism. Yet the utilitarian dimension of his liberalism 
lent itself to a rhetorical pathology: defending women’s human rights 
in terms of public utility may make it look as though (or worse, feel 
as though) women’s freedom was primarily a tool for development 
outcomes beyond their individual well-being.
In the context of debates on Westernization, such instrumental 
arguments might conceive of women’s human rights as a means for 
advancing Western models of economic growth or education. Per-
haps most problematically for feminism, instrumental arguments 
can imply that the issue of women’s human rights is secondary to 
some other purpose. Conditions of cultural or political imperialism, 
including colonialism, can exacerbate the ethical problems associ-
ated with this form of reasoning. If an argument for women’s hu-
man rights assumes the superiority of Western culture over another 
culture, then it contributes to the legitimation of the idea of West-
ern domination over other cultures. Women’s human rights, ironi-
cally, can become a means for supporting cultural imperialism, even 
though the concept’s aim is to liberate all women from conditions of 
domination.42
The inequalities of power that colonized or developing peoples face 
in national and international politics make the rhetorical and ethical 
implications of such instrumental feminist arguments even worse. As 
Mohanty has argued, feminism can be represented as a tool handed 
down to colonized or developing peoples for their advancement ac-
cording to a higher Western standard. The construction of women’s 
human rights as an instrument of Western reform only contributes 
to the misperception that the indigenous culture is inferior and lack-
ing its own resources for enabling women’s empowerment.43
Through an analysis of the Western biases and instrumental femi-
nist argumentation of The Subjection of Women, we see how its rheto-
ric sets up a liberal imperial model for women’s human rights argu-
ments. The book opens with Mill’s attack on the customs that keep 
women subjected to men in nineteenth-century society, even in “all 
the countries of Christian Europe.” Mill critiqued the endurance of 
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the antiquated practice of the “social subordination of women” in 
an otherwise civilized Western Europe by confronting his readers 
with an extended counterfactual: imagine that St. Paul’s Cathedral 
in London—the epicenter of the Church of England—did not ex-
ist, but instead a “gigantic” megalithic “dolmen” or a “vast” Roman 
pagan temple of “Jupiter Olympius” was still used by British Prot-
estants for their daily worship. This complex metaphor suggested 
that the subjection of women was a “relic” of primitive culture and 
religion, which Western Europeans ought to entirely transcend.44
These locutions had the effect of locating Mill’s conception of 
modern civilization in Western Europe, particularly a “civilized and 
Christian England.” Granted, this bias is unsurprising for a man 
of Mill’s culture and status, but it is nonetheless one that contrib-
utes to a series of rhetorical oppositions between Western Europe 
and the rest of the world. In chapter 2, he stated that Christianity 
“has been the religion of the progressive portion of mankind, and 
Islamism, Brahminism, &c., have been those of the stationary por-
tions; or rather . . . the declining portions.” Although Mill scholars 
have shown that he did not designate Muslim and Hindu cultures as 
permanently stagnant or absolutely incapable of development, the 
quoted statement implied their relative—yet likely long-term—
cultural inferiority to “Christian Europe.” Trading on the religious 
biases of his Western European, and especially English Protestant, 
audience, Mill employed a series of mutually reinforcing rhetorical 
binaries in The Subjection of Women: women’s rights/women’s sub-
jection; Western Europe/Eastern cultures; European Christianity/
Hinduism and Islam.45
In chapter 2, Mill identifi ed the institution of patriarchal marriage 
as the effective cause of the enduring subjection of women across 
modern societies from East to West. Although he identifi ed it as a 
global source of women’s contemporary subjection to men, he con-
ceptualized patriarchal marriage not in universal and culturally non-
specifi c but in primitivist and Orientalist terms. Patriarchal marriage 
was a “relic of primitive barbarism” and thus existed “under a varnish 
of civilization and cultivation” in developed countries. In a series of 
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prejudicial rhetorical moves, he associated the barbarism of patriar-
chal marriage with Eastern cultures and religions.46
Mill used familiar Orientalist symbols such as the “odalisque” to 
develop his critical account of female domestic servitude in patriar-
chal marriages. In contending “it was wrong to bring up women with 
any acquirements but those of an odalisque, or a domestic servant,” 
he likened European wives to female slaves sequestered in the Turk-
ish seraglio. Capitalizing on his nineteenth-century Occidental male 
audience’s intrigue with the dark, sensual Middle Eastern “other,” 
he cast a female Muslim servant as a negative yet sexually charged 
trope in his argument for women’s right to higher education. The 
odalisque, in this discursive context, represented the basest yet most 
exotic form of female subordination: enslavement to female slaves 
and their polygamous sultan. She was a metaphorical object of con-
fl icted, Christian European male desire and judgment, not a human 
subject in a different religious tradition who was as entitled to educa-
tion as the European wife.47
Mill furthermore adopted the alluring yet taboo setting of the se-
raglio as a mirror for exposing to European eyes the perverse effects 
of patriarchy on both spouses. He compared a European wife to a 
“Sultan’s favorite slave,” in order to show that “the desirable thing 
would be that she should neither have slaves nor be a slave.” He 
complained of the “sublime and sultan-like” self-image of men in 
the patriarchal family. Breaking down the distinction between the 
symbolic and the real, he went so far as to speak for “the women in 
the harem of an Oriental” by claiming that they “do not complain 
of not being allowed the freedom of European women. They think 
our women insufferably bold and unfeminine.” Like Wollstonecraft 
with her Orientalist strategies, Mill took advantage of the European 
salience of anti-Muslim stereotypes to make arguments for women’s 
human rights that treat Muslim culture as contrary to the progres-
sive feminist values of Western Europe.48
Mill’s rhetorical strategies on behalf of women’s rights also tar-
geted Indian culture. Mill cited the “violent abuse” of women in 
“Hindoo writings” as evidence of the “Oriental” view that “women 
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are by nature peculiarly voluptuous.” By contrasting this sexual and 
violent “Oriental” view of women with milder and merely “ridicu-
lous” European chauvinistic attitudes, he reinforced the idea of Eu-
ropean preeminence over Asian cultures on the question of women’s 
status. He also belied his “latent,” or unrefl ective, Orientalism in 
sketching Asian women as what Said has called “creatures of a male 
power-fantasy.”49
Invoking the authority of his work for the East India Company, 
Mill explained how his “long offi cial knowledge of Hindu govern-
ments” gave him insight into the “natural capacity of women for 
government.” In a backhanded compliment, he noted that Indian 
women have been competent and prolonged legal regents of prin-
cipalities during the minorities of male heirs, despite the fact that 
“these princesses have never been seen in public, have never con-
versed with any man not of their own family except from behind a 
curtain, that they don’t read, and if they did, there is no book in their 
languages which can give them the smallest instruction in political 
affairs.” Despite his other writings on the value of indigenous Indian 
cultures and languages, Mill here marshaled British presumptions 
about the colonized Indians—including illiteracy, cultural bank-
ruptcy, and political ineptitude—for the sake of an argument for 
women’s “natural” capacity for governmental leadership.50
In chapter 4, Mill laid out his major instrumental argument for the 
institutionalization of equal rights between the sexes. The effect of 
“giving to women the free use of their faculties,” “leaving them the 
free choice of their employments,” and “opening to them the same 
fi eld of occupation and the same prizes and encouragements as to 
other human beings” would be “that of doubling the mass of mental 
faculties available for the higher service of humanity.” By arguing 
that women’s full development as human beings would double eco-
nomic and civilizational progress, Mill opened the door for women’s 
rights to be seen and used as a tool for development, rather than for 
the well-being of individual women. He concluded the book with a 
telling reminder that his own end goal in defending women’s rights 
was to enhance “all that makes life valuable to the individual human 
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being.” In light of this, he cannot in all fairness be understood as a 
straightforward imperialist on the issue of women’s human rights or 
any other political issue. While his feminist arguments were some-
times imperial in implication and (as we shall see) in subsequent ap-
plication by other thinkers, his rights-based individualistic liberalism 
also endowed his political theory with cosmopolitan potential for 
the woman question.51
The rhetorical advantage of privileging the Western-biased point 
of view over the cosmopolitan, or culturally attuned yet universalis-
tic, perspective on justice was not lost on Mill, however. He freely 
admitted that he had to persuade British and European men in posi-
tions of political power to adopt the cause of women’s human rights 
in order for the movement to succeed. In chapter 4, he likened dis-
crimination against women to the discrimination that men in “unen-
lightened societies” face: “What, in unenlightened societies, colour, 
race, religion, or in the case of a conquered country, nationality, are 
to some men, sex is to all women; a preemptory exclusion from al-
most all honorable occupations.” Even as he was issuing a universal 
critique of unjust discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and 
sex, he wielded the prejudiced binary between “unenlightened” so-
cieties and Western societies to motivate European men to protect 
their wives and daughters from such discrimination. Ironically, both 
the Western biases and the instrumental feminist arguments of The 
Subjection of Women have led it to be engaged on the issues of wom-
en’s human rights and development, as illustrated by the comparative 
analysis of two of its early non–Western European forewords from 
Russia and colonial India.52
Refl ecting Cultural Bias: The Subjection of Women 
in “Westernizing” Russia and British India
James Scanlan and Douglas Howland have provided the most ex-
tensive studies of Mill’s translation and reception beyond Western 
Europe, in late nineteenth-century Russia, Japan, and China. The 
Subjection of Women has been credited as an inspiration for feminists 
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in nineteenth-century North and South America, Russia, Japan, and 
Continental Europe, as well as Britain and its empire, including In-
dia and New Zealand. By comparing the forewords to The Subjection 
of Women by Blagosvetlov (1869) and Kanitkar (1902), we see how 
local intellectuals from Russia and colonial India situated the book’s 
ideas in the context of their own debates on development and West-
ernization. Demonstrating the power of Mill’s Orientalist rhetoric 
to insidiously shape public discourse, these two non–Western Euro-
pean intellectuals reproduced some of his cultural biases in crafting 
their own arguments for women’s human rights.53
The Russian feminist movement had gained steam in the late 1850s 
with a debate over medical careers for women, as some had served as 
nurses in the Crimean War. Vera Pavlovna—the heroine of Cherny-
shevsky’s infl uential novel What Is to Be Done? (1863)—expressed the 
radical idea that economic independence, not merely sexual or per-
sonal freedom, enabled a woman’s realization of her full humanity. 
Women’s clubs, devoted to charity, education, and business ventures 
such as publishing Russian translations of English works, emerged 
in St. Petersburg in the early 1860s. The “drive to higher education” 
for and by women in Russia commenced in 1868. Six printings of 
The Subjection of Women in St. Petersburg in 1869–70 was another 
milestone for the growing Russian feminist movement.54
Prior to 1869, Mill was already infl uential in Russian intellectual 
and political life. Around the time that he sponsored the women’s 
suffrage petition in the British Parliament in 1867, he corresponded 
with a friend in Russia about the movement to establish a women’s 
university there. Evident in the letter was the Western bias of Mill’s 
theory of women’s rights, as shown in his supposition that Russia 
would “prove that a nation relatively recently civilized grasps the 
great ideas of amelioration sooner than the older ones.” Blagosvetlov 
and the other radical journalists who penned forewords to Russian 
editions of Mill’s Subjection of Women duly noted the Western bias of 
Mill’s philosophy of women’s rights that led him to situate their na-
tion as “recently civilized” on the scale of European civilization. To 
varying degrees, they accepted or disputed this view in using Mill’s 
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ideas to outline their distinctive accounts of how to advance the 
rights of women in the context of political debates on Westerniza-
tion, economic development, and populist reform in Russia.55
Blagosvetlov (1824 –80) was born in Stavropol. He trekked to 
England in 1857 to live and study with the radical expatriate Russian 
journalist Alexander Herzen (1812–70). Returning to St. Petersburg 
via Paris in 1860, he founded the journal Delo (the Cause) there in 
1866. For his commitment to the 1861 emancipation of the serfs, 
the rights of women, and individual liberty, Blagosvetlov was de-
scribed in one nineteenth-century Russian biography as an “extreme 
radical Westernizer.” The Westernizers challenged the philosophy 
of the Slavophiles, pitting the idea of “free, autonomous personal-
ity” against the demand to a return “to the old Slavic principles of 
‘community life.’” According to Andrzej Walicki, Russian Western-
ism was not “a homogenous school of thought” but rather a “com-
mon denominator” for intellectuals who “believed Russia might and 
should follow the general pattern of European progress.” Blagosvet-
lov’s foreword to his 1869 edition of The Subjection of Women set forth 
his vision of Westernization in Russia by building on the Orientalist 
and instrumental feminist arguments, as much as the liberal indi-
vidualism, of Mill.56
Blagosvetlov began his foreword by upholding the “social status of 
women” as one of the “main issues of contemporary European phi-
losophy.” Yet he situated Russia outside this debate, since it was “two 
centuries behind from where, in the sphere of intellectual culture, 
the English fi nd themselves in the present time.” He called for the 
immediate practical implementation of Mill’s philosophy of women’s 
rights in Russia: “The question is not whether it is timely to hold 
here a discussion of emancipation of women as it is understood by 
people of higher intellectual culture” but rather “to what extent a 
Russian society is able to reduce and eliminate those obstacles that 
stand in the way of carrying out this great life goal of the contempo-
rary generation.”57
Deploying the Orientalist imagery found in Mill’s work to rhetor-
ically distance himself from the Slavophiles, Blagosvetlov stated that 
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“Russia can no longer go back to its old Asiatic stillness.” Against 
these nationalists’ romanticization of Russia’s supposedly republican 
past, he upheld “European civilization” as the “role model for her 
future prosperity,” not “the aged Eastern heritage that our pseudo 
patriots are ready to perceive as uniqueness or majestic serenity.” 
Employing one of Mill’s images from the Turkish seraglio, he pro-
posed that Russia should face the question of whether it would “ben-
efi t by allowing a woman to obtain an independent status, i.e. if we 
make a real mother out of a simple wet nurse, if we make a free 
member of the family out of a household maid, a real loving wife out 
of a harem odalisque, a lively and active force out of a dead social 
material?” While Mill had contrasted his subversive and “disturb-
ing” ideal of the educated woman with the “odalisque” or “domes-
tic servant,” Blagosvetlov revealed the limits of his feminism with 
his rather conservative opposition of the “harem odalisque” to the 
“real loving wife” to be produced by Russian women’s liberation. 
Following Mill’s rhetoric more closely, he demarcated progress and 
 feminism as Western European values by using Asiatic and Muslim 
caricatures to mock the backwardness of the Slavophiles on these 
issues. Although these tropes had an ironic sense in the context of 
Russia’s place between East and West, they still had the rhetorical 
effect of casting women’s human rights as a Western imperative.58
Building on Mill’s liberal utilitarianism, Blagosvetlov applied the 
main instrumental feminist argument from chapter 4 of The Sub-
jection of Women to Russia. He predicted that equal rights in Rus-
sia would mean double the economic productivity: “Two hundred 
years of people’s activity under the same social conditions would be 
reduced to one hundred years, and for underdeveloped people that 
saves an enormous amount of labor and time.” Advancing women’s 
human rights was not primarily about promoting women’s freedom 
and personal development but rather a step in the process of giving 
Russia “a right to declare itself to be an educated people rather than 
a useless one.”59
Westernization, development, and women’s human rights were 
also at the forefront of the minds of turn-of-the-century Indian 
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 intellectuals, who often addressed these issues from the standpoint 
of their colonization by Britain. Kanitkar of Maharashtra translated 
and introduced the Marathi edition of The Subjection of Women in 
1902. Building on the postcolonial theory of Frantz Fanon, Jayanti 
Patel, and Said, I argue that Kanitkar’s philosophical response to The 
Subjection of Women represents the “assimilation” stage of the colonial 
intellectual. Kanitkar appropriated a colonial British model of using 
Mill’s liberal feminism to endorse Westernization for the develop-
ment of India. His treatment of the woman question within his colo-
nial predicament in many ways mirrored the ironies of Blagosvetlov’s 
liminal position as a Russian Westernizer who challenged his tradi-
tional patriarchal culture.60
An indigenous, prenationalistic feminist movement had grown in 
India by the 1870s, especially in the region of Maharashtra. Accord-
ing to Rosalind O’Hanlan, a public debate emerged in this decade 
in western India on “the ways in which Indian and Hindu women 
might develop and transform themselves, whilst preserving what was 
best in ‘traditional’ culture.” It was in this context that the Marathi 
translator Kanitkar (1854 –1918) came to address the women’s issue. 
Kanitkar was a poet, reformer, and subjudge in the colonial legal 
system. In the late 1860s, he joined a group of his male, Brahmin 
friends in implementing their liberal ideas “by educating their own 
child-wives.” These women, led by Kanitkar’s wife, Kashibai (1861–
1948), organized their own feminist society, Striyancha Sabha, in 
1880s Maharashtra. The all-female group read Austen, Eliot, and 
The Subjection of Women, and promoted the cause of women’s educa-
tion in the region. The couple came to embody the model of com-
panionate marriage among intellectual equals that was popular in 
late nineteenth-century Brahmin society.61
Kanitkar recalled his own exposure to The Subjection of Women 
around 1870, when he married Kashibai and entered university. In 
1872, he published Sushikshit Stricharitra, which explored the tra-
ditional ideal of “pativrata,” or the chaste and devoted wife, and 
its compatibility with education. Contrary to traditionalists who 
thought education would make Indian women unfaithful and re-
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bellious, Kanitkar argued that education would make mothers and 
daughters more chaste and respectable.62
Kanitkar’s foreword recalled how he fi nally fulfi lled his “sacred duty” 
to translate the treatise into Marathi after years of contemplating the 
project. With a kind of stoicism that belied a deeper sense of loss in 
the wake of British cultural imperialism, he supplied his motivation 
for translating the book: “The language of Maharashtra may or may 
not fl ourish in the future.” His translation also had a reformist agenda: 
undermine the “ridicule” of the “topic of the ‘subjection of women’” 
in local Indian culture. To show that ancient Hinduism shared Mill’s 
deep respect for women, he cited the Sanskrit epic Mahabharata: “The 
wife is a man’s half. The wife is the fi rst of friends.”63
Recounting how he fi rst translated selections of The Subjection of 
Women for the “popular magazines ‘Manoranjan’ and ‘Nibandhchan-
drika’ in Pune” around 1890, Kanitkar metaphorically addressed 
Mill’s book as though it was an Englishwoman he had been court-
ing: “O lady! It has been several years—almost 20 years—since I 
chanced upon your liberal and charming character. At the time, I 
had just been admitted to university; since the day, I had a deep wish 
to acquire you! But you were a foreigner! You were born in the boun-
tiful land of the independent and triumphant English! So, how could 
you be acquired by a poor Brahmin like me! My mind would return 
to you again and again. Finally, I made the determination to force-
fully clothe you in a Maharashtrian costume and bring you to my 
people!” This strikingly sexual and latently violent representation of 
Mill’s book as a “liberal” English “lady” whom Kanitkar “forcefully” 
clothed in the “costume” of his native language illustrated his pre-
dicament as a colonial intellectual. In attempting to assimilate the 
Western liberal feminist values of Mill while adapting them to some 
of the traditional values of his own culture, Kanitkar reproduced in 
his writing the imbalances of power caused by the intersection of 
patriarchy and colonialism in India. In imagining the translation of 
Mill’s book as “forcefully” fi tting it into the clothing of his language, 
he indulged in a troubling symbolic reversal of British cultural impe-
rialism. He declared his ambivalence to the “lady” with an emotional 
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reference to the Mahabharata: “I both want you and do not want you! 
Or, like the cursed Dushyant . . . wanted to both accept Shakuntala 
and reject her, I am in a similarly strange state of mind.” Torn by 
reverence of the English lady and desire to conquer her, Kanitkar 
modestly chose to clothe her—dramatizing what Fanon has called 
the colonized male’s feeling of emasculation in the face of the politi-
cal rape of imperialism.64
Kanitkar asserted “that the importance of women’s rights should 
be pointed out and discussed with quiet and serious consideration.” 
Demonstrating such “quiet” consideration, he did not use his own 
words but rather quoted the British colonial Theosophist Annie Be-
sant. Kanitkar implied that he agreed with Besant’s views on teach-
ing indigenous Indian women some English alongside their native 
tongue: “The main motivation for this is so that she develops com-
munion with her English-knowing husband and children.” Again 
borrowing words from Besant, he stated: “The Indian woman will 
never lose her devotion, but her devotion must be coupled with 
knowledge.” Kanitkar aimed this colonial instrumental argument 
for female education toward the preservation of indigenous women’s 
“devotion” to, and “communion” with, their more educated, West-
ernized husbands and male children.65
Kanitkar’s feminist proposals were muted by design, in order to 
rhetorically appease his conservative audience’s fears that “all women 
will revolt against men” if liberated. He soothed their concerns: “It 
is extremely unlikely that conventions and thinking which have been 
rooted very deeply for thousands of years in this soil called society, 
will be uprooted or eroded through discussions.” Kanitkar’s gradualist 
approach to feminist reform oriented itself toward the advancement 
of Westernization in British India. Situating the progressive liberal 
values of the West against the traditionalist indigenous culture, Ka-
nitkar began his discussion of women’s rights by stating, “‘A woman 
does not deserve freedom’ . . . is a principle or a theory well-known in 
our country. Taking the opposing viewpoint, Mr. Mill wrote a small 
excellent treatise with the support of his wife in 1861 and named it 
Subjection of Women.” Although he acknowledged that cultural differ-
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ences between India and England meant that “Indian ladies” could 
not be “given the same type of education as in England,” he thought 
that training in English would mean that indigenous women would 
“get directly acquainted with one of the strongest infl uences on the 
recent progress in India.” Kanitkar assumed a British standard of 
excellence for reform of female education, and progress in general, 
in India. In so doing, he slyly pushed his stubbornly traditionalist 
society toward a Westernized conception of “equality of rights.”66
Situated between the 1885 establishment of the Indian National 
Congress and the post-1917 nationalist independence movement, the 
Marathi preface to The Subjection of Women provides a fascinating ex-
ample of the internal confl icts that arise when a colonial society faces 
the prospect of radical political change. Caught up in the colonial 
assimilationist spirit, Kanitkar attempted to initiate changes within 
Indian culture—such as the Westernized education of women—to 
bring it into alignment with British culture, while avoiding suspicion 
from Indian traditionalists. Separated by decades, languages, and na-
tional politics, Blagosvetlov’s and Kanitkar’s responses to The Subjec-
tion of Women nonetheless operated within a shared political context: 
the unequal international power relations set by Westernization. 
Like Mill’s, Blagosvetlov’s and Kanitkar’s intellectual and rhetorical 
relationships to Western notions of progress limited the scope of 
their otherwise visionary commitments to women’s human rights.
Struggling with Cultural Bias: The Rights of 
Woman in Colonial South Africa
Olive Schreiner, the white South African writer famous for her 
1883 feminist novel The Story of an African Farm, grappled with the 
problem of cultural bias in her refl ections on the relevance of the 
Rights of Woman for relations between black and white women in her 
colonial nation. As Carolyn Burdett has recounted, Schreiner trav-
eled to London in 1881 with the manuscript for her novel. There 
she was active in Karl Pearson’s “Men’s and Women’s Club” (which 
originally was to be named after Wollstonecraft) from 1885 to 1886. 
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In Pearson’s circle, she was introduced to the publisher Walter Scott. 
Learning of her interest in theorizing the late Victorian “sex ques-
tion,” Scott encouraged the young feminist to introduce a new cen-
tennial edition of the Rights of Woman.67
Schreiner worked on her Wollstonecraft project for three years but 
abandoned it around the time she returned to South Africa in 1889. In 
the late 1890s, she took the pro-Boer stance in the Second Boer War 
between British and Dutch settlers over control of the South African 
territories of the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State. Ac-
cording to Burdett, Schreiner’s aporetic introduction to the Rights 
of Woman exemplifi ed her lifelong struggle with the diffi cult ques-
tions of colonial and patriarchal power relations without adequately 
resolving them. Continuing in this vein, I argue that Schreiner’s in-
troduction and her feminist treatise Woman and Labor (1911) strove 
for a global female solidarity yet reproduced negative stereotypes of 
non-Western women in a way similar to Wollstonecraft.68
Although Schreiner’s introduction began with rehashing the 
standard British Victorian reading of Wollstonecraft as an inconse-
quential thinker and bad writer, it quickly turned toward a positive 
reclamation of the book’s prescient grasp of the “necessity” of the 
“ woman’s movement.” Schreiner underscored how the book’s de-
mand for  women’s rights was rooted in the author’s own experiences 
as a woman: “Being a woman, perhaps there was no necessity for her 
to see it; she knew it.” She concluded the essay with her own obser-
vations of black women in South Africa, whom she believed dem-
onstrated the natural, evolutionary roots of a universal female sense 
of their sex’s oppression. Her colonial upbringing gave her a conde-
scending view of these indigenous women as “uncivilised.” Schreiner 
simultaneously felt a strong moral obligation to fi ght racist prejudice 
against them. She later resigned from a women’s suffrage organiza-
tion that sought to exclude black women from the vote in the buildup 
to the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910.69
Despite her colonial prejudices, Schreiner presented her inter-
action with the local black women as a kind of feminist ethnogra-
phy. She tried to preserve the cultural distinctions between herself 
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and the indigenous women, in distinguishing between her and her 
interviewees’ fi rst-person voices. She recalled, “I have bent over a 
woman half fl ogged to death by her husband, and seen her rise, cut 
and bleeding, lay her child against her wounded breast, and go and 
kneel down silently before the grind-stone and begin to grind.” Yet 
Schreiner undercut her poignant sense of solidarity with this abused 
African woman by attempting to explain such “savage” women’s res-
ignation to patriarchal domination in terms of a Eurocentric model 
of historical progress.70
Seeking to understand such “deep” resignation, she interviewed 
a black woman and translated her explanation at length. Schreiner 
recorded her interviewee’s insight into black women’s double burden 
of sex-based and race-based oppression: “We are dogs, we are dogs. 
There may perhaps be a good for the white women; I do not know; 
there is no good for the black.” Her register of this African wom-
an’s voice echoed Wollstonecraft’s lament that girls are born into 
domination: “We might as well never have been born, unless it were 
necessary that we should be created to enable man to acquire the 
noble privilege of reason.” Pushing the Eurocentric rhetoric of the 
Rights of Woman in a robustly imperial political direction, Schreiner 
interpreted the black woman’s despair as a sign of the “necessity” 
of  “savage” women’s resignation to sexual domination in undevel-
oped, non-Westernized societies. Ending the essay with a disturb-
ing projection of the “necessity” of an African man’s murder of his 
insubordinate wife, Schreiner coded feminism for the West and the 
inevitability of submission for the “savage” rest.71
Like her feminist counterparts in nineteenth-century Britain and 
America, Schreiner also reproduced one of the central Orientalist 
stereotypes of the Rights of Woman. In her unpublished introduction 
to the centennial edition of Wollstonecraft’s treatise, Schreiner used 
the “female in a Turkish harem” to explain her theory of the bio-
logical and social evolution of sex difference. Just as she had reduced 
the abused African woman to the savagery of her social conditions, 
Schreiner equated the polygamous wives of the Turkish seraglio 
to “jelly bag” female wood bugs, with none of the “brain power” 
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to escape their domination by the “active, complex” males of their 
group. The racist implications of this evolutionary narrative were 
grave. Schreiner wished to claim that women in sex-segregated soci-
eties (such as Islamic cultures) became inferior in mind and body to 
men. She implied that these women lacked mental and physical re-
sources for their own critical engagement with their Muslim culture 
or its Western critics. Her “jelly bag” bugs of the harem were cast as 
dispossessed subalterns who could not even talk, let alone speak for 
themselves so as to be heard by those in power.72
In her feminist treatise Woman and Labor (1911), Schreiner con-
tinued to appeal to this imaginary of the “Turkish harem of to-day” 
as if it were sociological fact. Presenting European monogamy as a 
benchmark of women’s and human progress, she claimed that “the 
study of all races in all ages proves that the greater the freedom of 
woman, the higher the sexual value put upon her by the males of that 
society.” For evidence to support this imperial feminist variation on 
Enlightenment philosophies of history, she resorted to the Western 
stereotype of the “pashaws,” also found in the Rights of Woman: “The 
hundred wives and concubines purchased by a Turkish pashaw prob-
ably have not even an approximate value in his eyes, when compared 
to the value thousands of European males set upon the one compara-
tively free woman, whom they have won, often only after a long and 
tedious courtship.” Just as she calculated the worth of the insubor-
dinate African wife at zero, Schreiner presumed the negligible value 
of polygamous Turkish wives in comparison to their monogamous 
Western counterparts. Such attempts to understand women’s op-
pression and liberation in terms of a stadial Western conception of 
development made her wrestle with the issue of cultural difference 
without fully challenging her imperial prejudices.73
Challenging Cultural Bias: The Feminist Liberalisms 
of Tsebrikova, Borgoño, and López
Not all early feminist readers of the Rights of Woman and The Sub-
jection of Women imitated their imperial biases against non–Western 
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European peoples and religions. Some focused on the fl ip side of 
feminist liberalism: humanism and cosmopolitanism. Maria Tse-
brikova, a radical Russian journalist from St. Petersburg like Bla-
gosvetlov, penned a cosmopolitan—meaning, culturally attuned yet 
universalistic—prologue to The Subjection of Women in 1870. In her 
feminist liberal approach to reading Mill, Tsebrikova paralleled her 
contemporary, Martina Barros Borgoño of Chile. Borgoño translated 
and introduced the fi rst Spanish-language edition of The Subjection of 
Women for the Revista de Santiago in 1872. Borgoño subtly adopted 
a cosmopolitan standpoint that was rooted, yet not entrenched, in 
postcolonial Chile’s mounting debates on women’s education and 
suffrage.74
These women from strikingly different political contexts—a de-
veloping Russia and a postcolonial Chile, independent from Spain 
since 1818—illustrate how Mill’s book can inspire feminist liber-
als to conceptualize women’s human rights in culturally sensitive 
and inclusive terms. Likewise, the Argentinian Elvira López’s 1901 
doctoral dissertation, “El movimiento feminista,” traced the in-
ternational feminist cause to “Inglaterra” and its Rights of Woman 
yet charted the adaptation and fl ourishing of the movement across 
the global South in the nineteenth century. Taken together, these 
non–Western European intellectuals demonstrated the possibility 
of  challenging cultural bias in the feminist liberalisms inspired by 
Wollstonecraft and Mill.
Borgoño (1850–1941) was born in Santiago to an upper-class, po-
litically infl uential Chilean family. Her early education was at a school 
in Santiago run by a British Protestant woman. Her uncle—the his-
torian and liberal political fi gure Diego Barros Arana— educated her 
after the age of eleven. Her fi ancé, Augusto Orrego, edited the  liberal 
journal Revista de Santiago. With his encouragement and translation 
assistance, the twenty-two-year-old boldly published her serialized 
edition of Mill’s Subjection of Women. Her feminist prologue to the 
edition made her a radical fi gure among the typically conservative 
Chilean women of her social class. It was one of the fi rst public 
feminist writings in Chilean culture,  following the 1865 newspaper 
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 articles in El eco de las señoras de Santiago by elite Catholic women 
who sought the right to vote in order to defend their religion. Active 
in the Chilean women’s rights movement through the early twenti-
eth century, Borgoño eventually joined the Catholic Conservative 
Party, which, unlike the anticlerical Liberals, made women’s suffrage 
a legislative priority. Borgoño lived to see the passage of women’s 
municipal suffrage in her nation’s Congress in 1934, just seven years 
before her death.75
Tsebrikova (1835–1917) was born in Cronstadt to an Orthodox 
Russian family with military ties. Her uncle, Nicolai Romanovich 
Tsebrikov, educated her. He was a Decembrist whose “revolution-
ary liberalism” of the 1820s had resulted in years of Siberian ban-
ishment. Tsebrikova became an editor of the leading leftist Russian 
journal of letters, Notes of the Fatherland, in late 1860s St. Petersburg. 
In 1870, she published her foreword to The Subjection of Women and 
organized evening classes for women on the topic of women’s rights. 
After a prolifi c writing career, which produced an internationally 
known essay on Russian women for Theodore Stanton’s The Woman 
Question in Europe (1884), she was banished to Smolensk in 1890 by 
Alexander III for sending him a letter criticizing his government’s 
“persecution of free-thought.”76
Beyond the intriguing parallels in their upbringings and careers, 
Borgoño and Tsebrikova shared an interpretive approach to The 
Subjection of Women, treating it as a philosophical text that invited 
their own critical refl ections on how best to advance women’s human 
rights. Tsebrikova only mentioned Mill to accentuate the political 
differences between the commentator and the author. She criticized 
Mill for not thoroughly investigating the solutions to the problem of 
women’s subjection: “Having proven the legitimacy of the woman’s 
right for equality, Mill proves the necessity to set her free. Here, 
however, he stops halfway.” She offered her own solution to women’s 
subjection: the enabling of women’s employment outside the home, 
regardless of marital status. After pointing out that “Mill has a differ-
ent solution for the problem,” she showed that he primarily defended 
unmarried or widowed women’s work outside the home. Departing 
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from Mill, she contended that women were needed to “spread ideas 
in remote and stagnated corners of Russia, to fi ght against preju-
dice by means of words and example, to create societies to enlighten 
common people, to reduce prostitution, to invent new sources of 
employment for women, create workshops for people.” With an op-
timistic sense of the breadth of professional opportunity for women 
in the future, she concluded: “There will be plenty of work; we only 
need women who will do it. By contributing her time and talent to a 
useful activity in the sphere of her choice, a woman will prove by ac-
tion that, as far as she is concerned, the time when she used to be an 
odalisque or a slave is in the past.” Although she sometimes used the 
Orientalist imagery and Eurocentric ideas of progress that animated 
both Mill’s work and Russian debates on Westernization, Tsebrikova 
took a feminist liberal stand in upholding the value of women’s hu-
man rights for the enhancement of Russian women’s freedom and 
self-worth, not economic utility or other development outcomes.77
Similarly, Borgoño critically described Mill as “a serene and el-
evated thinker who, like all those who search for the truth, may 
sometimes lose his way,” then cited him only to support her own 
distinctive views. She praised the empirical method of The Subjec-
tion of Women but indicated how its theory of civilizational progress 
contributed to misrepresentations of women’s condition and history. 
She noted that Mill’s binary between the “barbarity” of women’s 
subjection and their civilized liberation obscured the fact that some 
women had an elevated social status in feudal society. It furthermore 
downplayed the fact that feminist argumentation had a history: 
“Ever since books have appeared in the world, women have made 
their complaints be heard.” Borgoño also questioned the feminist 
import of Mill’s utilitarian arguments for civilizational progress: 
“Stuart Mill, when describing the advantages society would reap 
from the equal education of men and women, pauses to point out 
. . . the stimulus which men would receive upon seeing the need to 
justify their supposed superiority over women; and the more ben-
efi cial infl uence the educated women would exercise over boys and 
men as their mothers and wives.” These consequences were suspect 
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to Borgoño, as they focused on the utility of women’s human rights 
for males. She supplied an alternative list of advantages that derived 
from women’s education, including the development of women’s ca-
pacity for deductive reason, the scientifi c progress of humanity, and 
the egalitarian transformation of marriage and the family such that 
“respect and mutual confi dence will be the patrimony of all homes.” 
Turning Mill’s liberal utilitarian ideas toward more robust feminist 
ends, Borgoño emphasized the value of women’s human rights for 
women fi rst, and subsequently for humanity at large.78
Neither feminist liberal sought to mimic Mill’s views, or the poli-
tics of the West, in developing her arguments for women’s human 
rights. While Tsebrikova to some degree assessed the need for wom-
en’s rights in Russia in terms of the gap between it and the West, 
she generally compared the two cultures in sociological not norma-
tive terms. For example, she adapted her ideas for reform to the fact 
that Russia did not have a “society in the sense that Western Europe 
understands the meaning of the word, i.e. in the sense of an indepen-
dent force with recognized infl uence.” She also rooted her advocacy 
for women’s rights in the particular social situations of a variety of 
Russian women. In arguing that “pregnancy and giving birth . . . can 
be an obstacle only to women who are sick and physically weak,” she 
cited the Russian “peasant women” who “work during the last days 
of their pregnancy term,” whose “health can’t be compared to the 
one of idle society ladies.” Tsebrikova differentiated women’s expe-
riences within her nation as part of her argument for generally im-
proving women’s health, education, and employment options.79
Borgoño’s prologue was silent on Westernization and Spanish 
colonialism and their impact on the woman question in Chile. She 
claimed, “If one thing has encumbered the resolution of this prob-
lem it has been the tenacious insistence of considering it through the 
infl amed prism of politics.” She thus treated The Subjection of Women 
as a philosophical point of departure, distinct from the prejudices of 
any particular culture or political system. She grounded her argu-
ment for women’s rights on a universalistic theory of human nature. 
Following Mill, she argued that each human had the same right “to 
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develop oneself; to freely cultivate one’s soul.” Biological sex differ-
ences, however, meant that men and women would naturally excel 
at different things. Borgoño echoed The Subjection of Women’s call 
to make the human species more “rich” through the activation of 
women’s capabilities, with the twist that sexual difference would be 
enhanced in this process.80
In partly transcending the limits of her political situation in the 
name of advancing women’s human rights, Borgoño avoided direct 
engagement of the postcolonial political context of the woman ques-
tion in Chile. Her recently independent nation was embroiled in 
debates about the scope and purpose of representative government, 
including the issues of men’s and women’s suffrage, in the 1860s and 
1870s. Her rebuttals of arguments against women’s rights mirrored 
the contemporary Chilean debates without directly mentioning 
them. Cognizant of the “seditious” import of Mill’s book for her con-
servative culture, Borgoño made a strategic distinction between ad-
vocating for women’s “social rights” to education, employment, and 
self-development and women’s formal political rights such as voting 
and offi ce holding. Although she later became an outspoken women’s 
suffragist, Borgoño argued in her 1872 prologue that “women do not 
call for these political rights; what she wants, what she needs, are her 
social rights.” This gradualist approach to reform made her theory 
of women’s rights fi t the values of the Catholic Conservative Party, 
which introduced the fi rst women’s suffrage bill in the Chilean Con-
gress in 1917.81
Tsebrikova’s universalistic rights arguments, coupled with her at-
tention to the sociological context of Russian women’s subjugation, 
offered an alternative feminist liberal model of how to advocate for 
women’s human rights. Tsebrikova’s feminist essays, which used rich 
descriptions of the life of Russian women to support her arguments for 
the rights of women in general, were published in nineteenth- century 
Europe, Britain, and America. Tsebrikova’s brand of  feminist liber-
alism bridged Russia and the nascent international feminist move-
ment, which drew insights about women from a variety of countries 
to marshal global support for the cause.82
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The prioritization of women’s human rights can direct feminist 
liberals to take a more cosmopolitan, or universalistic yet culturally 
attuned, perspective on the problem of women’s subjection, seeing 
it as a matter of global—not just local—justice. As Tsebrikova put 
it, “The so-called women’s issue is the issue of enjoying rights and 
of the liberation of half of humankind, and, thus, it is the issue of 
a reasonable organization of life for humankind.” The comparison 
of Borgoño’s foreword and Tsebrikova’s foreword to The Subjection 
of Women demonstrates how the former developed a philosophically 
cosmopolitan yet nationally salient feminist liberalism, while the lat-
ter developed a sociologically rich yet internationally salient femi-
nist liberalism. In theorizing women’s rights as a vital part of a just 
scheme of human development, Borgoño and Tsebrikova gravitated 
toward the feminist humanist side rather than the liberal imperial 
side of The Subjection of Women.83
At the turn of the twentieth century around the globe, the term 
“feminism” came to be used to describe the social movements de-
voted to specifi c women’s rights issues, such as suffrage, or to the 
general liberation of women from patriarchal oppression. López of 
Argentina was one of the fi rst authors from the Americas to use the 
term “feminist” to describe the women’s movements of her home-
land and other nations. She was also one of the fi rst historians to 
focus on the international character of feminism. Submitted to the 
faculty of “fi losophía y letras” at the University of Buenos Aires, 
her 1901 doctoral dissertation, “El movimiento feminista,” assessed 
contemporary debates on women’s issues across Europe, British In-
dia, Australia, Africa, and Latin America, with a chapter devoted to 
Argentina. López traced the historical roots of international fi n de 
siècle feminism, describing “Inglaterra” as the origin of “la idea fem-
inista.” She cited St. Thomas More, Mary Astell, and, with greatest 
emphasis, Wollstonecraft as the crucial philosophical moments in 
the English origins of the now global idea of feminism.84
Though only discussed twice, Wollstonecraft functioned as the 
linchpin in the dissertation’s development of the English and Ameri-
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can idea of feminism. Representing her work as breaking from the 
typically abstract debates about the equality of the sexes that trans-
pired during the querelle des femmes of early modern Europe and 
its Latin American colonies, López praised Wollstonecraft’s “famous 
Vindication” for directly “calling for freedom of sex instruction and 
political rights.” She described Wollstonecraft as pitting her philo-
sophical views on women’s rights to a “complete and solid educa-
tion” and “work and political freedom” against the retrograde views 
of Rousseau. López upheld Wollstonecraft as defending women’s en-
titlement to the rights that “the [French] Revolution acknowledged 
as the heritage of all humanity.” She indicated the radical and farsee-
ing quality of Wollstonecraft’s theory of women’s rights, highlight-
ing her call “for free access to a career in medicine and the right to 
vote, all of which makes this work truly remarkable and advanced for 
the time it was written.”85
López compared Wollstonecraft’s conception of the sexes’ equal 
rights to civil and political liberties to the current “English expres-
sion of feminism,” which throughout her dissertation she associated 
with Mill. Both Wollstonecraft and the current school of English 
feminism—with all their “bold aspirations”—were “not exempt 
from good sense.” López concluded with an argument about Woll-
stonecraft’s substantial philosophical and political legacies in the 
United States. Her practical egalitarianism made her views appeal-
ing to the “religious community of Quakers” in early nineteenth-
century America. They appropriated this dissenting Christian strand 
of English radicalism for the arguments of the U.S. abolition and 
women’s rights movements.86
Despite this favorable account of Wollstonecraft’s legacies, Ló-
pez’s dissertation spent more time assessing the infl uence of Mill—
whose women’s suffrage advocacy in the British Parliament and in 
The Subjection of Women were widely discussed and emulated in late 
nineteenth-century Latin America. The popularity of Mill’s Sub-
jection of Women had helped to reinvigorate international attention 
to Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman in the 1890s. “El movimiento 
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feminista” demonstrated that López was certainly familiar with the 
arguments of the Rights of Woman, like her fellow Argentinian and 
women’s rights advocate Ernesto Quesada.87
López’s overview of Wollstonecraft’s philosophy was short but 
symbolically central to the story she told about the international and 
intercultural character of feminism and the place of the Argentinian 
women’s movement within it. She succinctly yet precisely “trans-
lated” Wollstonecraft’s philosophy into fi n de siècle Argentinian cul-
ture. López crafted a careful account of Wollstonecraft’s ideas and 
their early infl uence in the Americas to ground the various national-
level feminist movements, North and South, in a common ancestral 
source. Moreover, her symbolic use of Wollstonecraft connected the 
contemporary “movimiento feminista” with the intellectual tradi-
tions of Britain and Europe, in a global narrative woven with diverse 
cultural threads.
Rooted Cosmopolitan Responses to Global Patriarchal Problems
When we think of roots, we tend to think of our families, our com-
munities, and our prejudices shaped by our upbringings. A case in 
point is my own roots in a small town in northern Maine. Preju-
dices abound in this village not more than seven hundred strong. 
The well-bred Congregationalists—and a few Baptists who snuck 
into their neighborhood—look down on the rest of the town from 
the Victorian turrets of “Christian Hill.” Farther afi eld is “French 
Flats,” the residential area of the despised Acadian Catholics who 
could afford to move to the edge of town. For those too poor to es-
cape, there is “Tin Can Alley.” Frenchmen are said to squander their 
time kicking empty beer cans on the streets near the small Catholic 
mission church, instead of working their way into heaven with the re-
spectable (and profi table) New England work ethic. A town as white 
as homogenized milk, it attracted the Ku Klux Klan to its parades 
in the 1920s—presumably to intimidate anyone who thought the 
culture was too plain. It was sometimes called a “one Indian town,” 
shoring up the community’s sense of togetherness by generously ac-
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knowledging the presence of a single outsider within its limits. The 
local Native American tribe, based thirty miles away, was pegged as 
incapable of self-government. Locals still made boastful claims of 
exotic Native American ancestry, which they safely positioned in the 
distant past.
Reading this origin story, you might guess that I identify with 
none of the groups I mention but do share some of their faults. De-
scended from a long line of church-hopping Yankees on one side and 
recent Irish Catholic immigrants on the other, I was raised to think 
of myself as serving the poor and huddled masses, while wistfully ad-
miring the turrets on Christian Hill. My roots have certainly shaped 
my prejudices, but they have also endowed me with a strong (though 
often misguided) sense of social justice.
Such awareness of the rootedness of prejudice, in our psyches and 
our histories, is not an excuse for complacent acceptance of it, or 
worse, imposing it upon other people. Wollstonecraft and Mill were 
aware of the moral problem of prejudice, especially in its patriarchal 
form, yet they persisted in using stereotypes of non–Western Eu-
ropean cultures to fortify their rhetoric for women’s human rights. 
Their lack of critical ethical concern for the negative effects of their 
use of such prejudicial rhetoric on other people and cultures is far 
more troubling than the fact of prejudice inhabiting their (or other 
human) minds.
Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s abstract arguments for women’s hu-
man rights are global in scope—they apply to all women, regardless 
of social distinctions. Their concrete rhetoric for women’s human 
rights, however, sometimes excluded or caricatured women from 
Eastern cultures, or treated women and their rights as tools for de-
velopment and Western civilizational progress. Given the ethical 
problems with this argumentative framework, the ultimate value of 
the Rights of Woman and The Subjection of Women may be their ability 
to generate a variety of feminist philosophical responses that push us 
beyond their liberal imperialism toward their feminist humanism.
Through a genealogy of their early international receptions, we 
have seen how Wollstonecraft and Mill contributed to both the 
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 imperial and the humanist sides of feminist liberalism. The insidious 
power of their Western-biased model of women’s human rights ar-
gumentation surfaced in its adaptation and reproduction across tem-
poral, cultural, religious, and political contexts. In the postcolonial 
United States, we saw Christian women such as Adams, Crocker, and 
Grimké advocating women’s human rights with anti-Muslim stereo-
types. In a developing Russia of the 1860s, we witnessed the radical 
journalist Blagosvetlov buy into the Orientalist binaries of the West-
ernization debate. In India and South Africa at the turn of the twen-
tieth century, we found colonial intellectuals—both the indigenous 
Kanitkar and the second-generation settler Schreiner—wrestling 
with prejudiced rhetoric against their local cultures as they struggled 
with the woman question within the constraints set by imperialism.
By bringing these thinkers into conversation with each other as 
well as Wollstonecraft and Mill, I have sketched a model for how 
the history of political thought can foster a cross-cultural dialogue 
on women’s human rights. Contemporary political theorists have 
contended that such cross-cultural dialogues inspire critical yet sen-
sitive refl ection on cultural differences and how they shape the ethi-
cal implementation of universalistic feminist arguments. By looking 
back to the Western and non-Western respondents to the Rights of 
Woman and The Subjection of Women, we have discovered not only the 
fl aws in Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s forms of feminist liberalism but 
also the potential of such critical analysis to strip them of pernicious 
prejudices and thereby give their arguments a truly global reach.88
Speaking from non–Western European standpoints, the feminist 
liberal voices of Tsebrikova, Borgoño, and López show the power 
of “rooted,” or culturally attuned, cosmopolitan approaches to the 
global problems of patriarchy and other kinds of social prejudice. 
Tsebrikova and Borgoño produced two varieties of feminist liberal 
readings of The Subjection of Women: the former’s sociologically rich 
yet internationally salient descriptions of Russian women’s experi-
ences of inequality, and the latter’s cosmopolitan attempt to univer-
salize arguments for women’s human rights without losing touch with 
the realities of her postcolonial Chilean political context. Likewise, 
Y6872.indb   198 1/6/16   10:38:07 AM
T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  C U L T U R A L  B I A S
199
López’s history of “el movimiento feminista” situated her Argentin-
ian branch of the movement within a global cause that partly sprung 
from, but quickly adapted and diversifi ed, the ideas of Wollstone-
craft and Mill. The comparative study of the three writers’ responses 
to Wollstonecraft and Mill shows the philosophical fecundity of the 
Rights of Woman and The Subjection of Women, as much for, as despite, 
their Western biases. Most important of all, it illustrates the rich 
diversity of feminist perspectives that emerge from non–Western 
European political contexts.
In “going global,” contemporary feminists have converged on the 
idea that encouraging women’s empowerment in the Two-Thirds 
World begins with listening to their stories, their struggles, and their 
hopes for justice. Like the nineteenth-century abolitionist feminist 
tradition of which Mill was a part, twenty-fi rst-century feminists 
have highlighted the cross-cultural moral importance of conceptu-
alizing women as subjects with capabilities for self-direction, self-
narration, and other forms of agency. Similarly, Mill wrote in The 
Subjection of Women that justice for women and humanity at large 
would not commence “until women themselves have told all they 
have to tell.” Studying the personal narratives of women and other 
historically disadvantaged groups is not enough to ground contem-
porary feminist attempts to theorize global justice, however. The 
philosophical voices of women, colonized peoples, non-Western 
Europeans, and peoples of the global South also have a place in the 
resurgence of interest in putting gender front and center in debates 
on global justice.89
A like-minded convergence of ideas has occurred within the con-
temporary philosophical debate on cosmopolitanism. Martha Nuss-
baum’s early turn toward a Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism—
with its almost crystalline rational abstraction—has given way to a 
cosmopolitan ethic rooted in those human emotions and local ties 
that motivate humans to promote social justice. Kwame Anthony 
Appiah pinpointed the origins of his own conception of rooted cos-
mopolitanism in his family’s deep personal connections to Ghana 
and Britain, the respective homelands of his father and mother. 
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These roots gave him a global sense of citizenship, in which “local 
partialities and universal morality” do not necessarily confl ict. As the 
multicultural theorists Will Kymlicka and Kathryn Walker have put 
it, “Although cosmopolitanism is usually understood as requiring us 
to put aside our more local attachments, a new school of thought ar-
gues that the outward-bound cosmopolitan perspective requires and 
involves the very roots it claims to transcend.” The emerging con-
sensus is that thinking globally about justice requires and involves 
critical recognition of roots while resisting the prejudicial tendency 
to reduce people to them.90
Wollstonecraft wrote eloquently about the role of the natural af-
fections that arise from family life and local schooling to inspire a 
sense of benevolence toward other creatures, both human and other 
animals. Mill disclosed to the world that it was his love and respect 
for his wife, Harriet, that inspired him to write his great treatises on 
individual liberty and women’s human rights. In their abstract phi-
losophies and their personal lives, we fi nd materials for building—
from the ground up—a rooted cosmopolitan approach to global 
justice.
Some scholars have attempted to explain away the cultural preju-
dices of past philosophers such as Montesquieu and Mill, by refer-
ence to the trends of their times or through allegorical readings of 
their symbolic deployments of the Orient. Such backward-looking 
attempts to explain and justify their biases ignore the forward-
 looking ethical problems concerning how such biases gain traction in 
the real world. I hold Wollstonecraft and Mill accountable for their 
prejudicial rhetoric toward non–Western European peoples not only 
because of its moral confl icts with their universalistic theories of hu-
man rights but also because of the publicity and infl uence of this con-
tradictory rhetorical model. On the other hand, I resist the righteous 
urge to reduce them to their prejudices or dismiss the value of their 
philosophies on the basis of such a reductive reading of their work.91
Contextual explanations of prejudicial rhetoric (such as the Ori-
entalist imagery found in the feminist texts of Wollstonecraft and 
Mill) do not justify the idiom’s use in that context or any other con-
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text. Furthermore, to focus on the contextual explanation without 
exploring the ethical implications of the rhetoric is to treat histori-
cal context as though it is static or isolatable in a moment in time. 
This interpretative approach proceeds as if contexts do not beget 
other contexts or overlap with other contexts. It proceeds as if hu-
man agents are simply reducible to a moment in time, rather than 
empirically understanding their agency as shaped and constrained by 
a variety of overlapping contexts (historic and current).
Understanding the ethical implications of human rights rhetoric 
is not primarily about determining intention and blame in a case 
where the bad consequences are known, such as in a mass murder 
trial. Theorizing the ethics of human rights rhetoric is rather about 
articulating the practical need for more thoughtful use of rhetoric in 
light of the moral commitments of the human rights tradition. Yet 
special attention must be paid to the negative (and sometimes un-
foreseen or unintended) consequences of previous rhetorical models, 
such as the feminist Orientalism of Wollstonecraft and Mill.
Abstractly seen, Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s moral contradiction 
is found in their manipulation of the salience of negative images of 
women in particular cultures even though they had theorized the 
damaging consequences of such stereotypes in the case of women in 
general. Wollstonecraft and Mill both prioritized the intrinsic value 
of persons as part of their abstract justifi cations for human rights; 
and, consistent with this guiding ethical principle, they also made 
consequentialist arguments in favor of the good effects of promoting 
human rights for each and all. I take a similarly consistent,  two-tier 
approach in critiquing the ethical implications of their culturally 
biased rhetoric for human rights. If one cares for the human per-
son, one ought to create respectful rhetorical models concerning the 
human person. One’s language ought to refl ect one’s human rights 
values. The benefi cial effects of that rhetoric (politically strategic 
benefi ts, for example) are always morally secondary to the primary 
obligation to uphold the intrinsic value of the person. The fi rst con-
cern trumps the second in cases where the second in any way com-
promises the fi rst.
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All this goes to show that there is no perfect separation of intention 
and consequence in practical ethics, as both Wollstonecraft’s capa-
cious metaphysics and Mill’s complex consequentialism freely allow. 
The intention to create rhetoric that refl ects human rights values is 
a consequence of having such values in the fi rst place. The problem 
of cultural bias means that humans will have their moral blind spots, 
even the greatest philosophical minds. Given their human rights com-
mitments and their actions as public advocates,  Wollstonecraft and 
Mill opened the door to their readers’ critical engagement of their 
use of rhetoric that compromised the moral integrity of those com-
mitments and actions. Over time, this dialogical process of reader 
responses to the original texts moves forward the creation of new 
rhetorical models, including those that challenge cultural bias—if 
not fully, at least in a partial yet suffi ciently ethical way.
The rooted perspectives of Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s feminist 
liberal readers—from St. Petersburg to Santiago to Buenos Aires—
gave the Rights of Woman and The Subjection of Women new, inter-
cultural meanings. Tsebrikova, Borgoño, and López were not per-
fectly impartial in their cosmopolitan approaches to feminist global 
justice, nor did they strive to be. The goal of their feminist liberal-
isms was to approach issues of global justice from their rooted stand-
points in order to achieve a partial yet suffi ciently ethical transcen-
dence of deeply felt and hurtful prejudices toward women and other 
oppressed groups. Their status as non–Western European women 
made them attuned to how gender could not be treated in isolation 
from other forms of socialization, including nationality, race, ethnic-
ity, class, and religion.
Since it is neither possible nor desirable to fully transcend these 
intersecting prejudices, we need to fi nd ways of working with them 
that respect the integrity of other people and cultures. Wollstone-
craft, Mill, and their international interlocutors identifi ed patriarchy 
as a global moral and political problem for humanity. It was not just a 
problem for women but rather a human problem. It was not solely 
a culturally specifi c issue but rather a universal moral problem that 
took on different cultural forms.
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To best respond to this global yet varied problem of patriarchy, 
we need to avoid reducing other people to the cultural differences 
that we are raised to see between “us” and “them.” A culturally sensi-
tive rhetoric of women’s human rights is one such cosmopolitan step 
toward a feminist and intercultural theory of global justice. In the 
fi fth and concluding chapter, we shall see how the personal, human 
stories of Wollstonecraft and Mill—especially their autobiographi-
cal writings about love and loss—helped to inspire such a rooted 
cosmopolitan ethic in feminist thinkers from around the world dur-
ing the nineteenth, twentieth, and now twenty-fi rst centuries.




WOLLSTONECRAFT, MILL, AND THE LITERATURE 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(Auto)biography as Human Rights Advocacy
Not solely philosophers of women’s human rights, Mary Woll-
stonecraft and John Stuart Mill were also literary innovators. They 
creatively appealed to personal narratives as forms of evidence 
that made their allegations of women’s human rights more legiti-
mate and persuasive in the court of public opinion. Long before 
the fact-gathering and testimonial approach of the human rights 
 literature—which is based on witness, transcripts, reports, and em-
pirical studies of crimes against humanity since the Second World 
War— Wollstonecraft and Mill used personal witness to shape a new 
genre, the literature of human rights.1
Wollstonecraft thinly fi ctionalized her (and her friend Fanny’s 
and her sister Bess’s) experiences of patriarchal oppression in craft-
ing her novels Mary, a Fiction (1788) and Maria, or the Wrongs of 
Woman (1798). In her Letters Written during a Short Residence in Swe-
den, Norway, and Denmark (1796), she turned the drama of her re-
cent breakup with Gilbert Imlay into a psychological subtext for her 
philosophical meditations on the possibility of achieving a “single 
life with dignity.” She also developed a distinctive fi rst-person femi-
nist voice across her oeuvre. Speaking with the “I” and the “We,” 
she began to make claims for women’s human rights in a solidaristic 
fashion, seeking to unite herself with all women (“O my sisters”) in 
the cause of “justice” for their sex.2
In his 1873 Autobiography and other memoirs, Mill’s Romantic 
representation of his unconventional relationship with Harriet Tay-
lor established another literary model for making women’s human 
rights arguments. By poignantly recalling Taylor’s life and impact on 
others, including the composition of his own great works of political 
philosophy, Mill legitimated his human rights claims on behalf of 
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women. In Western and non-Western cultures, his male and female 
readers sympathized with his remembrance of his remarkable wife, 
and they upheld the relationship as a standard for egalitarian reform 
of women’s status inside and outside the institution of marriage. Es-
pecially among male intellectuals and legislators, Mill reinforced his 
moral authority as a women’s rights advocate by virtue of his partial 
adherence to the customs of marriage while seeking to reform the 
institution from within.
Mill’s disturbing personal experiences of patriarchal conventions, 
such as Taylor’s enduring sense of obligation to her fi rst husband de-
spite moving out of his home, made his feminism more convincing, 
perhaps especially for other men. He confi ded in his Autobiography 
the reasons why he tolerated his extramarital predicament with Tay-
lor for almost two decades: “Ardently as I should have aspired to this 
complete union of our lives at any time in the course of my existence 
at which it had been practicable, I, as much as my wife, would far 
rather have foregone that privilege for ever, than have owed it to the 
premature death of one for whom I had the sincerest respect, and 
she the strongest affection.” Mill’s stoic denial of any wishful think-
ing for the early death of the man who stood between him and his 
love seems to belie the pain that no doubt characterized the lives of 
all three adults involved in this unusual domestic arrangement. Mill, 
alongside John Taylor and other men, had been indirectly though 
profoundly hurt by the patriarchal system that directly harmed 
women. Yet by bravely recognizing men’s share of this emotional 
burden—not so much through abstract philosophical arguments as 
through messy and complex personal disclosures—Mill could make 
patriarchal marriage an even more urgent problem for the human 
species to confront and solve.3
Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s literary writings were as much auto-
biographical as biographical. Because Wollstonecraft and Mill wove 
their subjective experiences of their selves and their relationships with 
beloved others into intersubjective stories of love and loss, these texts 
are best understood as (auto)biographies. Their life writings blurred 
the lines between self and other, author and subject,  autobiography 
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and biography, hagiography and history, and sometimes even fi ction 
and fact in order to better convey the social context, interpersonal 
ethics, and emotional basis of their human rights claims. By grap-
pling with the complexity of these literary works, readers of their 
(auto)biographies were more likely to become engaged with, if not 
sympathetic to, their moral goals. The stories of Wollstonecraft and 
Mill had the narrative sophistication and emotional power to become 
universal human stories, capable of moving people to care about 
the neglected cause of women’s human rights. Indeed, contempo-
rary psychology has confi rmed the value of some of their literary 
instincts. In 2013, the journal Science published a study showing that 
people who read sophisticated literary fi ction, rather than nonfi ction 
or popular fi ction, are more capable of expressing sympathy toward 
others and understanding complex social relationships.4
Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s contributions to the genre of (auto)
biography indicate the power of literacy and literature for human 
rights activism. The spread of literacy enables people to read, write, 
and speak about self, other, and their relationships with one another, 
on a broader scale than cultures with only oral traditions or an elite 
literary class. As Lynn Hunt has argued in her book Inventing Human 
Rights (2008), the proliferation of novel writing and reading in late 
eighteenth-century Western culture gave traction to the emergent 
idea of human rights: “Learning to empathize opened the path to hu-
man rights.” Sensitive and compelling novels, such as Samuel Rich-
ardson’s Clarissa (1748), Laurence Sterne’s series Tristram Shandy 
(1759–67) and Sentimental Journey (1768), and Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau’s Julie (1761), stirred the sympathy of people with their tales of 
strong yet ill-fated women, and unlucky but stalwart men. Reading, 
or just hearing others discuss, these and other novels taught men and 
women to feel more empathy for each other as human equals. Sterne 
even referred to the “rights of humanity” to which Tristram Shandy 
was entitled as a “homunculus” in his mother’s womb—albeit with 
irony if not sarcasm.5
Eighteenth-century epistolary novels, like the later (auto)bio-
graphical writings of Wollstonecraft and Mill, broke down the di-
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vide between literature and history in a way that allowed readers to 
strongly identify with their heroes and heroines as though they were 
real people. A common trope of Richardson and Rousseau was to use 
an editorial frame story, by which the author represented the novel as 
an (actual) collection of letters by the (supposedly real) protagonists. 
Although Wollstonecraft remained skeptical of some of the gender 
messages that these eighteenth-century novels directed at women, 
she was suffi ciently moved by the stories of Julie, Clarissa, Tristram, 
and Yorick to allude to them in her private and published letters. Her 
epistolary memoir Letters Written during a Short Residence in Sweden, 
Norway, and Denmark referred to Sterne’s Sentimental Journey and 
shared its lightly fi ctionalized (or heavily edited) approach to autobi-
ography. Moving beyond the merely “pleasing” female characters of 
Rousseau and Richardson, Wollstonecraft was inspired to write two 
novels with new “models” of “thinking” women who “wish to speak 
for themselves” and “not to be an echo.” But it was hard to com-
pletely break ties with her literary mentors. The heroine of Maria is 
deluded into believing she is in love as a result of reading Rousseau’s 
Julie, before she comes to her senses.6
Mill, too, was indebted to late eighteenth-century literature, es-
pecially Rousseau’s 1782 Confessions as received by William Words-
worth and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Alongside these authors he 
had an interest in autobiography as the genre best suited for relaying 
the tough yet vital journey of self-discovery. He even quoted Rous-
seau’s Julie in an 1831 letter to the Examiner that defended the Royal 
Society of Literature’s provision of publically funded stipends for 
literary writers such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge. For the state to 
renounce this duty would be to establish a dangerous “maxim” that 
would in turn produce “ten thousand” bad actions: not just the eco-
nomic deprivation of the nation’s best authors but, worst of all, the 
cultural deprivation of society. The political import of literature was 
clear to the young Mill.7
By modeling (auto)biographical approaches to women’s human 
rights advocacy, Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s literary works raise a 
series of epistemological and moral questions for their readers. Is it 
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 legitimate to use the human stories— of our families, our friends, and 
ourselves—as evidence to support human rights claims? Do appeals 
to subjective, or even fi ctionalized, stories undermine the truth and 
universal reach of human rights arguments? Finally, can the use of 
human stories be consistent with the practical ethics of human rights 
activism—especially the obligation to respect the intrinsic value of 
the individual human being? It would appear that using personal sto-
ries to defend human rights could exploit either the emotions of the 
audience or, worse, the very lives on which the stories are based.
On the question of whether to use human stories in human rights 
advocacy, contemporary feminist theorists have generally affi rmed 
the legitimacy of this literary and legal strategy. Personal testi-
mony is a necessary form of evidence for documenting violations of 
 women’s human rights. For decades, the radical feminist legal theo-
rist Catharine MacKinnon has chronicled the wide range of women’s 
personal experiences of sexual violence as a way of raising awareness 
of the depth and breadth of women’s subjection around the globe. 
By recording women’s personal testimony of sexual violence, she 
has also contributed to the prosecution of rape as a weapon of war, 
especially in the Bosnian War. In another documentary approach, 
Martha Nussbaum interwove Women and Human Development with 
biographical portraits of two lower-caste Indian women whom she 
met, interviewed, and befriended as part of her fi eld research for 
the book. These two personal stories gave weight to her arguments 
for the necessity of listening to local women’s self-interpretations 
of what is needed for improving human development in a particu-
lar region or nation. There is a growing consensus among feminists 
that only by building into theories of justice a plurality of women’s 
perspectives can we even begin to enhance women’s sense of “agency 
and well-being” in general. The universality of human rights claims 
is partly established by the personal testimonials of women and other 
historically oppressed groups who need rights in order to fl ourish.8
On the question of whether human stories can compromise the 
truth of human rights claims, there is some justifi ed suspicion of the 
attempts of advocates to closely identify with the people whom they 
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are striving to help. Deep empathy—whether purported, attempted, 
or actual—can be politically dangerous because of its personal biases. 
Unduly sympathetic reformers may fail to demarcate a clear space for 
objective reporting of human rights violations. Given the widespread 
disregard of the scale of massive crimes against humanity such as the 
genocidal rape of women during the Bosnian War, human rights ad-
vocates have a special obligation to improve knowledge of the facts 
of these atrocities. Fact-fi nding may at times require the adoption of 
a cooler professional demeanor, or even the sacrifi ce of an emotional 
sense of involvement in the case at hand. Any storytelling, including 
(auto)biography and fi ction, that blurs the line between author and 
subject will not achieve this kind of empirically verifi able objectivity, 
but it can foster a kind of intersubjective perspective that inspires 
sympathy for the plight of others. Both elements of human rights 
advocacy—fact-fi nding work and sympathy-inspiring literature—
can productively work in tandem. If they are suffi ciently grounded in 
the culture of the local community, activists might achieve the kind 
of “multisited” perspective necessary for choosing the right times, 
places, and people for gathering hard facts or composing quality lit-
erary refl ections on the issues at hand.9
Finally, there is a potential internal confl ict between the moral 
purpose of the literature of human rights and its reliance on bio-
graphical narratives. By building human rights arguments on another 
person’s story, the author risks treating the subject of her biography 
as a means to an end, rather than as an end in herself. A biography 
would not appear to promote human rights if it does not respect its 
human subject as such—a person with the capability to tell her own 
story.
The most infl uential exponents of the latter line of argument are 
postcolonial feminist critics of Western liberalism, such as Gayatri 
Spivak, Chandra Mohanty, and Inderpal Grewal. In their visionary 
work from the 1980s and 1990s, they identifi ed the moral problems 
with Western liberal attempts to “speak for,” rather than listen to, 
the subaltern and oppressed in the developing, democratizing, and 
non-Western world. They theorized why the voices of women in the 
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Two-Thirds World had to be heard and incorporated into interna-
tional dialogue on human rights and social justice, in order for such 
dialogue to be inclusive and egalitarian in process and outcomes. 
With their grassroots and democratic approach to theorizing the 
empowerment of women worldwide, they paved the way for femi-
nists in general to frame their human rights approaches to global 
justice around the voices, stories, and self-interpretations of women 
beyond the West.10
In response to this postcolonial critique, some feminists have ad-
vocated a qualitative social scientifi c approach to surveying and in-
terviewing women of the global South. Brooke Ackerly and Jacqui 
True, for example, accept ethnographic research (such as formal or 
informal personal interviews) within a single case study (such as an 
event, city, or country) as a valid moral platform for alleging and 
defending women’s human rights. The key to good single-case femi-
nist ethnography is suffi cient attention to local detail, cultural sen-
sitivity, and transparency about the researcher’s outsider standpoint 
within the group she is observing. Other feminists, such as Nancy 
Hirschmann, have simply been transparent about the inescapable 
interpretive dimension of using the stories of other people as a re-
source for theorizing issues of justice. Hirschmann insightfully ex-
plained the rationale behind this hermeneutical approach in her book 
The Subject of Liberty (2003): “These stories are not the result of sys-
tematic interviews in the tradition of qualitative empirical political 
science. But neither are they fi ction, in the hallowed philosopher’s 
tradition of creating hypothetical examples to illustrate philosophical 
points . . . I do not offer any of them as systematic ‘proof ’ of women’s 
experiences, or of their oppression or freedom; but at the same time, 
I think it is important to acknowledge that the stories I relate are 
‘real,’ that they are not the fantasies of angry feminists, out to blame 
men for all the evils of the world, but rather represent the experi-
ences of real, live women.” In sharing the stories of a diverse range 
of female humans—whether in ethnographic or anecdotal form— 
feminists have responded to the postcolonial demand for recognition 
of girls’ and women’s powers of self-representation and self-direction 
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in the Two-Thirds World. By incorporating these voices, feminists 
have expanded the reach of human rights arguments, making them 
worthy of the descriptors “universal” and “international.”11
By attending to the epistemological and ethical issues surround-
ing the use of human stories for human rights advocacy, contem-
porary feminist theorists have sketched a philosophical justifi cation 
for a genre with a global history. As we shall see, Wollstonecraft’s 
and Mill’s (auto)biographical writings have inspired people since the 
nineteenth century to feel sympathy for the cause of women’s human 
rights and rethink the principles of justice that govern their socie-
ties in light of this feminist commitment. From the United States 
to Japan, and from Prague to Maharashtra, people retold and some-
times even relived Wollstonecraft’s stories of heroic womanhood and 
Mill’s stories of spiritual marriage, in new iterations of the old narra-
tives. Wollstonecraft, Mill, and their international followers together 
forged a literary approach to women’s human rights argumentation 
that still resonates in twenty-fi rst-century feminist struggles from 
South Korea to Pakistan.
Wollstonecraft’s Stories of Heroic Womanhood
Wollstonecraft’s novel Mary, a Fiction (1788) initiated the (auto)
biographical and literary trends in her writing career. She partly 
based the plot of the novel on her journey to Portugal in 1785. The 
twenty-six-year-old Wollstonecraft sailed for Lisbon to care for her 
recently married, pregnant best friend Fanny Blood, who tragically 
died as a result of childbirth soon after Wollstonecraft’s arrival. The 
“Heroine of this Fiction,” the eponymous Mary, is a composite of 
the author Wollstonecraft, her sister Bess, who was recently sepa-
rated from her husband, and Fanny. Wollstonecraft was unmarried 
at the time she wrote the novel, yet she imagined her namesake Mary 
struggling to realize independence within the conventions of patri-
archal marriage as she strove to aid her dying friend, Ann. Just prior 
to her trip to Lisbon, Wollstonecraft had assisted her sister Bess in 
leaving a loveless and possibly sexually exploitative marriage. The 
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struggle of her “Heroine” Mary to avoid a similar marriage trap, in 
which she would be forced to give her body to a man she loathed, was 
the dominant narrative thread of the novel.12
Although the protagonist Mary was married when she arrived in 
Lisbon, she “never had any particular attachment” to her husband. 
Tellingly, she had contracted with him to live apart for a year prior to 
their living together as husband and wife. The unstated implication 
was that the marriage was unconsummated. Mary’s feelings of “dis-
gust” for her husband suggested that she would have liked to avoid 
this inevitability as long as possible. Mary’s father had arranged this 
loveless marriage for the sake of preserving the family estate. As the 
third-person narrator dryly observed, “While this important mat-
ter was settling, Mary was otherwise employed.” The “heroine” was 
caring for her ailing friend, Ann, and her impoverished family when 
her father chose to broker this marital deal that cost her her youthful 
freedom.13
While in Lisbon, Mary chastely fell in love with a wan, pious “man 
of learning,” Henry, with whom she shared passionate conversations 
about theology, philosophy, and the meaning of life. When Ann’s 
health took a turn for the worse, guilt overcame Mary as if she had 
committed a “crime” in letting her relationship with Henry divert 
even one of her thoughts from Ann’s needs. When Ann died while 
Mary helped her cross the room, the bereaved friend found herself 
overwhelmed with anguish. Her grief “disturbed her reasoning fac-
ulties; she seemed stunned by it; unable to refl ect, or even to feel her 
misery.” After she recovered her reason and senses after the initial 
shock of loss, Mary refl ected counterfactually: “Had Ann lived, it is 
probable she would never have loved Henry so fondly; but if she had, 
she could not have talked of her passion to any human creature.” Emo-
tionally torn between her love for Ann and her love for Henry, Mary 
understood passion and mutual confi dence as the bonds she shared 
with both. By confi ding her passions to each friend, especially her 
grief for the loss of Ann to her new love, Henry, Mary learned to talk 
her way through an evolving story of her ongoing self- interpretation 
as an independent, even rebellious, married woman.14
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Despite the heroine’s deft navigation of her personal tragedies 
and charting of “strange conduct” in friendship and love, the novel 
ultimately forces us, the readers, to confront the grim realities of 
 eighteenth- century patriarchal marriage. Three months after Henry’s 
death, social pressure compelled Mary to reunite with her husband. 
Her “disgust” at seeing him again was so strong that she fainted. 
She negotiated another year’s hiatus from cohabitation, but the time 
abroad fl ew by, and soon they were living together: “She gave him 
her hand—the struggle was almost more than she could endure.” 
Mary sacrifi ced her sense of bodily integrity to enter into a marriage 
that disgusted her. Without the motive of love of a living human 
being, Mary lost her wily determination to evade the marriage she 
hated. While the laws of entail and coverture set into motion this 
tragic, forced choice, the devastation of her double loss of Ann and 
Henry propelled it. Mary could only waste away her last years on 
earth imagining she was “hastening to that world where there is nei-
ther marrying, nor giving in marriage.”15
The radical theological message of Mary, a Fiction was the same as 
its feminist message: marriage, as practiced in the eighteenth cen-
tury, was a profoundly bad deal for women. Even the most heroic 
and resourceful of them could not escape its insidious spillover ef-
fects into personal health, well-being, and, most important, freedom. 
Looking forward to a heaven without sex or marriage thus emerged 
as the only complete exit option available to women of her time.
Wollstonecraft’s autobiographical Letters Written during a Short 
Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark—initially published in 
London, Delaware, Hamburg, and Altona in 1796—had as its im-
plicit topic her tragic romance with Gilbert Imlay. Wollstonecraft 
had met this American trader in Paris in the spring of 1793, during 
the radical stage of the Revolution. They quickly fell in love and en-
tered into a “republican” (or unoffi cial) marriage later that summer. 
Around this time Wollstonecraft became pregnant with her fi rst 
child, whom she named after her best friend, Fanny. Imlay’s infi deli-
ties and other defi ciencies as a provider for his family eventually led 
Wollstonecraft to leave the relationship in the fall of 1795.
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Around the time that she ended her fi rst (unoffi cial) marriage, 
Wollstonecraft wrote her Letters. Based on her journey to Scandi-
navia to assist Imlay in a business matter in the summer of 1795, her 
Letters reworked her correspondence with her husband into a mas-
terpiece of autobiographical literature. The Letters did not mention 
Imlay by name, but readers in Wollstonecraft’s tight-knit intellectual 
circles in France and Britain would have grasped the domestic prem-
ise for this ostensible travel memoir. The resultant text is what the 
smitten William Godwin called “a book calculated to make a man 
in love with its author.”16 More important than its inspiration of her 
second, last, and only offi cial husband to fall in love with her was the 
book’s role in securing Wollstonecraft’s fresh sense of self in the pro-
cess of her unoffi cial yet brutally painful divorce. Wollstonecraft’s 
authorship of the letters that became her Letters was bound between 
the two bleakest moments in her life: her suicide attempts in May 
and October 1795. These attempts took place immediately before 
and following her journey to Scandinavia. Both were occasioned by 
discoveries of Imlay’s ongoing infi delities.
Wollstonecraft’s reworking of the letters into the Letters in the 
aftermath of her second suicide attempt meant that the autobio-
graphical composition served as a midwife to the rebirthing of her 
selfhood. Within the literature of human rights, we might describe 
the Letters as a literary exercise in personal agency and its neces-
sary assertion of a basic human right to life itself. Wollstonecraft’s 
Shakespearean rendering of a meditative experience in a Norwegian 
church, as she took in the startling view of mummifi ed corpses, pro-
vided a case in point: “Life, what art thou? Where goes this breath? 
this I, so much alive? In what element will it mix, giving or receiving 
fresh energy?—What will break the enchantment of animation?—
For worlds, I would not see a form I loved—enbalmed in my heart—
thus sacrilegiously handled!—Pugh! my stomach turns.—Is this all 
the distinction of the rich in the grave?—They had better quietly 
allow the scythe of equality to mow them down with the common 
mass, than struggle to become a monument of the instability of hu-
man progress.” Like her literary alter ego Hamlet speaking to the 
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skull of the jester Yorick, Wollstonecraft refl ected on human life 
and mortality, fi rst reveling in the wonder of the “I, so much alive,” 
then recoiling from the mummies before her. The corpses bothered 
her not so much because of their exotic appearance but because of 
what they symbolized politically: the childish attempts of the rich 
and privileged to steal a kind of immortality for themselves at the 
expense of other, poorer humans.17
Just a few lines later, Wollstonecraft assured her correspondent 
(the implied Imlay) that “with more than usual tenderness, I there-
fore assure you that I am yours.” Ironically, she reworked this let-
ter for publication after she had left her fi rst love. She embedded 
this meditation on the fragility of the good of human love within 
a larger and more pressing moral and psychological narrative: her 
retrospective forging of a new identity out of the crucible of her 
near self-destruction. She presented her past affi rmation of her devo-
tion to Imlay alongside a melancholic refrain on the passing shadows 
of earthly human experience. Akin to Mill in his Autobiography, she 
countered this dark observation on impermanence with the asser-
tion of the permanent happiness of discovering the intrinsic value 
of one’s own self: “God bless you! I feel a conviction that we have 
some perfectible principle in our present vestment, which will not 
be destroyed just as we begin to be sensible of improvement; and I 
care not what habit it next puts on, sure that it will be wisely formed 
to suit a higher state of existence.” On a metaphysical/ethical level, 
the author of the Letters thought of the development of her self (and 
other human selves) as a perfectionistic process, guided by the (per-
haps inscrutable) providence of the divine Creator.18
On a psychological and empirically grounded level, Wollstone-
craft thought of the process of self-development in Humean terms. 
As David Hume argued in his 1739 Treatise of Human Nature, per-
sonal identity was not static but dynamic. It was best understood as a 
process by which our minds took a set of snapshots of our historically 
contingent selves, each shaped in a different way by time and place. 
One looked back on the set of snapshots and endowed them with an 
overarching sense of selfhood. In this Humean spirit, Wollstonecraft 
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cared not “what habit” her self “next puts on.” Identity formation 
was a process of trying on new clothes that were suited for the time 
and place, but also for the ongoing, retrospective struggle of self-
understanding and self-development.19
The Letters saw a surge of reprinting and translations after God-
win’s 1798 Memoirs of the Author of A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman, probably because of the rise of public interest in Wollstone-
craft’s unconventional life story. Swedish, Dutch, and Portuguese 
translations of the Letters, a new German translation in Leipzig, and 
another printing in London were produced between 1798 and 1806. 
No new editions of Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman appeared be-
tween the Danish translation of 1801 and a New York printing in 
1833; yet Wollstonecraft remained well known among literary elites 
in Britain, Europe, and the Americas through the reception of the 
Memoirs, Letters, and Maria during this period.20
Making her even more famous as an (auto)biographical author 
and subject at the turn of the nineteenth century, her incomplete 
novel Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman—initially published by God-
win in London in 1798—was soon translated into French, Swed-
ish, and German and published again in English in Philadelphia. 
The novel was widely read as a semiautobiographical defense of 
women’s right to sexual freedom and divorce. The public salience of 
her scandalous life story in the fi rst decades after her death shifted 
the wider public’s focus from her ideas on women’s rights to her 
biography.21
Wollstonecraft partly based Maria on her sister Bess’s dramatic 
exit from what was likely an abusive marriage in 1784. Wollstone-
craft and her sister Everina orchestrated the escape of Bess, because 
their recently married sibling had fallen into a terrible depression. 
The price of fl ight was leaving behind Bess’s baby, over whom she 
had no parental rights under the rules of coverture. The child died of 
illness soon thereafter, making the sisters’ decision to liberate Bess 
even more morally complex in unanticipated consequences.22
Yet Maria was as much political as it was personal. Through the 
narration of the life stories of Jemima (a lower-class woman) and 
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Maria (a middle-class woman), the novel illustrated how class dif-
ferentiates and stratifi es women’s experiences of patriarchal, gender-
based inequality and oppression. Wollstonecraft drew the fi ctional 
characters of Jemima and Maria from the bleak lives of women she 
observed in London (even at the Bedlam insane asylum) as part of 
the process of writing this work of Gothic realism. Her anthropo-
logical and ethnographic approach, drawing from the real world of 
English women’s experiences of oppression, let the novel express 
contemporary political criticism.23
In one of the narrative frames of this many-layered tale, Jemima 
worked as a lowly servant at the Bedlam-like insane asylum in which 
Maria’s husband had unjustly imprisoned her. Trapped in the asy-
lum—a Gothic symbol for the corrupt, arbitrary, hierarchical social 
and political order—Jemima and Maria shared their life stories with 
one another. Through the comparison and contrast of their stories, 
the reader discerns that Jemima’s struggles as a woman have been 
even more severe than Maria’s.
The double burden of being poor and female made Jemima sub-
ject to a devastating array of social prejudices, economic obstacles, 
and physical violations. While Maria had a basic but not formal edu-
cation, Jemima had no opportunity to better herself through edu-
cation of any kind. While the middle-class Maria fi rst experienced 
economic insecurity as a result of the law of coverture, Jemima faced 
extreme poverty from birth. While Maria never worked outside the 
home, Jemima spent her entire life working in demeaning, physically 
demanding, slave-like jobs, mainly as a servant. While Maria en-
dured a marriage to a repulsive, alcoholic, verbally abusive husband, 
Jemima was subject to regular physical and sexual abuse, including 
rape, from adolescence onward. While Maria suffered marriage as a 
form of legal prostitution when she was married with a dowry of fi ve 
thousand pounds to a man she did not love, the young Jemima was 
forced into literal prostitution as her only means of economic sur-
vival. While Maria struggled to regain custody of her infant daughter 
from her husband, Jemima had to abort a baby because she could not 
support it.
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One of the moral objectives of the novel was to show how such 
intersectional comparisons of women’s experiences across classes 
might inspire a kind of sensitive solidarity among them for their dis-
tinct but related struggles. Through the process of telling their life 
stories to one another, Jemima and Maria developed a potent sympa-
thy for each other’s plights as women precisely because they recog-
nized the salient differences between their experiences of oppression. 
Encountering Jemima’s “unmerited sufferings” prompted Maria to 
promise her jailor “a better fate . . . and I will procure it for you.” 
While moved by Maria’s personal narrative to assist her in escaping 
the asylum, Jemima still understood her own oppression as more se-
vere. She felt displaced from humanity altogether, since others had 
treated her, from childhood, “like a creature of another species.”24
As the more privileged woman, Maria returned the favor of libera-
tion by accepting Jemima’s poignant plea to “reconcile me with the 
human race.” These two women—despite their radically different 
backgrounds—became friends, escaped the asylum together, and, 
in the only optimistic ending drafted for the unfi nished novel, cre-
ated what some scholars have called an all-female family. Jemima re-
united Maria with her infant daughter, who was, unlike Bess’s baby, 
rescued despite the lack of maternal child custody rights. Although 
Wollstonecraft had argued that poor women were among the worst 
 victims of the patriarchal social and political order, she used the unex-
pected friendship of Jemima and Maria to show that women’s  mutual 
recognition of how class stratifi ed their experiences of  gender-based 
oppression can spark a common quest for the realization of women’s 
human rights, such as to care for their own children. As Maria joy-
ously cried before Jemima when reunited with her infant daughter, 
“I will live for my child!”25
Well before writing her last novel, Wollstonecraft had developed a 
distinctive fi rst-person feminist voice across several genres. As  Janet 
Todd has argued, the frequency of Wollstonecraft’s use of “I” can 
seem egocentric even to a twenty-fi rst century reader familiar with 
the conceits of postmodernism. But set in its literary context, her 
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pounding, insistent return to the fi rst-person standpoint is reminis-
cent of the repetition found in Biblical poetry. In both cases, re-
petitive word choice drives home the moral teaching of the text. The 
assertion, and reassertion, of the value of her or any woman’s voice—
“this I, so much alive”—is a necessary step toward the development 
of a general human morality that recognizes the intrinsic worth of 
each person.26
Wollstonecraft also regularly used the fi rst-person plural to locate 
herself as part of the broader group of women who face patriarchal 
injustice. “We might as well never have been born, unless it were 
necessary that we should be created to enable man to acquire the 
noble privilege of reason,” she pointed out with dark humor in her 
Rights of Woman. This fi rst-person plural formulation anticipated 
what has been called the “radical feminist” turn of Wollstonecraft’s 
fi nal novel, in which the middle-class Maria learned to identify with 
the suffering of the working-class Jemima by listening to her personal 
story of lifelong patriarchal oppression: “Thinking of Jemima’s pecu-
liar fate and her own, she was led to consider the oppressed state of 
women, and to lament that she had given birth to a daughter.” This 
sense of solidarity—specifi cally, the identifi cation of the individual 
with group oppression—is a psychological precondition for the for-
mation of any social movement to alleviate collective injustice. For 
this reason, we may read Maria as a founding text for modern orga-
nized feminism.27
Wollstonecraft’s innovative use of fi rst-person voices, singular and 
plural, allowed her to develop a rich personal basis for the litera-
ture of human rights. While her Rights of Woman provided a univer-
salistic metaphysical foundation for human rights claims on behalf 
of women, her (auto)biographical works such as Mary, Letters, and 
Maria erected another, more practical grounding for human rights 
advocacy: testimony and witness of women’s heroic struggles to 
navigate the tragic choices set by patriarchy. This literary approach 
to human rights advocacy built on the personal stories of women, 
drawn from Wollstonecraft’s life, including her own loves and losses. 
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The literature of human rights confronts us with these diffi cult his-
tories in order to move us, emotionally and physically, to speak up 
for a better way for each and all.
Voices in the Wilderness: The “Spiritual Daughters” of Wollstonecraft
In 1891, the U.S. historian Annie Meyer wrote in her book Women’s 
Work in America that the pioneering women in the fi eld of medicine, 
such as Elizabeth Blackwell, were the “spiritual daughters of Mary 
Wollstonecraft.” Meyer hailed Wollstonecraft as a “voice crying in 
the wilderness,” who had the courage to speak up for women’s rights 
to professions, including law, politics, and medicine, long before 
governments had even made equal provision for primary education. 
In the generous humanistic spirit of Wollstonecraft, Blackwell and 
her nineteenth-century American peers “did not seek wider oppor-
tunities in order to study medicine, but they studied medicine in or-
der to secure wider opportunities for all women.” Blackwell followed 
Wollstonecraft in leaving “the Record of a Heroic Life,” which “has 
since carried hundreds of women over impossibilities.”28
Meyer was neither the fi rst nor the last women’s rights advocate to 
hail Wollstonecraft as a new kind of political prophet. Many people 
read Wollstonecraft as a female Isaiah or a feminist John the Bap-
tist—a lone voice crying out for humanity to clear a new way for its 
liberation. A “legion of Wollstonecrafts” followed her path- breaking 
example, especially among the Quakers and other dissenting Chris-
tians in North America during the nineteenth century. Lucretia 
Mott, a Quaker preacher who helped to organize the fi rst women’s 
rights convention at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848, was not only 
an avid reader of the Rights of Woman but also shared the book among 
her friends—including the controversial feminist theologian Eliza-
beth Cady Stanton and the Quaker abolitionist Sarah Grimké.29
As part of the Anglo-American Quaker tradition of female preach-
ing that dated to the seventeenth century, Mott saw herself as chan-
neling the “indwelling Spirit of God” in feeling moved to speak on 
matters of religion and public morality. A 1906 speech at a Quaker 
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conference in Maryland equated Mott’s legendary talents for public 
speaking, on issues ranging from abolition to women’s rights, with 
“the voice of the prophet, ‘crying in the wilderness, Make ye ready 
the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.’” Within her religion, 
Mott was represented as an authentic prophet, who relied only “upon 
the Word of God, found not in manuscript or book, but written large 
in souls that are in touch with the spirit of Jesus Christ.”30
Mott’s own preaching recalled Wollstonecraft as a Christ-like 
fi gure who modeled the life of selfl ess sacrifi ce necessary for clear-
ing the way for women’s rights. Her 1866 speech at the National 
Woman’s Rights Convention borrowed the conventions of a sermon 
in its religious representation of Wollstonecraft: “Young women of 
America, I want you to make yourselves acquainted with the history 
of the Woman’s Rights movement from the days of Mary Wollstone-
craft. All honor to Mary Wollstonecraft. Her name was cast out as 
evil, even as that of Jesus was cast out as evil, and those of the apostles 
were cast out as evil; but her name shall yet go forth and stand as the 
pioneer of this movement.” In a kind of feminist eschatology, Mott 
resurrected Wollstonecraft, turning her from an Eve-like fallen 
woman who was “cast out as evil” into a female Jesus who had come 
to lead the American women’s rights cause.31
It was a close friend and political colleague of Mott, Stanton, who 
made Wollstonecraft’s philosophy of women’s human rights into the 
basis for an American feminist civil religion. In 1840, she had met 
Mott at the World’s Anti-Slavery Convention in London. There 
they discussed how Wollstonecraft and other dissenting Christian 
political thinkers had been “tabooed by orthodox teachers.” In the 
History of Woman Suffrage, Stanton recalled how she encountered 
Quaker families in England who “warned against [Mott’s] infl uence” 
because “in a recent speech in London she quoted sentiments from 
Mary Wollstonecroft [sic].”32
Stanton responded pragmatically to the taboo status of Wollstone-
craft even within the dissenting Christian tradition. In her own writ-
ings and speeches, she invoked Wollstonecraft and her ideas not so 
much in terms of any particular religious faith as in terms of a new 
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civil religion. This American civil religion was based on rational 
principles of morality (such as, each person’s desert of equal respect 
due to each person’s dignity as a human being). Around the same 
time, during the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln similarly 
resorted to familiar biblical images and phrases to shore up his secu-
lar principles and politics. In defi ning the secular use of religious 
language in Lincoln’s antislavery statesmanship, Steven B. Smith has 
argued that a “civil religion” is any “non-denominational profession 
of faith based upon certain symbols, rituals, and public practices that 
bind citizens of a polity by virtue of their common membership.”33
Stanton used Wollstonecraft to articulate the feminist principles 
latent within postrevolutionary America’s civil religion, particularly 
its doctrines of popular sovereignty and equal rights. She and Mott 
rewrote Jefferson’s 1776 Declaration of Independence to include women 
in their 1848 Declaration of Sentiments, to show that American civil 
and political rights ought to apply to all adult persons, regardless of 
sex. Stanton distinguished her reading of Wollstonecraft from Mott’s 
by making Wollstonecraft a wholly secular icon of women’s right 
to civic equality and nondiscrimination. In an 1871 letter to Mott, 
Stanton turned Wollstonecraft into a feminist martyr: “We have had 
women enough sacrifi ced to this sentimental, hypocritical, prating 
about purity. This is one of man’s most effective engines, for our divi-
sion, & subjugation. He creates the public sentiment, builds the gal-
lows, & then makes us hangman for our sex. Women have crucifi ed 
the Mary Wolsencrafts, the Fanny Wrights, the George Sand’s, the 
Fanny Kemble’s, the Lucretia Mott’s of all ages, & now men mock 
us with the fact, & say, we are ever cruel to each other. Let us end 
this ignoble record, & henceforth stand by womanhood.” Stanton’s 
mastery of rhetorical amplifi cation transformed Wollstonecraft from 
a “sacrifi ced” Christ into a martyr for a wholly secular cause—the 
cause of “womanhood” itself. While Wollstonecraft was a righteous 
prophet for Mott, for Stanton she was a noble and willing political 
victim who embodied a new kind of female heroism. In Stanton’s bit-
ing analysis, the tragic history of women persecuting other women 
and thereby perpetuating patriarchy would be the “ignoble record” 
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of the female sex, if they do not fi nally band together “& henceforth 
stand by womanhood.” This personal letter to Mott was thereby a 
political demand for women to “stand” against patriarchal domina-
tion, yet for civil not revealed religious reasons.34
Another leading Quaker feminist, Susan B. Anthony, was Stan-
ton’s political partner in establishing the fi rst freestanding national 
women’s rights organization in the United States in 1869. Stanton 
and Anthony’s formation of the National Woman’s Suffrage Asso-
ciation (NWSA) effectively split their more radical branch of the 
women’s rights movement from both the civil rights movement for 
African American men and the mainstream women’s suffrage move-
ment. With the founding of NWSA, Stanton and Anthony drew 
a fi rm line between their ultimate commitment to women’s rights 
such as suffrage, divorce, and voluntary motherhood, and the limited 
victory of the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that 
activists such as Frederick Douglass and Lucy Stone had embraced 
for its extension of suffrage to black men and former male slaves. 
The political cleavages of 1869 over the ratifi cation of the Fifteenth 
Amendment became the crucible for the consolidation of the Ameri-
can women’s rights cause into a freestanding social movement ex-
plicitly focused on feminist issues—sometimes, disappointingly, in 
opposition to the rights of blacks and other minority groups. As it 
faced forward, toward the realization of Wollstonecraft’s abstract vi-
sion of social justice, American feminism ironically distanced itself 
from its iconic philosopher’s commitment to universal human rights 
in the quest to realize the civil and political rights of women.35
Anthony, like Stanton, revered Wollstonecraft as a philosophical 
source for the women’s rights cause. It was widely reported that they 
prominently displayed portraits of Wollstonecraft and Mott in the 
offi ces of their feminist newspaper, the Revolution, around the time 
of the founding of NWSA. No longer heard as religious prophets 
for women’s rights, Wollstonecraft and Mott were instead the secu-
lar and pioneering voices for the “great cause” of full and formal 
female citizenship. In 1904, Anthony donated her copy of the Rights 
of Woman to the Library of Congress with the symbolic  inscription: 
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“To the Library of Congress from a great admirer of this earli-
est work for woman’s right to Equality of rights ever penned by a 
woman. As Ralph Waldo Emerson said, ‘A wholesome dissenter is 
the fi rst step towards progress.’ And here we have the fi rst step.” In 
the iconography of the late nineteenth-century American women’s 
rights movement, Wollstonecraft had transmogrifi ed from a female 
Jesus, to a feminist martyr, to a “wholesome dissenter,” even among 
the dissenting Christians who had popularized her views across the 
United States. What remained the same across these mimetic itera-
tions of Wollstonecraft was the focus on the clarity, originality, and 
urgency of her voice as an advocate of women’s rights.36
As organized feminism grew in popularity at the turn of the twen-
tieth century, there was an international shift toward representing 
Wollstonecraft as a secular voice of reason and advocate of human 
rights. In her 1884 biography of Wollstonecraft, the American ex-
patriate and European intellectual Elizabeth Robins Pennell wrote 
of Wollstonecraft as “the voice of one crying in the wilderness, to 
prepare the way. What she had to do was awaken mankind to the 
knowledge that women are human beings, and then be given the 
opportunity to assert themselves as such.” In 1899, the Jewish Ger-
man feminist Bertha Pappenheim contended in her introduction to 
the second German edition of the Rights of Woman that Wollstone-
craft was “the fi rst woman who with overwhelming clarity awoke the 
consciousness in women—and also had the courage to voice—that 
women have rights, not assumed through raw force or custom, but 
rather human rights whose basis lies in irrefutable duties.”37
Anna Holmová was the Czech translator of Wollstonecraft’s Rights 
of Woman in 1904. Her introduction to this edition, published in 
Prague, captured another trend in the reception of Wollstonecraft at 
the turn of the twentieth century. As biographies of Wollstonecraft’s 
life and editions of her letters became popular across Europe, Brit-
ain, and the United States, the author of the Rights of Woman became 
more important than the contents of her groundbreaking treatise. 
Wollstonecraft’s arguments were now philosophically quaint and po-
litically irrelevant because they fully refl ected the “rationalistic reli-
Y6872.indb   224 1/6/16   10:38:08 AM
H U M A N  S T O R I E S
225
gion and rationalistic philosophy of her time.” Holmová concluded 
that the lasting power of Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman lay not 
in its “philosophical system” but rather in its emotional sway over 
the “sensibility” of its contemporary feminist readers: “With almost 
an elementary force stands out the sense that a change, a renewal, 
is necessary,—and in this immediacy, in this desire, lies the signifi -
cance of this book, which makes up for its logical and stylistic im-
perfections. It isolates the author from her [female] contemporaries, 
but connects her with the striving and longing woman of today, 
who disagrees with the old ways and who demands freedom to try 
and to look for new ways.” Like an electric charge, the fi n de siècle 
Wollstonecraft jolted the “woman of today” to leave behind the “old 
ways” in order to seek “new ways” in the wilderness.38
In 1907, the British conservative Mrs. Humphrey Ward felt com-
pelled to satirize this tendency of modern feminists to see Wollstone-
craft and themselves as secular prophets. In her widely read novel 
The Testing of Diana Mallory, an idealistic young feminist advised 
the heroine to split up with her fi ancé in order to commit herself 
to the selfl ess mission of women’s rights. Belying her sense of self-
 importance, the feminist confi ded: “I fear I may seem to you a voice 
crying in the wilderness.” With this confession aside, she proceeded 
to matter-of-factly invite her friend to join the “Mary Wollstonecraft 
Club,” devoted to suffrage and pacifi sm, once she overcame her mere 
“personal grief” over losing her beloved. Showing Mrs. Ward’s fear-
ful satire to be prophetic itself, the British militant suffragette news-
paper Votes for Women ran an article in 1912 entitled “The Voice in 
the Wilderness.” Citing Pennell, the article praised Wollstonecraft 
as a “remarkable pioneer” whose views pointed “so unmistakably in 
that direction” of the “Woman’s Movement of the present day.”39
In his infl uential 1922 book on the international history of female 
emancipation, the Dutch historian Jacob Bouten located Wollstone-
craft as the ideological source of the globally successful women’s 
rights cause. Using words that have been repeated to the present day 
in scholarship on Wollstonecraft and feminism, Bouten referred to 
her as a “lonely voice in the wilderness of British conventionality” 
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who “heralded the great and successful movement of a later century.” 
In 1929, Virginia Woolf canonized within literature this fi rst-wave 
feminist trend of hearing Wollstonecraft as a secular, rational, yet 
emotionally captivating voice. For her Second Common Reader, Woolf 
wrote of Wollstonecraft: “One form of immortality is hers undoubt-
edly: she is alive and active, she argues and experiments, we hear her 
voice and trace her infl uence even now among the living.”40
After modeling a new style of fi rst-person voice and narration in 
her contributions to the literature of human rights, Wollstonecraft 
herself came to symbolically represent women’s power to speak pro-
phetically, and thus critically, about women’s social status. In the rhe-
torical and oratorical works of her early followers within organized 
feminism, Wollstonecraft was heard as a “voice in the wilderness,” 
whether she was seen as a religious prophet, a political sacrifi ce, or 
a secular suffragist. Even as the mainstream feminist movement lost 
touch with its explicitly religious foundations, it retained its spiritual 
motivations in secularized form. Driven by a quixotic desire to help 
the whole of humanity, the “spiritual daughters of Wollstonecraft” 
developed a narrative framework by which they could understand 
their work as answering a political prophet’s call to action. Like 
other forms of politics, nonreligious forms of feminism are still a 
kind of secularized theology, with Wollstonecraft and her fellow ra-
tional Christian dissenters situated at their philosophical and literary 
base. James Darsey has argued that “Considered as biography, the 
prophetic ethos is a kind of legend.” The early American and Euro-
pean feminists built such a prophetic ethos on the legend of Woll-
stonecraft’s visionary life and ideas.41
The Wollstonecraft legend and its prophetic ethos were generated 
by, and continue to generate, a variety of Wollstonecraft memes. 
Memes— or widely recognizable yet variously replicated symbols of 
ideas—have become a staple of modern popular culture. Recent fem-
inist theory and scholarship have begun to grapple with the powerful 
concept of the meme, with satirical yet intellectual web sites such 
as “Feminist Ryan Gosling” spurring a global Internet discourse on 
“feminist memes.” Richard Dawkins is credited with inventing the 
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term “meme” to describe the nonteleological, evolutionary cultural 
process by which social symbols are formed, cross-fertilized, and re-
produced in new and diverse iterations of an original (or “genetic”) 
idea. Richard Rorty argued in turn, “Memes are things like turns of 
speech, terms of aesthetic or moral praise, political slogans, prov-
erbs, musical phrases, stereotypical icons, and the like.” Upholding 
the political relevance of Dawkins’s concept for a pragmatic con-
ception of feminism, Rorty explained that “different batches of . . . 
memes are carried by different human social groups, and so the 
triumph of one such group amounts to the triumph of those . . . 
memes.” Feminist memes can be understood as dominant clusters 
of public symbols that embody the political ideas and infl uence of 
the movement for women’s liberation as a group from conditions of 
patriarchal oppression.42
The comparative analysis of her international reception at the 
turn of the twentieth century shows how Wollstonecraft came to 
be such a feminist meme. Sidney Tarrow has argued that political 
symbols are a vital part of any social movement. I build on his theory 
in conceptualizing memes as a highly visible type of political symbol, 
around which a social movement such as feminism can be organized. 
People latch onto the meme in their responses to the cause at hand, 
and thereby associate the cause with the meme. Such a potent sym-
bol becomes shorthand for the movement at large and the ideas that 
drive it. Both negative and positive uses of the meme promote the 
growth of the movement by instigating debates, attracting attention 
to the cause, inspiring recruits to join, and endowing the group with 
an overarching sense of history and purpose.43
Wollstonecraft helped to fulfi ll these roles for the formation of 
modern feminism, by serving as a mimetic marker of the movement’s 
philosophical origins, its social consequences, and its radical politi-
cal aspirations. In their capacity as prominent feminist intellectuals, 
thinkers from Mott to Woolf utilized Wollstonecraft and her ideas as 
symbols in order to foster the authority, public appeal, and internal 
solidarity of their women’s movements. The turn of the twentieth 
century was the pivotal juncture at which the term “feminism” began 
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to be commonly used to describe women’s movements around the 
globe. It is also the historical moment at which women’s movements 
had evolved into highly sophisticated national and international-
level organizations. In the early decades of the twentieth century, 
women’s movements worldwide gained momentum toward realizing 
their reform agendas pertaining to women’s rights to education, vol-
untary motherhood, property ownership, divorce, suffrage, and safe 
labor conditions.44
In this crucible of the development of what have retrospectively 
been labeled “fi rst-wave” feminist movements, many intellectuals 
looked back to Wollstonecraft and her ideas to help ignite and unite 
each of their causes. There was a pattern of feminist interest in Woll-
stonecraft as a prescient model for independent womanhood, female 
sexual freedom, and egalitarian marriage as part of the broader cul-
ture of the women’s movement from 1900 to 1930, as shown in fa-
mous essays by the Russian émigré anarchist Emma Goldman, the 
American anthropologist Ruth Benedict, and the British modernist 
novelist Woolf. Although they made multiple memes of their com-
mon icon to fi t their particular national and political contexts, femi-
nist intellectuals deployed their respective images of Wollstonecraft 
in similar ways for similar reasons. In using Wollstonecraft’s persona 
and philosophy to both ground their movements in a historical start-
ing point and orient them toward common political goals, they gave 
these movements an overarching structure—a beginning, a middle, 
and an end. Just as Wollstonecraft used literature as a sympathetic 
mode for human rights advocacy, her fi rst-wave feminist followers 
appealed to her as a prophet, martyr, and dissenting voice of reason 
to craft an emotionally compelling narrative structure, or practical 
grounding and purpose, for their burgeoning reform movements.45
“My strongest incitement”: The Millian Marital Model
Mill also wrote a kind of feminist narrative that could serve as a 
practical and emotional grounding, or motivation, for women’s hu-
man rights advocacy. Like Wollstonecraft’s, his feminist narrative 
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was an (auto)biography about his self-development through the ex-
perience of charting a new path in love, outside the bounds of patri-
archal marriage. This (auto)biography was as much about him as it 
was about his spiritual marriage with Taylor. She played the role of 
Diotima to his Socrates, by guiding him, he professed, to “enlarge 
and exalt my conceptions of the highest worth of a human being.” 
As he put it in the 1859 dedication to On Liberty, his (extra)marital 
relationship with Harriet was “my strongest incitement” to write not 
only this great work of political philosophy, but to write his own life 
down, to make his own life worth reading. She provided the neces-
sary reason for writing at all. As he shared in an early draft of his 
Autobiography: “The poetic elements of her character, which were 
at the time the most ripened, were naturally those which impressed 
me fi rst, and those years were, in respect of my own development, 
mainly years of poetic culture.” His immersion in her “poetic cul-
ture” gave him the chance to achieve in his later years a “purely liter-
ary life . . . which continued to be occupied in a preeminent degree 
with politics.” With his posthumously published Autobiography, Mill 
fully merged the literary life of the writer with the political life of 
the public servant. Most signifi cantly for his women’s human rights 
advocacy, he used the Autobiography and the dedication to On Liberty 
to champion the example of his “friend and wife,” who steered him 
to see the importance of “giving full freedom to human nature to 
expand itself in innumerable and confl icting directions.”46
Mill’s Autobiography and Taylor’s few remaining private letters to 
him recalled how they became acquainted, at a dinner party in her 
home, in the winter of 1830–31. The two intellectuals faced a moral 
crisis soon thereafter. Because they unexpectedly fell in love, the 
question arose: What were their obligations to Harriet’s husband, 
John Taylor, and the three children she had borne in that still youth-
ful marriage? In 1833, Harriet followed John Taylor’s advice and 
took a retreat from both relationships. During this separation, she 
corresponded with Mill, imploring him to share more of his feelings, 
and his deeper sense of self, with her. On 6 September 1833, she 
sent a letter to him at the India House, where he worked: “The most 
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horrible feeling I ever know is when for moments the fear comes 
over me that nothing which you say of yourself [is to be] absolutely 
relied on. That you are not sure even of your strongest feelings. Tell 
me again this is not.” This emotional imperative, for Mill to both 
know himself and share himself, found its philosophical parallel in 
the Autobiography’s portrait of her character at this critical juncture: 
“Her unselfi shness was not that of a taught system of ethics, but of a 
heart which thoroughly identifi ed itself with the feelings of others, 
and often went to excess in consideration for them, by imaginatively 
investing their feelings with the intensity of its own.” In the moral 
allegory of the Autobiography, Taylor represented the virtues of love 
and sympathy, and their power to inspire “a lovingness ever ready to 
pour itself forth upon any or all human beings who were capable of 
giving the smallest feeling in return.” Mill offered himself as a model 
of the latter, emotionally meager, kind of human being, whose capa-
bility for expressing feeling was enriched over time by refl ecting on 
the virtues of the woman he called, in an early draft of the Autobiog-
raphy, his “main instructor.”47
The complex outcome of the twenty-six-year-old Harriet’s medi-
tation on the state of her marriage was to choose Mill with her heart 
but to remain Taylor’s devoted wife, with all the propriety of a mar-
ried woman in Victorian Britain. She established a residence  separate 
from her husband, where she met privately with Mill on evenings 
and weekends. She and Mill also took long vacations together. She 
never let her extended family beyond her husband know of the de-
tails of this arrangement. She continued to raise her children with 
Taylor at their home. Yet she involved Mill in educating her daughter 
Helen, who often resided and traveled with her mother. After her 
mother’s death in 1858, Helen took on Harriet’s role as intellectual 
collaborator by substantially assisting Mill with the production of his 
Autobiography and Subjection of Women for publication.48
In this highly irregular familial arrangement, Harriet had her 
share of diffi cult choices. But each choice illuminated the moral 
primacy of love and sympathy for others within her practical and 
caring, not abstract and taught, “system of ethics.” In March 1849, 
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Harriet wrote to her husband, John, to say that “nothing but a feel-
ing of right would prevent my returning at once” to care for him 
in his terminal cancer. Yet it was precisely such a “feeling of right” 
that led her to choose to nurse her partner Mill, who was rendered 
blind by illness, for three weeks that winter. In a letter to Mill later 
that year, she confi ded how her hospice care for her husband was a 
salve to her conscience. This intensive and giving practice of marital 
love allowed Harriet to “set against extreme sadness & the constant 
acute sense of being in an utterly false position.” The act of loving 
both men helped her to interpret her fi delity as both capacious and 
unquestionable: she could love Mill enough to nurse him in his time 
of need, while choosing to care for John when he and their family 
needed her most.49
Harriet Taylor took the time to instruct Mill in the sympathetic 
basis for ethics while at John’s sickbed. After Mill made the blunt 
and thoughtless suggestion that she should think of someone other 
than her patient, she wrote back with force: “Good God sh[ould] 
you think it a relief to think of somebody else some acquaintance or 
what not while I was dying?” A modern and feminist Diotima, Har-
riet sought to teach Mill that real love (including their relationship) 
ought not to be selfi shly focused on any particular person or set of 
people but rather be generously dispersed toward those who needed 
it. To cement this moral fact in Mill’s mind, she wrote of her dying 
husband, John: “There is nothing on earth I would not do for him 
& there is nothing in earth which can be done / do not write.” This 
last imperative—“do not write”—marked the sacredness of her bond 
with John alongside her loving commitment to Mill and the learning 
process of his self-development as a sympathetic human being.50
Taylor’s encouragement of Mill to know, share, and critically in-
terpret himself in the context of his relationships shaped both the 
content and the direction of his Autobiography. It became as much the 
story of his self-development as a biography of a large and compli-
cated family. In 1854, Harriet wrote to Mill regarding his writing of 
“the Life”: “Should there not be a summary of our relationship from 
its commencement in 1830—I mean given in a dozen lines—so 
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as to preclude other and different versions of our lives.” While she 
thought this (auto)biographical exercise would be an “edifying pic-
ture for those poor wretches who cannot conceive friendship but in 
sex,” her ultimate “reason for wishing it done” was their right as a 
couple to tell their “own” story. Vindicating a basic human right to 
self-interpretation and self-expression, especially in matters of the 
heart, she argued that “every ground should be occupied by ourselves 
on our own subject.” The subject of their own lives was the practi-
cal and emotional “ground” they ought to occupy as authors of “the 
Life” they wished to share as a moral example with others.51
Paying tribute to his wife’s intersubjective methods, Mill wrote in 
his Autobiography that he “settled” into a “purely literary,” yet none-
theless “practical” and robustly political, life after Harriet died of ill-
ness in 1858. With his 1859 dedication to On Liberty, he represented 
his magnum opus to the world as the philosophical product of their 
spiritual marriage and intellectual collaboration. In the Autobiogra-
phy he reinforced his interpretation of the book’s expected longevity 
and value for humanity by describing its origins in his complex and 
confl icted marriage: “The conjunction of her mind with mine has 
rendered it a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth, which 
the changes progressively taking place in modern society tend to 
bring out into ever stronger relief: the importance, to man and so-
ciety, of a large variety in types of character, and of giving full free-
dom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and confl ict-
ing directions.” Just as the “conjunction” of their minds led to their 
“fusion” into the material form of the book On Liberty, their nearly 
thirty-year (extra)marital relationship was the rich ethical site for 
the treatise’s mandate of free, full, and “confl icting” directions for 
human self-development.52
In the Autobiography, Mill connected his grief for the “irreparable 
loss” of Harriet with his growing hunger for writing and other kinds 
of political action in his remaining years. One of his (or rather, “my”) 
“earliest cares” in life without Harriet was to “print and publish” On 
Liberty, in order to “consecrate it to her memory.” He credited Har-
riet with inspiring his “literary life” and, most important, his self-
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development into a human being who thought himself capable of 
independent, creative, caring, yet capaciously ethical thought. Their 
relationship(s) had taught him that he was much more than “an inter-
preter of original thinkers, and mediator between them and the pub-
lic.” He was in fact an original thinker, in ethical realms well beyond 
the comforting certainties of logic and science, whose writings had 
tremendous moral import for humanity’s present and future. The 
posthumously published Autobiography became his literary tribute to 
Harriet and their relationships’ shaping of his self-understanding as 
an author of a political kind of literature. As with Wollstonecraft’s, 
the infl uence of Mill’s political literature was vast. The Autobiography, 
but perhaps even more effectively his world-renowned dedication to 
On Liberty, pointed to the deep familial roots of the global problem 
of patriarchy. The power of these texts lay in their proposal of a prac-
tical yet imaginative and intensely empathetic solution to patriarchy: 
a new model of marriage, based on “the Life” itself.53
Millian Marriage Goes Global
Mill’s dedication to On Liberty begins: “To the beloved and de-
plored memory of her who was the inspirer, and in part the author, 
of all that is best in my writings.” The instant global success of On 
Liberty made this tribute matter almost everywhere. By Mill’s death 
in 1873, the book had appeared in multiple English editions plus 
German, Polish, French, Dutch, Russian, and Japanese translations. 
The treatise’s strikingly personal inscription consequently became 
Mill’s most important (auto)biographical tribute to Harriet and their 
marriage to be published during his lifetime.54
According to the dedication, it was in Harriet’s roles as Mill’s 
“friend and wife” that she modeled to him an “exalted sense of truth.” 
The author marked the absolute loss of her death alongside the en-
during meaning of her life with a triumphant triple negative: he was 
left bereft yet grateful, as he found himself alone, “unprompted and 
unassisted” by her “all but unrivalled wisdom.” On Liberty thus had 
to be the best political work he could have hoped to write, because its 
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muse was “buried in her grave.” This paratext to On Liberty claimed 
Taylor to be its author as much as Mill.55
By legitimating Taylor as the true and complete partner of Mill, 
the dedication resurrected her and their collaborative marriage as 
feminist political symbols for a broad and gender-inclusive audience. 
By emphasizing his debt to his “friend and wife,” Mill challenged his 
fellow male intellectuals to sympathetically refl ect on this marital 
model as clearing a path in the wilderness for personal and public 
liberty and happiness. His female readers, on the other hand, could 
fi nd in his depiction of Taylor the promise of a new kind of marriage 
in which women would be fi rst moral and intellectual equals along-
side men and secondly wives and mothers.56
Around the same time as writers from New York to Buenos Aires 
to Prague made Wollstonecraft into an international feminist meme, 
Mill (and his marriage) became a widespread literary model for a 
practical kind of feminist political philosophy. He built his 1873 Au-
tobiography around his conception of himself as ethically and intel-
lectually transformed by his relationship with Taylor. His (or their) 
“Life” was translated into at least seven languages before 1900. While 
the dedication of On Liberty strongly alluded to their marriage, the 
Autobiography fl eshed out Harriet and John Taylor’s “Life” in much 
of its messy complexity. The near-global issuing of The Subjection 
of Women, often with substantial biographical and philosophical in-
troductions by indigenous intellectuals, also contributed to the in-
ternationalization of the Taylor-Mill marital model. Together, these 
three texts provided their readers and commentators further reason 
and inspiration to follow Mill in the symbolic appropriation of his 
relationship with Taylor for their own feminist philosophical and 
political projects.
The non–Western European reception of the Millian marital 
model shows how such symbolic representations of human relation-
ships can pass a practical and emotional test of cultural translation. 
The rootedness of such ideas in a particular time, place, culture, and 
set of personal circumstances is not an intractable obstacle to their 
cross-cultural meanings. A comparison of more than a century’s 
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worth of Indian, Czech, Japanese, and Korean responses to the Mil-
lian marital model illustrates its value as a morally responsible moti-
vation for women’s human rights advocacy, then and now.
As we saw in chapter 4, Govind Vasudev Kanitkar was the colonial 
subjudge and Brahmin liberal reformer who translated The Subjec-
tion of Women into his native Marathi in 1902. His poorly educated 
child bride, Kashibai, was only nine, and he only sixteen, when they 
were betrothed according to the customs of their Hindu community 
in 1870. Although they were devoted to one another and a joint set 
of moral and political values, Kashibai and Govind’s marriage was 
always clouded and troubled by its origins in the patriarchal power 
structures of their families. As one of the fi rst women to publically 
advocate for reform of child marriage via the Age of Consent Bill in 
1891, Kashibai became one of the most famous indigenous feminists 
in Indian history. Her Autobiography and other life writings are in one 
sense the mirror image of Mill’s: they charted the complicated prac-
tice of a new model of companionate marriage, similarly hindered by 
patriarchal traditions, yet spoke from a woman’s perspective of irre-
vocable personal loss as a result of such unjust social structures.57
In an undated essay on her early education, Kashibai wrote of how 
Govind pushed her to learn English by introducing the recently pub-
lished ideas of Mill’s Subjection of Women to her: “As far as English 
was concerned ‘he’ had explained to me John Stuart Mill’s On the 
Subjection of Women. Although I became acquainted with the book, I 
had not studied it systematically. I could not even read it. Sometimes 
‘he’ explained it to me and said, ‘You are not destined to read this 
book. You will not learn enough English to read it in this lifetime.’ 
At this time I made a vow that, in this very life, I would translate one 
page of this book without help.” Kashibai impersonally, even coldly, 
used the third person to refer to her husband’s role in her attainment 
of English literacy. Her even colder use of quotation marks (“he”) 
belied the emotional diffi culties that arose from the practical asym-
metries in their arranged marriage. Yet she still credited him with 
teaching her how to write biographies in English, and with provid-
ing editorial and translation assistance as her literary career moved 
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forward: “He is the sole reason I have acquired the ability to write a 
book now. Even if I shod him in shoes made of my own skin, and did 
so for the next seven lives, this debt would not be repaid.” The high 
price of her education was dutiful domestic service and childrear-
ing, or, as she gruesomely imagined: making shoes for her husband 
out of her own skin. The self-abnegation implicit in this dehumaniz-
ing metaphor suggests that Kashibai felt their relationship, however 
progressive by current Brahmin standards, never fully escaped the 
patterns of domination and disrespect that characterized patriarchal 
marriages of their time.58
Kashibai was painfully aware of her husband’s preference for fair-
skinned women, which her darker coloring never fi tted. She was 
also beset by his projection of (white and British) Taylor as an ideal 
spouse. Govind framed his 1902 foreword to The Subjection of Women 
with praise of Mill and his collaboration with his “superb” wife. It 
promoted a Romantic-liberal vision of Indian women educated in 
the style of Taylor to become the intellectual companions of their 
husbands. Govind’s conciliatory liberal approach to colonial reform 
allowed for Indian women to become chaste and domesticated Har-
riet Taylors, but not fully independent women with strong identities 
beyond their marital roles.59
Much like Govind, Kashibai perceived the value of life writing for 
political reform, especially among those colonized peoples who had 
reason to be cautious in their claims for change. Composing a biog-
raphy of the fi rst female Maharashtran medical doctor, Anandibai 
Joshee, led her to consider the practical limitations of using histories 
of exemplary women to promote the cause of women’s human rights. 
Kashibai instead pragmatically theorized the value of fl attering men 
in the process of celebrating great women for the sake of feminist 
reform: “Instead of lauding women who have been thus improved we 
should praise men who have improved the condition of such women. 
Women, just like men, possess capability and rationality. But their 
capability fi nds no outlet.” Even as Kashibai insisted “a woman’s bi-
ography be written by a woman,” she realistically assessed the need 
for women to gain favor of the men in power who controlled ac-
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cess to education, literacy, and the press itself. At stake in this set of 
trade-offs was the future realization of women’s “capability and ra-
tionality” via the granting and exercise of human rights to education 
and political participation. Her feminist utopian fantasy novel, The 
Palanquin Tassel (written between 1897 and 1928), envisioned such a 
future, in which an Indian female political leader established equal 
economic rights for the sexes in quasi-Millian fashion. The novel 
moved even further beyond Mill in proposing the justice of equal 
descriptive (gender-based) parliamentary representation.60
In the lived reality of their marriage, the practice of the principle 
of equal respect remained elusive for Kashibai and Govind. They 
were separated during the last few years before he died in 1918. Deep 
disputes and disturbing emotions drove them apart: her religious 
turn to Theosophy against his wishes, and their mutual yet alienat-
ing grief over the devastating loss of a child. As the surviving spouse, 
Kashibai took a Millian path in serving as a leader in postcolonial 
Indian feminist-democratic politics. Also like Mill in his later “liter-
ary” and “political” years, Kashibai Kanitkar wrote her own post-
humously published autobiography as a testament to the enduring 
meaning of her (and her husband’s) own imperfect personal struggles 
toward realization of the “capability and rationality” of humankind.
Another prominent pair of married intellectuals, in turn-of-the-
twentieth-century Prague, fared better than the Kanitkars in prac-
ticing the Millian marital model in their personal lives. Charlotte 
Garrigue Masaryk was the American wife of the Czech philosophy 
professor Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. She translated and also likely 
penned the anonymous introduction to the 1890 Czech edition of 
Mill’s Subjection of Women. The Masaryks had courted by reading The 
Subjection of Women together, so the introduction likely represented 
a collaborative synthesis of their feminist views, just as Mill’s book 
was the product of decades of intellectual collaboration with his wife, 
Harriet. Tomáš became a noted Millian feminist lecturer in turn-of-
the-century Prague. As the fi rst president of Czechoslovakia in 1920, 
he proudly oversaw the political incorporation of women as equal 
citizens in the new republic.61
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The Masaryks’ appropriation of the Millian marital model appears 
to have been both privately happy for them and eventually publicly 
benefi cial insofar as they led the battle for the enfranchisement of 
Czech women. As highly privileged, Western-educated members 
of the elite, however, they did not face the same obstacles to these 
goals as their contemporaries on another continent, the Kanitkars. 
Colonization and patriarchy were forces felt more in theory than in 
practice by the Masaryks. The Masaryks’ international yet egalitar-
ian marriage combined with Tomáš’s Eastern European background 
likely aided their rooted cosmopolitan appropriation of Mill and 
Taylor for themselves and their national politics.
Charlotte’s 1890 foreword emphasized the political relevance of 
Mill’s book on women’s rights for “Czech literature” and culture: 
“The translation of Subjection of Women is the introduction of Mill 
into our literature. With great joy we hope that this man’s ideas, 
which so greatly infl uenced his contemporaries, will have the same 
benefi cial effect also on us.” Charlotte thus presented Mill as a 
highly salient philosophical source for rethinking and reforming 
women’s status along egalitarian lines in the contemporary Czech 
context. Her foreword alluded to the signifi cance of Mill’s Autobiog-
raphy for understanding the impact of his marriage for the writing 
of the arguments in The Subjection of Women. Taylor was more than 
a wife but rather someone with whom Mill had cultivated a lifelong 
“genuine friendship.” “Mrs. Taylor” was a “great infl uence on his 
work” but especially “for the conception of the immense practical 
implications of the subjection of women.” It was on the latter issue 
that Mill “drew upon his wife’s guidance” in crafting his pivotal trea-
tise on the topic.62
Charlotte Masaryk brought Mill into “Czech literature” via her 
translation of and biographical introduction to The Subjection of 
Women with the aim of “refreshing, relaxing, and uplifting” the 
“spirit” of the Czech people. Of all the texts by Mill she could have 
been the fi rst to give to the Czechs, she chose the book that had 
most deeply shaped her as an individual and as a married woman. 
Mill’s feminist liberalism, for the Masaryks, was a kind of practical 
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philosophy to be lived out in love and politics, much as Harriet and 
John once had done.63
The 1921 Japanese introduction to The Subjection of Women, pub-
lished in Tokyo in 1923, shows the growing non-Western salience of 
Wollstonecraft, Mill, and Taylor as personally compelling symbols 
for an international feminism. Ōuchi Hyōe (1888–1980) was the 
German-educated Japanese translator of this edition. Mill’s political 
philosophy, especially his On Liberty but also his feminist ideas, had 
been robustly debated in Japan since the downfall of the Tokugawa 
shogunate and the transition to the Meiji regime in 1867. Ōuchi pro-
vided the fi rst complete and literal translation of The Subjection of 
Women into his native language. His 1921 introduction underscored 
the emotional impact of the book on the rise of feminism world-
wide: “Since its publication, it has been widely read in all the West-
ern countries, and for a long time has been called ‘the Bible of the 
Women’s Suffrage Movement,’ and it has served as source of spirit 
and power for those who have participated in the movement.” Ōuchi 
mentioned Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman as an important precur-
sor to The Subjection of Women, then drew the conclusion that Mill’s 
work “cannot hold the honor of being the origin of women’s rights 
discourse, nor does it hold the special privilege of cornering the mar-
ket on a perfect women’s discourse.” In 1957, he put the point more 
strongly in a new edition of The Subjection of Women: it was “because 
of people like Condorcet and Wollstonecraft” that other people, 
particularly in France and England, began to advocate “for women’s 
equality.” As important as Mill became for international feminism, 
the groundwork for Japanese and other non-Western feminisms had 
been laid down by the French revolutionary generation.64
Ōuchi’s 1921 introduction dwelled on the signifi cance of Mill’s re-
lationship with Taylor for cultivating the emotional power and per-
suasiveness of his feminist arguments. Indirectly referencing the Au-
tobiography, Ōuchi described how Mill “expressed his sorrow at being 
separated from his wife, the object of his great passion; in death, she 
became the powerful motivating force that turned his lonely fi nal years 
into prolifi c ones.” Although he was skeptical of Mill’s  hagiographic 
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treatment of his wife, Ōuchi conceded the psychological force of this 
rhetorical and narrative move. As an intellectual historian, he under-
stood the subsequent intense concern with Taylor’s impact on Mill 
as integral to the global spread of Millian feminism itself: “Thus, to 
return to his wife in the establishment of this work is not unreason-
able, but in fact, is part of Mill’s own exaggerated feeling that his wife 
was a greater thinker than himself—and at times even greater a poet 
than Carlyle or Shelley.” The Taylor-Mill relationship was crucial 
for the “establishment” of The Subjection of Women as a canonical text 
for international feminism. The (auto)biographical depiction of this 
unusual marriage gave a Victorian British man’s abstract work of 
political philosophy a compelling personal history and origin story 
that could both cross borders and bridge generations.65
Soon thereafter, Takahashi Hisanori took exactly this personal ap-
proach to writing his (auto)biographical introduction to the selected 
political writings of Mill in Japanese. Published in Tokyo in 1928, 
this edition contained translations of On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and 
The Subjection of Women, alongside some of Jeremy Bentham’s works. 
Takahashi’s translator’s introduction to On Liberty was inserted be-
tween Mill’s dedication to Taylor and chapter 1 of the book itself. 
Takahashi’s introduction, like Mill’s dedication, functioned as a 
paratext that dictated the authority and authorship of On Liberty. 
Takahashi understood his authority as a translator as stemming from 
his rescuing of Mill’s meaning from loose and inaccurate Meiji-era 
translations in Japan after 1867. He represented this experience of 
literal translation as philosophically meaningful for himself as an em-
pirically oriented and logical thinker: “Mill bestowed on this transla-
tor a manner of inquiry for his everyday life.” Takahashi reinforced 
the parallel between Mill’s conception of himself as the translator of 
Taylor’s ideas for the world and his own historic role as a literal trans-
lator of Mill’s major political writings for modern Japanese culture, 
by treating the dedication to On Liberty as strong empirical evidence 
of Mill’s intellectual debt to his wife: “The extent of her infl uence 
on Mill is evident in his dedication page to her in On Liberty.” Taka-
hashi’s introduction revealed his attentive reading of Mill’s Autobiog-
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raphy. Much like both Ōuchi in his 1921 foreword to The Subjection 
of Women and Mill in the Autobiography itself, he portrayed the death 
of Taylor as a traumatic yet transformative psychological linchpin in 
Mill’s development as a political writer and activist: “Mill’s despair 
need not even be mentioned.”66
Forty years after he began his own translation of The Subjection of 
Women, Ōuchi wrote a new introduction for a corrected version of 
his 1921 edition undertaken by his thirty-three-year-old daughter-
in-law, the Tokyo University–educated economist Ōuchi Setsuko. 
In his 1957 introduction Ōuchi Hyōe was at once more biographical 
and more autobiographical. On the autobiographical side, he revealed 
his intellectual partnership with his daughter-in-law  Setsuko—a re-
lationship much like that of Mill and his stepdaughter Helen Taylor, 
who together had produced The Subjection of Women in the 1860s af-
ter Harriet’s death. He also provided a personal context for their re-
issuing of The Subjection of Women in Japanese: the devastating Great 
Kantō Earthquake of 1923 had destroyed most of the copies of his 
original edition. This national and personal tragedy gave them rea-
son to publish a revised edition several decades later.
Ōuchi also discussed the broader intellectual context of his ini-
tial reception of The Subjection of Women into Japanese after World 
War I: “At the time, I was a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance 
and being in such a position I could not but feel the waves of the 
democratic movements that were taking place in Japan in response to 
shifts in international intellectual circles. Thus, I joined those young 
economics students who had gathered under the tutelage of Takano 
Iwasaburō at Tokyo University and discussed such matters with 
them.” Each member of this group of young male intellectuals de-
cided to “translate a classic work of the West.” Preoccupied with the 
growth of capitalism, the group focused on economic texts. Ōuchi 
had been trained in Millian classical economics but chose to translate 
The Subjection of Women because of the emergence of a formal Japa-
nese women’s movement for suffrage after World War I. Also, he was 
interested in Mill as an immanent and progressive critic of “global 
capitalist economics,” because “he had at times questioned . . . the 
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limits of capitalism,” especially for social justice for women and 
the poor.67
On the biographical side, the 1957 introduction placed even greater 
emphasis on the nearly mythological story of the Mill- Taylor mar-
riage and its cross-cultural meaning for Japanese feminism: “From 
long ago, there are many tales of the meeting of the genius and the 
beauty. Even when the women’s movement occurred in Japan, a num-
ber of such stories were told. Above all, however, this tale was about 
the nineteenth century’s greatest economist on the one hand, and on 
the other an exceptional woman of London high society. That is why 
their romance remains a topic of interest among intellectual histori-
ans.” After citing F. A. Hayek’s 1951 book on Taylor and Mill, Ōuchi 
mentioned his own essay on their “romance” that he had published 
long ago in the January 1920 issue of the Japanese journal Warera 
(Us). He then implored his current readers to go back to neither of 
these commentaries but rather to Mill’s Autobiography itself, in order 
to understand the marriage’s literary signifi cance for Mill’s political 
thought.68
As with his 1921 foreword and Takahashi’s 1928 translator’s in-
troduction, Ōuchi in 1957 foregrounded the emotional impact of 
Taylor’s death on Mill’s later years as a writer: “Needless to say, 
Mill’s grief was great. He bought a small home in Avignon, in the 
south of France, where Mrs. Taylor died while traveling, and spent 
most of his remaining life there honoring her memory. The Liber-
ation of Women came to fruition in this place, at such a time, and 
was organized into its present form and sent out into the world.” 
Ōuchi’s  optimistic, forward-looking translation of the title of Mill’s 
1869 treatise (The Liberation of Women) fi tted into his biographical 
thesis that the loss of Taylor was not total for Mill but rather a tip-
ping point toward the reconstruction of himself and the emergent 
international feminist movement. As Ōuchi theorized in the spirit 
of chapter 4 of The Subjection of Women, “The liberation of women 
is the liberation of humanity. Human beings will be liberated as the 
great obstacle that thwarts the character development of half of their 
members is removed.” Writing eleven years after the formal grant-
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ing of equal rights to the sexes in the 1946 Japanese constitution, 
Ōuchi pushed his recently independent democracy to fully imple-
ment in culture the egalitarian principles implicit in its post–World 
War II (and post occupation) legal and political order.69
In another Asian country shaken by decades of war and Western 
occupation, a Korean edition of The Subjection of Women did not ap-
pear until 1986 in Seoul. As with several non–Western European 
readings of the text before it, the translator Ye-suk Kim’s introduc-
tion used the relationship of Mill and Taylor as a concrete basis for 
cultivating cross-cultural understanding of the treatise. Mill not only 
philosophically defended but also practiced in his personal life a 
“unisex mindset” or “harmonious mind” that incorporated “intellect, 
which was viewed as men’s virtue, and emotion, which was viewed as 
women’s virtue.” Building on Alice Rossi’s classic biography of Mill 
and Taylor, Kim judged this androgynous style of thought to “prob-
ably” arise from “his equal and productive relationship with Taylor, 
which was ahead of its time.”70
Pyŏng-hun Sŏ’s introduction to the 2006 Seoul edition of The 
Subjection of Women shored up the translation’s relevance for con-
temporary Korean feminist activism by way of a political reading 
of Mill’s Autobiography. After discussing Mill’s life and especially his 
relationship with Taylor, Sŏ upheld Mill as a model of personal au-
thenticity. This authenticity, moreover, served as an affective basis 
for effective social and political reform: “The reader of this book 
will easily sympathize with Mill’s authenticity. It is impressive how 
Mill stood against the society which regarded subjugation of women 
natural, and demonstrated his belief bravely and with confi dence.” 
Speaking to contemporary readers in South Korea, the translator 
encouraged them to “sympathize” with Mill on the grounds that he 
challenged entrenched gender norms in his traditionalistic society. 
His late-life activism, propelled by his enduring love of his dead wife, 
was all the more courageous for its refusal to accept his society’s lim-
iting, patriarchal views of propriety and the public-private distinc-
tion. Writing from within a twenty-fi rst-century South Korean so-
ciety with persistent patriarchal norms, Sŏ annotated The  Subjection 
Y6872.indb   243 1/6/16   10:38:09 AM
H U M A N  S T O R I E S
244
of Women in order to encourage contemporary Korean feminists to 
take inspiration from Mill’s “authentic” approach to women’s hu-
man rights advocacy as much as to urge a broader Korean reader-
ship to recognize this book as “the authoritative classic of feminism” 
worldwide. Perhaps with a silent nod to Mill’s collaboration with 
his stepdaughter, Helen Taylor, on the composition of The Subjec-
tion of Women, Sŏ’s analysis of the treatise concluded with a personal 
disclosure: “I am glad that my daughter Ji-Eun, who just started an 
undergraduate degree in her university, read this book.”71
In the School of Wollstonecraft and Mill
As one of the most prominent intellectuals to face death threats, 
persecution, and exile for his writing on human rights issues, the 
British Indian novelist and memoirist Salman Rushdie has defended 
a political conception of literary traditions. As he puts it in his recent 
third-person memoir of his years in hiding under the alias Joseph 
Anton: literature “encouraged understanding, sympathy, and identi-
fi cation with people not like oneself” when “the world was pushing 
everyone in the opposite direction.” For Rushdie, as for Wollstone-
craft and Mill before him, literature and especially (auto)biographi-
cal writing had the power to elicit a sense of solidarity among people. 
This solidarity could serve as an emotional motive for a rooted yet 
responsible human rights ethic.72
Wollstonecraft’s rational theology and Mill’s secular liberal utili-
tarianism represent two, if not the two most infl uential, philosophical 
foundations for justifying women’s human rights. Yet Wollstonecraft, 
Mill, and their international followers saw the practical insuffi ciency 
of such abstract rational justifi cations for persuading people to join 
their moral and political cause. An affective basis for women’s human 
rights claims was necessary if people were to be moved to carry the 
claims forward into their cultures and laws. Rational justifi cations 
for women’s human rights may productively work in tandem with 
emotional motivations for the same cause. Through their inter na-
tional reception, Wollstonecraft’s and Mill’s (auto)biographical writ-
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ings gave diverse readers the right motives to write themselves and 
their peoples into the literature of human rights. Learning from this 
history, as well as from contemporary feminist theory, philosophers 
and other writers may fi nd further ways to reconcile “rational” and 
“sentimental” approaches to defending and alleging the rights of 
humans.73
In his 1993 Oxford Amnesty lectures, Rorty made a plea for “long, 
sad, sentimental” stories to be seen as the most effective tools for 
teaching the powerful that the powerless also deserve human rights. 
His primary example was Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 1852 novel Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, which persuaded many white Americans to care about 
the antislavery cause in the antebellum United States. I offer two ad-
dendums to this important point, one historical and the other philo-
sophical. First, Wollstonecraft, Mill, and other feminist thinkers to 
the present day have successfully used both rational philosophical 
justifi cations and sentimental literary narratives to argue for the rec-
ognition of universal human rights. Second, feminist philosophers 
are rightly sensitive to the fact that women have often been denied 
status as human beings because of their supposed lack of reason. To 
dismiss rational approaches to justifying women’s human rights in 
favor of purely “sentimental” modes of persuasion may perniciously 
reinforce the gender prejudices that feminist philosophy seeks to 
under cut in the fi rst place. Finding ways of balancing appeals to rea-
son and emotion in women’s human rights advocacy is thus a defi n-
ing practical task and tradition of feminist philosophy.74
Feeling passionate deliveries of arguments for human rights, audi-
ences gain the power to use their imaginations to draw, from these 
wrongs of the past, a set of reasons for establishing rights for women 
and other humans in the present and future. The relationship be-
tween speaker and audience generates a dialogical and narrative 
framework for women’s human rights advocacy. In the beginning, 
there are the wrongs done to women. In the middle, there is the al-
legation of a human right not to suffer such wrongs, and the hearing 
of and response to that voice in the wilderness. In the end, there is 
the psychological, cultural, and legal realization of a universal human 
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rights ethic that recognizes the equalities as much as the differences 
between the sexes.75
Spivak argued that such a communal rewrite of the conditions for 
social justice depends on a “transaction between the speaker and 
the listener.” Otherwise, the subaltern cannot speak (in voice or any 
other action), because they have not yet been heard. Spivak made an 
ethical distinction between speaking and talking. Speaking requires 
a dialogical relationship in which one is heard; talking may be mere 
utterance. Speaking need not be vocal but may be any kind of action 
(writing, leadership) that elicits a hearing or response from others. 
In her stirring refl ection on the ancient religious practice of satı̄ (the 
self-immolation of grieving widows) in her native India, Spivak used 
the example of these self-sacrifi cing women to illustrate the complex-
ity of the problem of oppression. She did not aim to speak for these 
widows but rather to convey the diffi culty of their struggle within 
colonial and patriarchal social structures. In so doing she rewrote the 
story of her fellow Indian women’s suffering in a new postcolonial 
frame, which has since inspired others to better hear and respond to 
the voices of the subaltern in general.76
To make ethical claims for women’s human rights requires a seri-
ous concern with the context for the claims themselves. The feminist 
advocate must train her eye like a good novelist, getting a sense of 
the social setting for patterns of injustice toward women. With this 
setting described in detail, the feminist advocate may endow even the 
most radical and risible claims for the rights of women with an in-
ner, and richly literary, logic: as allegations based on the past, made 
in the present, and oriented toward the future, they at least can be 
understood as having a beginning, a middle, and an end. This narra-
tive structure also endows these claims with the rhetorical  potential 
to pose what Amartya Sen calls “wrathful” and “rational” arguments. 
From Wollstonecraft to MacKinnon, we hear moral outrage that 
emotionally reinforces what is rationally graspable as right for all 
humans. Wollstonecraft cried out against the sexual exploitation of 
women in the patriarchal marriages of her time as destructive to hu-
manity as such. MacKinnon begs us to confront the atrocity of the 
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genocidal rape of women as a crime against humanity itself. In each 
case, their wrathful reasoning pushed others in power, often men like 
Mill, to reform domestic and international laws and other cultural 
norms as a step toward institutionalizing women’s human rights to 
not be raped in marriage and to not be raped in war.77
Given that many people do not respect others, and have been so-
cialized not to respect those who are different or less powerful than 
them, feminist ethicists such as Nussbaum have hypothesized the 
moral preferences that human beings would have if they in lived in 
respect-enhancing social conditions. With these ideal moral prefer-
ences in mind—such as appreciation of the equal dignity of human 
beings—theorists in the “women’s rights are human rights” move-
ment have articulated the ethical conditions for developing the sense 
of solidarity necessary to support and grow the cause. This idea of a 
global feminist solidarity challenges the binaries and barriers between 
North and South, East and West while encouraging attention to the 
differences that give rise to internationally recognized women’s hu-
man rights. Hirschmann has put it simply and clearly: the differences 
between women are the occasion for the theoretical argumentation of 
their rights. Listening, narration, questioning, and free discussion are 
a set of discursive practices that push people toward mutual respect 
of both their moral equality and their bodily/social differences.78
Joining the chorus of those interested in proceeding from the 
fact of difference and inequality, social scientists have demonstrated 
that there are many practical asymmetries between the sexes that 
are verifi ably bad for women. Sen’s landmark economic studies of 
the systematic malnutrition of girls and women and the widespread 
practice of female-selective abortion have given grave examples of 
objectively bad practices of sexual discrimination. Although eco-
nomics and political science have done much to identify these is-
sues and propose effective strategies for “removing manifest causes 
of injustice,” part of the task of addressing unjust inequalities is not 
scientifi c but moral.79
The moral virtue of courage is often demanded of those who con-
front, in social and political reality, injustice toward girls and women. 
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In the same year as the 220th anniversary of the Rights of Woman, the 
Taliban shot fourteen-year-old Malala Yousafzai of Pakistan in the 
head for her public advocacy of the right of girls to education. Malala 
bravely chose to symbolically situate herself, via Internet videos and 
blogging, as a living example of the right of girls to primary and 
secondary schooling despite the dominant views of a violent and pa-
triarchal religious group. UNESCO has reported that in her home 
country “over three million girls” are “out of school” and “nearly half 
of all rural females have never attended school.” As she has recovered 
and recommitted herself to her political activism, Malala is a highly 
visible reminder of the fact that girls and women continue to need 
the institutionalization of the rights that their arguments seek to al-
lege, defend, and extend. Before the United Nations in July 2013, 
she beseeched children around the world, “Let us pick up our books 
and our pens, they are our most powerful weapons” in the ongoing 
fi ght for the universal right to “free, mandatory” basic education. 
Her heroism in fi ghting for the right to education for all children 
was recognized in 2014, when she became the youngest person ever 
to win the Nobel Peace Prize.80
Malala’s courage is extraordinary, but she is also just another girl, 
with fl aws like any other person. Her strong positioning of her pol-
itics against the Taliban introduced a strain of antifundamentalist 
rhetoric to her speeches and writings, which angered her enemies. 
She risked losing her hard-won image as a peacemaker who seeks to 
reconcile her Muslim faith with feminism, especially among funda-
mentalist followers of Islam. Even as it is read around the world, her 
autobiography has been banned in private girls’ and boys’ schools in 
Pakistan. Malala’s personal yet political predicament shows both the 
enduring promise and the real diffi culties of women’s human rights 
advocacy. In the school of Wollstonecraft and Mill, one learns by 
personal trial as much as by human error, but ultimately one learns 
to better defend the human rights of women.81
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zory, XII), tr. Anna Holmová (Prague, 1904), vi, xvi, translation by 
Irena Cajkova.
 39. Mrs. Humphrey Ward, The Testing of Diana Mallory, in Harper’s Maga-
zine 116 (December 1907), 905; “A Voice in the Wilderness,” Votes for 
Women 5 (29 March 1912), 212.
 40. Jacob Bouten, Mary Wollstonecraft and the Beginnings of Female Eman-
cipation in France and England (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, [1922] 
1975), 8; Raymond Birn, Crisis, Absolutism, Revolution: Europe and the 
World, 1648–1789 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 389; 
Virginia Woolf, The Second Common Reader (New York: Houghton Mif-
fl in Harcourt, [1932] 2003), 163.
 41. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sover-
eignty, tr. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985), 36; James Darsey, The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in 
America (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 34.
 42. Michelle Kort, “Ryan Gosling, Feminist Scholar,” Ms. Magazine Blog, 
14 October 2011. Accessed 3 January 2012 at http://msmagazine.com /
blog/blog/2011/10/14/ryan-gosling-feminist-scholar/; Richard Daw-
kins, The Selfi sh Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1976] 2006), 
192, 322; Richard Rorty, “Feminism and Pragmatism,” in Feminist Inter-
pretations of Richard Rorty, ed. Marianne Janack (University Park: Penn 
State University Press, 2010), 22; Offen, European Feminisms, 19–20; 
Offen, ed., Globalizing Feminisms, xxix–xxxiv.
Y6872.indb   288 1/6/16   10:38:11 AM
289
N O T E S  T O  P A G E S  2 2 7 — 3 3
 43. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, 
and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 118–34.
 44. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism, 3, 14; Offen, European Femi-
nisms, 19, 144 –81.
 45. Clare Hemings, Why Stories Matter: The Political Grammar of Feminist 
Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 33–34; Alice Wexler, 
“Emma Goldman on Mary Wollstonecraft,” Feminist Studies 7:1 (Spring 
1981), 113–33; Gordon, Vindication, 451. Following convention, I use 
the term “fi rst-wave” to describe feminist arguments and activism prior 
to the post–World War II revival of the women’s movement. For the 
origin of the term “fi rst-wave feminism,” see Marsha Lear, “The Sec-
ond Feminist Wave,” New York Times Magazine, 10 March 1968, 24.
 46. Mill, On Liberty, in CW, vol. 18, 217; Mill, Autobiography, in CW, vol. 1, 
198, 259, 264.
 47. Taylor Mill, Complete Works, 328; Mill, Autobiography, in CW, vol. 1, 
195–96.
 48. Jo Ellen Jacobs and Paula Harms Payne, “Introduction” and “To John 
Stuart Mill,” in Taylor Mill, Complete Works, 12–35, 320–23.
 49. Taylor Mill, “To John Stuart Mill,” in Complete Works, 355, 439.
 50. Ibid., 360, 370.
 51. Ibid., 375.
 52. Mill, Autobiography, in CW, vol. 1, 264. For Mill, it would be a cosmic 
irony if indeed Harriet died of syphilis contracted from her husband 
John Taylor, who, like many middle-class men of his time, probably 
used prostitutes before his marriage at thirty to his eighteen-year-old 
wife. It would be doubly ironic if indeed the diagnosis of syphilis drove 
her away from John toward Mill, yet led her to prohibit sexual inter-
course with either man. Near the end of his life, Mill defended the 
rights of prostitutes to bodily integrity against overweening legal and 
medical interventions for the sake of preventing the spread of vene-
real disease. For a discussion of the possible reasons for Harriet’s illness 
and death, and their implications for her relationships, see Jacobs and 
Payne, “Introduction,” xxxi. See also Jeremy Waldron, “Mill on Liberty 
and on the Contagious Diseases Acts,” in J. S. Mill’s Political Thought, 
ed. Urbinati and Zakaras, 11– 42. Mill, Autobiography, in CW, vol. 1, 
199, 259.
 53. Mill, Autobiography, in CW, vol. 1, 252, 261.
 54. Mill, On Liberty, in CW, vol. 18, 217.
Y6872.indb   289 1/6/16   10:38:11 AM
290
N O T E S  T O  P A G E S  2 3 4 — 4 4
 55. Ibid.
 56. Ibid.
 57. Meera Kosambi, ed. and tr., Feminist Vision or “Treason against Men”? 
Kashibai Kanitkar and the Engendering of Marathi Literature (Ranikhet: 
Permanent Black, 2008), 4; Deshpande, “Kanitkar, Kashibai,” 5.
 58. Kosambi, Feminist Vision, 57, 61.
 59. Deshpande, “Kanitkar, Kashibai,” 4 –5; Kanitkar, “Preface,” 11.
 60. Kosambi, Feminist Vision, 60, 66, 325–26. As Kashibai Kanitkar sug-
gested, Mill’s economic feminism may be read as necessitating equal eco-
nomic opportunities for the sexes despite the fact that he did not always 
explicitly push his premises to this logical conclusion. Similarly, Nancy 
Hirschmann has made the case that Mill’s economic feminism justifi es 
pay for housewives’ productive yet traditionally unpaid domestic labor. 
See Nancy J. Hirschmann, “Mill, Political Economy, and Women’s 
Work,” American Political Science Review 102:2 (May 2008), 199–213.
 61. Melissa Feinberg, Elusive Equality: Gender, Citizenship, and the Limits 
of Democracy in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1950 (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 17.
 62. Charlotte Garrigue Masaryk, “John Stuart Mill”, in John Stuart Mill, 
Poddanství z̆en, tr. Charlotte Garrigue Masaryk (Prague, 1890), 171–75, 
especially 175, translation by Irena Cajkova.
 63. Ibid.
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Ōuchi Hyōe, 239– 40, 241– 43
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